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Abstract

All people rely upon water for life. Indigenous peoples are especially vulnerable to water
conflicts and yet lack recognition in international water law. This thesis adopts Critical
Race Theory to examine the intersection between transboundary water law, the doctrine
of sovereignty and the international law of Indigenous peoples. The methodology
adopted in this thesis includes: (i) a deconstruction of the UN Watercourse Convention
and the doctrine of sovereignty; (ii) a review of Indigenous perspectives on sovereignty;
and (iii) a proposal for the reconstruction of transboundary water law in a manner that
recognizes the internationally affirmed rights of Indigenous peoples.
A deconstruction of the UN Watercourse Convention and related discourse reveals that
state-centric approaches to transboundary water law fail to recognize Indigenous peoples’
international rights or the pivotal role that Indigenous peoples’ traditional knowledge
might play in transcending conflict. Case examples are provided (Columbia River and
Tsangpo-Brahmaputra River) that illustrate the vulnerability of Indigenous peoples in the
face of state development agreements. The inequities that exist in international water law
are rooted in the historical doctrine of sovereignty which has evolved to subordinate
Indigenous peoples’ interests to state interests.
Indigenous perspectives regarding sovereignty provide a counter-point to the dominant
legal discourse and weave an alternate narrative that challenges the myth of objectivity
and neutrality that surrounds the doctrine of sovereignty and international law generally.
Once we recognize that sovereignty is a social construct, we can recognize our collective
ability to reconstruct international laws in a manner that transcends the sovereign
discourse and recognizes the rights of Indigenous peoples. Endorsement of the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) is indicative of
states’ commitment to recognize Indigenous peoples’ rights throughout the international
legal system.
This thesis concludes by offering a proposal for reconstructing transboundary water law
through a return to ethics and coalition building. Future reform should be directed
towards (a) articulating an international water ethic with the critical engagement of
Indigenous peoples; and (b) ensuring that river basin organizations are established on
every transboundary river in a manner consistent with this shared international water
ethic.
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Chapter 1:

Introduction

Water is life's mater and matrix, mother and medium.
There is no life without water.1
Albert Szent-Gyorgyi
Fierce national competition over water resources has prompted fears that
water issues contain the seeds of violent conflict. If all the world's peoples
work together, a secure and sustainable water future can be ours.2
Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary General

1.1

Anticipating Water Conflict
Water is the world’s most precious resource. Water is life. All living beings

depend upon water for survival. As a growing global population relies upon dwindling
supplies of fresh potable water, conflict over how water is governed appears inevitable.
However, there is also an unprecedented opportunity for cooperation and reconciliation
as we come to terms with our interdependence and the fragility of our existence on this
planet.3 Given the paramount importance of water to our survival and the inevitability of
conflict over limited water resources, thoughtful governance strategies are required to
guide ethical human relationships regarding shared water. The need for effective
international water laws is especially pressing within the context of transboundary rivers:
rivers that flow through two or more sovereign states.

1

Albert Szent-Gyorgyi, Biochemist, Nobel Prize Winner, cited in Saskatchewan Watershed Authority,
“Celebrating and Conserving Water”, online: Saskatchewan Watershed Authority
<http://www.swa.ca/WaterConservation/default.asp?type=CelebratingWater>.
2
Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary General, cited in UN-Water, Transboundary Waters” UN International
Decade of Action, Water for Life 2005-2015, online: UN
<http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/transboundary_waters.shtml> [UN-Water].
3
Jeremy Rifkin, The Empathic Civilization: The Race to Global Consciousness in a World in Crisis
(Penguin Group: New York, 2009).

1

By their very nature, transboundary watercourses offer the potential to become
flashpoints for conflict or cooperation.4 International river basins are not constrained by
political boundaries and as such are potent reminders of the interconnectedness of our
global ecosystem as well as the inherent limitations of sovereignty as an organizing
principle of international water law.5

States and local communities can either compete

for limited resources or work together to optimize use. There are approximately 260
transboundary river basins that cover 45% of the land surface of our planet.6 At least 145
nations have territory within an international drainage basin.7 Transboundary river basins
currently support nearly half our global population and yet the availability of fresh water
is declining rapidly.8 Brown & Odeh observe that population growth alone over the last
100 years has led to an almost “80 percent drop in per capita water availability”.9
Increasingly, stress on the natural environment due to water scarcity, pollution, resource
development and climate change have magnified the growing need for facilitated

4

Heather L Beach et al. Transboundary freshwater dispute resolution: Theory, practice and annotated
references (New York: United Nations University Press, 2000) at 39 [Beach et al].
5
Stephen C McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2007) at 68 [McCaffrey (2007)].
6
Alex Grzybowski, Stephen C McCaffrey & Richard K Paisley, “Beyond International Water Law:
Successfully Negotiating Mutual Gains Agreements for International Watercourses” (2010) 22 Global Bus
& Dev’t LJ 139 at 139-140 [Grzybowski et al].
7
R Paisley & G Hearns, “Some Observations from Recent Experiences with the Governance of
International Drainage Basins” in AC Corréa and Gabriel Eckstein, eds, Precious, Worthless or
Immeasurable: the Value and Ethics of Water, (Lubbock, Texas: Texas Tech University, 2006) online:
Governance-IWLearn <http://governance-iwlearn.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Texas-Tech.pdf> 1 at 4
[Paisley & Hearns]. The authors define an “international drainage basin” as referring to “fresh water
resources that are shared by two or more sovereign states”. Thorson defines an “international drainage
basin” as “more than simply a transboundary river, it is the entire geographic area of a watershed.” See
Erica J Thorson, “Sharing Himalayan Glacial Meltwater: The Role of Territorial Sovereignty” (2009) 19
Duke J Comp & Int’l L 487, online: Duke University School of Law
<http://www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl?19+Duke+J.+Comp.+&+Int'l+L.+487+pdf> at 506 [Thorson].
8
Paisley & Hearns, ibid at 4.
9
Anna Brown & Nancy Odeh, "Towards a Global Transboundary Watercourse and Aquifer Agreement
(GTWAA) in William R. Moomaw & Lawrence E. Susskind, eds, Papers on International Environmental
Negotiation, Volume 15 Ensuring a Sustainable Future (Boston: MIT-Harvard Public Disputes Program,
2006) online: Program on Negotiation, Harvard Law School <http://www.pon.harvard.edu/shop/papers-oninternational-environmental-negotiation-series/> 1 at 2 [Brown & Odeh].
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transboundary cooperation and dispute resolution. The potential for conflict is immense;
the opportunity and need for peace building around transboundary rivers is equally great.
This thesis considers the international law of transboundary rivers from the perspective of
Indigenous peoples who rely upon these resources for their survival and whose sacred
responsibilities to water are central to their culture.10
1.2

Transboundary Water Law, Indigenous Peoples and Sovereignty
My thesis has evolved over time. I initially approached international water law

from the question of how to increase public participation in the governance of
transboundary rivers. However, early in my studies, I was given the opportunity to attend
several formative meetings of the Canadian Columbia River Basin Forum comprised of
dozens of federal and provincial department bureaucrats as well as representatives from
10

Throughout this paper, I have used the word “Indigenous” in the spirit of the sentiments of preeminent
international legal scholar, S James Anaya:
… the term indigenous refers broadly to the living descendants of preinvasion inhabitants
of lands now dominated by others. … They are indigenous because their ancestral roots are
embedded in the lands in which they live, or would like to live, much more deeply than the
roots of more powerful sectors of society living on the same lands or in close proximity.
Furthermore, they are peoples to the extent they comprise distinct communities with a
continuity of existence and identity that links them to the communities, tribes, or nations of
their ancestral past.
See James S Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2004) at 3 [Anaya (2004)]. Corntassel & Primeau note that “indigenous” is the designation that “is most
widely used among native populations themselves, by intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) such as the
United Nations, as well as by many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). See Jeff J Corntassel &
Tomas Hopkins Primeau, “Indigenous ‘Sovereignty’ and International Law: Revised Strategies for
Pursuing Self-Determination” (1995) 17:2 Hum Rts Q as reprinted in (2006) 2 Hawaiian Journal of Law &
Politics 53 at 55 [Corntassel & Primeau]. However, I also acknowledge that any definition of Indigenous
may include inherent limitations. The UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights affirms, “no
formal universal definition is necessary for the recognition and protection of their rights”. See UN
Development Group, Guidelines on Indigenous Peoples’ Issues, (2008) online: Office of the High
Commissioner of Human Rights <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/indigenous/docs/guidelines.pdf> at
8. Other scholars expressly reject the term “aboriginal” and the term “Indian”. See Taiaiake Alfred & Jeff
Corntassel, “Being Indigenous: Resurgences against Contemporary Colonialsm” (2005) 40:4 Government
and Opposition 597 [Alfred & Corntassel]; Akwesasne Notes, “Indigenous Peoples, Self-Determination
and the Unfounded Fear of Secession” (1995) as reprinted in Robert Odawi Porter, ed, Sovereignty,
Colonialism and the Indigenous Nations: A Reader (Durham, North Carolina: California Academic Press,
2005) 713 [Akwesasne Notes] [RO Porter]. I have adopted the term “Indigenous” throughout this paper
except when quoting scholars that have used different terminology. Within the Canadian context, however,
I have used the term “First Nations” where appropriate to indicate the Indigenous peoples that reside within
Canada. The term “First Nations” does not include Métis or Inuit.
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several First Nations Bands that reside within the Canadian Columbia Basin.11 The
experience was a transformative one for me personally. One observation in particular has
had a lasting and profound impact upon my research. The communication gulf between
government officials and the Indigenous representatives was staggering.
When the Indigenous representatives spoke about the pressing issues confronting
the Columbia River, they spoke passionately of spirit, salmon and grandchildren. They
called for a basin-wide approach to governance and emphasized the interconnectedness
of all living things within the river basin. The bureaucrats smiled politely and spoke
pragmatically of limited mandates, budget constraints, and overlapping political
jurisdictions while simultaneously strategizing towards potential press releases. The gulf
in understanding and intentions was palpable. At the core of the disconnection was a
conflict of core values and different assumptions about the nature of our relationship with
the river and its ecosystem. The Indigenous representatives stopped coming to the
meetings.12 I became uncomfortable participating in the discussions between government
departments and disengaged from the process.
Upon reflection, it became clear to me that the first step on the long road to
participatory decision-making must begin by bridging the communication gap between
the state governments and Indigenous peoples, and ensuring that the latter are truly
11

Participants in these meetings included representatives from the following: British Columbia (BC)
Ministry of Environment BC Hydro, BC Crown Agencies Secretariat, BC Intergovernmental Relations
Office, BC Ministry of Energy, Mines & Petroleum Resources, Canadian Columbia River Inter-tribal
Fisheries Commission, Canadian Consulate – Seattle (DFAIT), Canadian Ministry of Indian & Northern
Affairs, Columbia Basin Trust, Environment Canada, Fisheries & Oceans Canada, Natural Resources
Canada, Okanagan Nation Alliance, Shuswap Nation Tribal Council, & Ktunaxa Nation Council.
12
First Nations did participate in subsequent meetings. In 2007, seventeen Canadian federal, provincial,
regional and First Nation agencies signed a Memorandum of Understanding and have committed to
collaborating on transboundary water management issues through the Canadian Columbia River Forum.
See Canadian Columbia River Forum. “Canadian Columbia River Forum Memorandum of
Understanding”, online: Canadian Columbia River Forum,
<http://www.ccrf.ca/assets/docs/pdf/MOU_Eng_17.pdf>.
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engaged in the governance of transboundary rivers. I began to research the rights of
Indigenous peoples in transboundary water law and found that, because they lacked
recognition of power akin to sovereign status, they were excluded from the discourse on
the law of transboundary rivers. Indigenous interests were summarily relegated to a
matter of domestic concern, a common state practice of colonization. This struck me as
contrary to the international status of Indigenous peoples as affirmed by the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples [UNDRIP or the Declaration].13
In 2010, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated that one of the five objectives of the
Second International Decade of the World’s Indigenous Peoples is:
Promoting the full and effective participation of indigenous peoples in
decisions which directly or indirectly affect their lifestyles, their
traditional lands and territories, their cultural integrity as indigenous
peoples with collective rights or any other aspect of their lives…
…
… participation in intergovernmental work is a core element …
of the Second Decade and a fundamental human rights norm in
international law, firmly enshrined in international human rights
instruments. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples reconfirms this norm and analyses of its meaning as
it pertains to indigenous peoples.14

13

United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN GAOR Doc.A/RES/61/295 (13
September 2007) online: UN <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/declaration.html> [UNDRIP].
14
Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary-General (2010), Report on the Midterm assessment of the progress made in
the achievement of the goal and objectives of the Second International Decade of the World’s Indigenous
People, cited in Ellen Gabriel (Speaker), “Joint Statement of Grand Council of the Crees (Eeyou Istchee);
Inuit Circumpolar Council; Assembly of First Nations: International Alliance of Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples of Tropical Forests/Alianza Internacional de los Pueblos Indígenas y Tribales de los Bosques
Tropicales; International Indian Treaty Council (IITC); Na Koa Ikaika KaLahui Hawaii; First Nations
Summit; Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs; Network of the Indigenous Peoples-Solomons (NIPS);
Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations; Treaty 4 Chiefs; Innu Council of Nitassinan; Kus Kura S.C.;
Haudenosaunee of Kanehsatà:ke; Kakisiwew Treaty Council; Ochapowace Cree First Nation; Cowessess
Cree First Nation; First Peoples Human Rights Coalition; Canadian Friends Service Committee (Quakers);
Center for World Indigenous Studies; KAIROS: Canadian Ecumenical Justice Initiatives” (Statement
presented to the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Fourth session, Geneva 11-15 July
2011) [unpublished], online: Canadian Friends Service Committee < http://quakerservice.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2011/07/Expert-MECHANISM-Study-re-IPs-Rt-to-Participate-ORAL-Statement-GCC-etal-July-12-11.pdf> at 2, paras 10 & 11[Gabriel] [emphasis added].
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This recognition of Indigenous peoples’ international rights to fully participate in
environmental decision-making is absent from the law of transboundary rivers.
This observation was further reinforced by my research regarding the TsangpoBrahmaputra River Basin that runs through the Himalayan Mountains of the Tibet
Autonomous Region in China and flows through India, Bhutan and Bangladesh.
Governance of this transboundary river is complicated by the complexity and magnitude
of the issues confronting the Indigenous peoples of Tibet, as well as the ongoing dispute
between China and India over portions of Arunchal Pradesh, all of which centre around
conflicting claims of sovereignty. In this context, the requirement of unambiguous
sovereign status in order to access the international law of transboundary rivers may
actually exacerbate violent conflicts in the area and undermine the status of Indigenous
peoples’ who have never ceded their sovereignty over these regions.
Together, the case examples of the Columbia and the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra
Rivers prompted me to critically examine the intersection between the international law
of transboundary watercourses, the doctrine of sovereignty, and the international rights of
Indigenous peoples. The issues surrounding these two rivers brought into focus the effect
that the doctrine of sovereignty has had in transboundary water law in excluding
Indigenous peoples from participating in international transboundary negotiations.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses [UN Watercourse Convention] is intended as a mechanism to
govern the economic and political relationships and agreements between sovereign states

6

only and does not recognize the rights of non-state actors.15 While at first glance this may
seem standard for an international convention, it is problematic for two reasons:
i)

it does not acknowledge and integrate the rights of Indigenous peoples as
ratified in a myriad of other international instruments; and

ii)

it does not provide any mechanism for dispute resolution for conflicts
regarding transboundary waters that are outside of a well-defined and clearly
delineated state-to-state relationship.

Rather than help reduce conflict over these rivers, the state-centric focus of the UN
Watercourse Convention may actually serve to further entrench competition and conflict
over territories in order to obtain or preserve the entitlements that come with sovereign
status.
The UN Watercourse Convention is a particularly unique subject matter for an
analysis of the doctrine of sovereignty in that it is directed at transboundary waters,
which by their very nature defy claims of sovereign entitlement. Stephen C.
McCaffrey16, author of The Law of International Watercourses, 2nd ed. (2007), considers
the challenges that arise when attempting to apply the doctrine of territorial sovereignty
to transboundary waters and observes that transboundary water defies ownership in that it
is “more akin to clouds, winds and migratory birds than to land”.17 In his role as special
rapporteur to the United Nations International Law Commission during the drafting of the

15

Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, opened for
signature 21 May 1997, 36 ILM 700 (1997) (not yet in force) at Art 2 [UN Watercourse Convention].
16
Professor McCaffrey is one of the world’s foremost authorities on international water law. He was a
member of the United Nations International Law Commission from 1982-91 and served as its chair during
the 1987-88 session. He served as special rapporteur for the commission’s draft articles on the law of the
non-navigational uses of international watercourses, which formed the basis of the UN Watercourse
Convention. See full biography online: Pacific McGeorge School of Law
<http://www.mcgeorge.edu/x7296.xml>.
17
McCaffrey (2007), supra note 5 at 68.
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UN Watercourse Convention, McCaffrey made firsthand observations regarding the
negotiation of the Convention. He perceives the equitable principles set out in the UN
Watercourse Convention as constituting a radical departure from the traditional notions
of absolute territorial sovereignty. In 2008, McCaffrey stated that the UN Watercourse
Convention “thoroughly rejects any notion that sovereignty over shared water resources
is part of international law. … A right to share in a common resource is difficult, at best,
to reconcile with the notion of ‘sovereignty’ over that resource.”18 He further asserts that
“[t]he notion of sovereignty over shared water is unsupported both in state practice and in
the work of expert groups.”19 McCaffrey also emphasizes the inclusive nature of UN
Watercourse Convention negotiations to emphasize its universal applicability. He states:
… the Convention will be of value whether or not it enters into force
because it was negotiated in a forum in which virtually any interested state
could participate, and therefore reflects the views of the international
community on the subject.20
When viewed from a state perspective, the UN Watercourse Convention is perceived by
supporters and detractors alike as representing a landmark departure from the historical
doctrine of sovereignty.
When viewed from the perspective of Indigenous peoples, however, sovereign
status continues to be a barrier to accessing transboundary water law. As non-state
actors, Indigenous peoples have no rights under the UN Watercourse Convention and are
18

Stephen C McCaffrey “Introduction: Politics and Sovereignty over Transboundary Groundwater” (Paper
presented to Proceedings of the Annual Meeting American Society of International Law Panel Discussion
entitled “If Water Respects No Political Boundaries, Does Politics Respect Transboundary Waters?” (2008)
102 American Society of Int’l L Proc 353, online: JSTOR <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25660314> at 354
[McCaffrey (2008)].
19
Ibid at 355.
20
McCaffrey (2007), supra note 5 at 376 [emphasis added]. Also at 359, McCaffrey observes that the
Working Group, which drafted the UN Watercourse Convention, was open to participation by all member
states within the United Nations as well as states that were only members of specialized agencies of the
United Nations. This had the effect of allowing states such as Switzerland to participate in the drafting of
the Convention even though they were not members of the United Nations.
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rarely mentioned in the legal discourse regarding transboundary rivers despite the
overwhelming affirmation of international Indigenous rights by the majority of states. In
this respect, the doctrine of sovereignty continues to dictate who may participate in the
international law of transboundary rivers and which peoples are deemed to be members
of the “international community” that are entitled to share in the transboundary water
resources.21
The UN Watercourse Convention was opened for signature on 21 May 1997 and
has been endorsed by 24 countries.22 It has not yet come into force because it lacks the
35 signatories required for ratification. Notably, UNDRIP was initially adopted on 13
September 2007 by 144 countries and as of January 2012 has been endorsed by 150
countries.23 Numerous provisions of UNDRIP affirm an indirect right to water as
incidental to Indigenous peoples’ rights to cultural integrity and economic development.
Articles 25 and 32(2) expressly affirm Indigenous peoples’ rights to water and require
states to obtain Indigenous peoples’ “free and informed consent” prior to any
development that impacts water in their territories.24 Given the overwhelming state
support for UNDRIP, does the UN Watercourse Convention truly reflect the views of the
21

Ibid.
UN Treaty Collections, “Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses New York, 21 May 1997” (Status as at 2 January 2012), online: UN Treaty Collections
<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=XXVII12&chapter=27&lang=en#Participants>.
23
UNDRIP, supra note 13. UNDRIP was originally endorsed by 144 countries in favour, four countries
voting against and 11 countries abstaining. The four countries that voted against UNDRIP were Canada, the
United States, Australia and New Zealand. All four have since endorsed UNDRIP. The countries
abstaining were: Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burundi, Colombia, Georgia, Kenya, Nigeria, Russian
Federation, Samoa and Ukraine. Columbia and Samoa have since expressed their support of the
Declaration. See UN Bibliographic Information System, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, online: UN
<http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?profile=voting&index=.VM&term=ares61295>. Also see
UN PFII, “United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Adopted by the General
Assembly 13 September 2007”, online: United Nations
<http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/declaration.html>.
24
UNDRIP, supra note 13.
22
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international community on the subject of international water law? If international values
have changed, then the UN Watercourse Convention also needs to be updated to reflect
the international rights of Indigenous peoples.
In this thesis, I contend that state-centric approaches to transboundary water law
fail to recognize Indigenous peoples’ international rights or the potentially pivotal role
that Indigenous legal theory and Indigenous peoples’ knowledge might play in
transcending conflict. The international community can transcend the conflict inherent in
sovereign discourse by developing international water law in a manner that recognizes
Indigenous peoples’ rights to participate in decision-making regarding transboundary
rivers and to gain access to regional dispute resolution mechanisms. This can be
achieved on a ‘without prejudice’ basis such that the laws concerning shared water
resources can evolve without adversely impacting any peoples’ claim to sovereignty.25 If
sovereign status remains a precondition to accessing and participating in transboundary
water law, then the UN Watercourse Convention effectively perpetuates imperialist
values and the historical exclusion of Indigenous peoples from the international
community.
While overcoming references to state sovereignty in international water law is a
daunting task, a review of the history of Indigenous peoples’ international rights in can
provide us with insights about how to navigate the doctrine of sovereignty in
international law. Hammer contends that international laws and norms regarding
Indigenous peoples’ status and position can provide an important bridge between
questions regarding the human right to water and control over water as a resource, as well
as issues relating to the environment. He states:
25

Personal conversation with June McCue (2011).
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By considering indigenous peoples and their approaches to the land, we can
begin to conceive of a holistic approach to water that goes beyond the
sovereign dialogue pertaining to states and their territories.26
The primary objective of this thesis is to reconcile international water law with the
international law of Indigenous peoples. In the next section, I set out my methodology
for undertaking this research project and introduce critical race theory as the theoretical
framework for this thesis.

1.3

Theoretical Framework and Methodology

The primary focus of this thesis is to deconstruct, decolonize and offer directions
for reconstruction of the international law of transboundary rivers from Indigenous
perspectives. Throughout this research, I have been guided by the question: What would
an international law of transboundary rivers look like if it were drafted from the
perspective of international Indigenous law and theory? To answer this question, I have
adopted Critical Race Theory as my theoretical framework to critically examine the
impact of the UN Watercourse Convention, its related discourse and the role of the
doctrine of sovereignty upon Indigenous peoples.

1.3.1

Critical Race Theory

Law and order exist for the purpose of establishing Justice and …
when they fail in this purpose they become the dangerously structured dams
that block the flow of social progress.27
Martin Luther King Jr. (1963)

26

Leonard Hammer, “Indigenous People as a Catalyst for Applying the Human Right to Water” (2004) 10
International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 131 at 150.
27
Martin Luther King in Carol Aylward, Canadian Critical Race Theory (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing
1999) at 14 [Aylward].
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In this thesis, I apply critical race theory as it applies to Indigenous peoples in
international water law [Critical Race Theory]. At the core of Critical Race Theory is the
goal of achieving social justice for historically oppressed groups.28 Mutua describes
Critical Race Theory as “ … a project of outsider jurisprudence” as it is primarily
directed at “social justice for ‘outsider’ groups”.29 While Critical Race Theory originally
emerged within the context of the struggle of African-American peoples in the United
States, it has emerged as a theoretical framework that is relevant for examining the
experience of other oppressed minorities and Indigenous peoples.30
In Canadian Critical Race Theory (1999), Carol Aylward identifies the primary
themes of the theoretical framework as follows:
… a contextual analysis which positions the experiences of oppressed
peoples at its center, a deconstruction which asks the question, How does
this legal doctrine rule, principle, policy or practice subordinate the interests
of Black people and other people of colour? And ultimately, a
reconstruction which understands the “duality” of law, recognizing both its
contribution to the subordination of Blacks and other people of colour and
its transformative power.31

An accompanying methodology has emerged that is comprised of a deconstruction of the
law, a presentation of alternatives and a reconstruction of the law in a manner that
remedies the injustice.32

Applied to this thesis, the methodology involves:

28

Christopher Dunbar Jr, “Critical Race Theory and Indigenous Methodologies” in Norman K Denzin,
Yvonna S Lincoln, & Linda Tuhiwai Smith, eds, Handbook of Critical and Indigenous Methodologies
(Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications Ltd., 2008) 85 at 93 [Smith (2008)].
29
Makau W Mutua, “Critical Race Theory and International Law: The View of an Insider-Outsider” (2000)
45 Vill L Rev 841, online: Social Science Research Network <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1525526> at 848
[Mutua].
30
Ibid at 841-842.
31
Aylward, supra note 27 at 34-35.
32
Ibid. Aylward offers the following methodology: “Critical Race methodology requires a deconstruction
of legal rules, principles and policies and it challenges the so-called “neutrality” and “objectivity” of laws
that oppress Blacks and other people of colour. Deconstruction is designed to confront subtle forms of
discrimination perpetuated by law. Critical Race Theory attempts to expose the ordinariness of racism and
to validate the experiences of people of colour, which are important for understanding laws that perpetuate
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(i)

a deconstruction of the law of transboundary rivers by confronting the
role of the legal doctrine of sovereignty within international water law
and demonstrating how it operates to subordinate Indigenous peoples;

(ii)

a presentation of alternate narratives regarding Indigenous peoples’
relationships to sovereignty which together “tell the story” 33 of the
racial antagonism that is at the center of the legal principle in question;
and

(iii)

a reconstruction of the international law of transboundary rivers
through a return to ethics and coalition building.

International law is not beyond the reach of Critical Race Theory. Andrews
emphasizes the ability of Critical Race Theory “to unmask the veneer of equality and
neutrality of international law and to expose international law’s colonial trappings.”34
Mutua identifies the role that Critical Race Theory can play in challenging the supposed
“universality” 35 of international law. Proponents of international law tend to present it as
a universal system of laws that is premised on equality and neutrality. Mutua asserts that
international law by its very nature is “Eurocentric in that it issues from European
thought, culture and experiences. This specificity denies international law
universality.”36 Critical Race Theory provides a framework for deconstructing how
colonialism and cultural bias have infiltrated international legal systems and institutions
and challenges the supposed universality of international laws. Mutua contends that the
application of Critical Race Theory to international law reveals that:
their disenfranchisement. … Critical Race Theory also employs “narrative,” or storytelling. Narrative
functions in a number of ways. It can allow lawyers and others to “tell the story” of their clients and the
Black experience of racism and subordination. … Narrative can debunk the myths of neutrality and
objectivity by placing emphasis upon the confrontational nature of an encounter … in its social and
historical context of racial discrimination. … The final stage in Critical Race methodology is
reconstruction. What are the alternatives (if any) to the existing doctrine, legal rule, principle or practice
that will advance the cause of Black people?”
33
Ibid.
34
Penelope Andrews, “Making Room for Critical Race Theory in International Law: Some Practical
Pointers” (2000) 45 Vill L Rev 855 at 858.
35
Mutua, supra note 29 at 844-845.
36
Ibid at 841.
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… international law has largely been developed and deployed as a vehicle
for advancing particular interests, for the benefit of specific peoples,
cultures and regions and, as a consequence, for the detriment of particular
interests, peoples, cultures and regions.37
Beyond deconstruction, Critical Race Theory also holds the promise of reconstructing
international law in a manner that reflects true universality and social justice. Mutua
asserts that, “international law need not be an instrument for exclusion and exploitation”
and that “it can and should speak to more noble ideals”.38 Critical Race Theory therefore
brings with it an “emancipatory potential … that can be tapped and deployed as part of
the project for the reconstruction of international law.”39
I have adopted Critical Race Theory and methodology from the perspective of
Indigenous peoples recognizing that they have been historically oppressed and
disenfranchised. Specifically, my research challenges the tendency of international water
law and the mainstream discourse associated with transboundary water law to
subordinate and marginalize the rights and interests of Indigenous peoples.

This thesis

demonstrates how ongoing colonial presumptions about the primacy of state sovereignty
in the international law of transboundary rivers have operated to exclude Indigenous
peoples’ from the social contract that forms the basis of international water law. Critical
Race Theory provides a lens through which to critique transboundary water law from the
perspective of Indigenous peoples and to envision how international water law could be
reconstructed if it were founded upon post-imperial values such as mutual respect.40

37

Ibid at 845.
Ibid.
39
Ibid.
40
Alfred identifies “three post-imperial values: consent, mutual recognition, and cultural continuity.” See
Taiaiake Alfred, “Sovereignty” in Joanne Barker, ed, Sovereignty Matters: Locations of Contestation and
Possibility in Indigenous Struggles for Self-Determinism (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005) 33
at 38 [Alfred (2005)] [J Barker].
38
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Respect is a key theme in Indigenous scholarship. In her well received book
Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples (2002), Linda Tuhiwai
Smith writes:
The term ‘respect’ is consistently used by indigenous peoples to underscore
the significance of our relationships and humanity. Through respect the
place of everyone and everything in the universe is kept in balance and
harmony. Respect is a reciprocal, shared, constantly interchanging principle
which is expressed through all aspects of social conduct. Haig-Brown and
Archibald write that, “to be in harmony with oneself, other members of the
animal kingdom, and other elements of nature requires that First Nations
people respect the gift of each entity and establish and maintain respectful,
reciprocal relations with each’. The denial by the West of humanity to
indigenous peoples, the denial of citizenship and human rights, the denial of
the right to self-determination – all these demonstrate palpably the
enormous lack of respect which has marked the relations of indigenous and
non-indigenous peoples.”41
To restore dignity overall, reconstruction of international water law must accord with
respect for both Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples.42
The current chapter outlines the methodology and theoretical framework of this
thesis. Chapter 2 sets out to deconstruct international water law. This chapter introduces
the UN Watercourse Convention and related mainstream discourse and demonstrates how
the doctrine of sovereignty operates to exclude Indigenous peoples from participating in
international water law and discourse. Chapter 2 also provides two case examples that
locate Indigenous peoples and interests within the complex geopolitics of two
transboundary rivers: the Columbia River and the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra River. The first
case example demonstrates how Indigenous peoples have been adversely impacted by
past transboundary developments and how their ongoing legal claims and future interests
41

Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples (New Zealand:
University of Otago Press, 2002) at 120 [Smith (2002)]. Also see Alfred (2005), supra note 40 at 46 where
he observes that, “Indigenous perspectives offer alternatives, beginning with the restoration of a regime of
respect.”
42
Personal conversation with D. Anthony Knox (2011).
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are routinely relegated to a secondary domestic concern. The second case example
illustrates the extreme vulnerability of Indigenous peoples and the geopolitical tensions
that are exacerbated by linking rights regarding transboundary water with sovereign
status. This chapter will demonstrate how the entrenchment of the doctrine of
sovereignty in international water law undermines the internationally protected rights of
Indigenous peoples and potentially fuels conflict in regions where sovereignty is disputed
or unresolved.43
Chapter 3 provides alternative narratives and perspectives regarding sovereignty.
This chapter offers a brief history of the concept of sovereignty in classical Western legal
discourse to show how it has been manipulated as a tool of Western lawmakers to
dominate Indigenous peoples and exploit resources. Chapter 3 then undertakes a
literature review of Indigenous experiences and perspectives of sovereignty. This chapter
will show that the concept of sovereignty is not a fixed absolute but rather is a socially
and culturally derived concept that has been shaped by lawmakers for specific political
purposes. Once we acknowledge sovereignty as a social construct, we can imagine the
reconstruction of new laws grounded in mutual respect.
Chapter 4 offers proposals for the reconstruction of international water law in a
manner that is inclusive of Indigenous perspectives. This chapter considers how
Indigenous peoples have successfully asserted their rights within international law and
43

The deconstruction that follows in the next chapter involves a critical examination of the UN
Watercourse Convention and related discourse. While I do make passing reference to the International
Law Commission’s draft articles on the law of transboundary aquifers, I do not critique those draft articles
in this thesis. (See International Law Commission, Draft articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers,
(2008) UN GAOR Sixty-third Session, Supp No. 10, UN Doc A/63/10, online: UN
<http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/8_5_2008.pdf> [Law of
Transboundary Aquifers].) Likewise, I have not undertaken a critical analysis of general water governance
theories such as Integrated Resource Water Management (IRWM) theories or Integrated Water Initiatives
(IWI), although I do make reference to them in some instances. Finally, this thesis is concerned solely with
international law of transboundary rivers and does not attempt to analyze the national laws of any one state.
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reviews several international instruments that recognize and affirm Indigenous peoples’
rights. I then consider several proposals for the reconstruction of international water law.
In my view, simply amending the UN Watercourse Convention to reference UNDRIP and
other Indigenous rights will not achieve genuine reconciliation. I conclude by proposing
a vision for a new and radically inclusive international convention, which encompasses
and integrates international Indigenous laws and values through a return to ethics and
coalition building. I contend that the international law of Indigenous peoples’ rights
together with the human right to water must form the pillars of international water law
reform, effectively displacing the doctrine of sovereignty currently governing
transboundary water conflict. In the next section, I reflect upon my own role as a nonIndigenous person seeking social justice for Indigenous peoples.

1.4

Deconstructing My Settler Self: On Becoming an Ally in Water Law
Given that I have adopted Critical Race (Indigenous) Theory as my theoretical

framework of my thesis, it is relevant to acknowledge that I am not Indigenous. I am a
second-generation Canadian of European-settler heritage. Several members of my family
have dedicated their professional and personal lives to working in close partnership and
friendship with Indigenous peoples. My father, also of European descent, has been a
band manager and consultant to British Columbian First Nations for the last 10 years
until his retirement. My mother, a lifelong educator, earned her doctorate at the age of 65
researching and documenting the strength and resilience of First Nations women as
community leaders in education. Other family members work in the field of First
Nations issues in counseling as well as refugee advocacy for Indigenous peoples arriving
in Canada. Others have lived or continue to live on First Nations reserves. As a young
17

child, I took annual vacations to visit family on a remote coastal reserve. I am shaped by
my settler heritage and I have also been raised to think deeply about the ongoing social
and legal reconciliation of Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples’ traditions.
Increasingly, non-Indigenous scholars are exploring the issues that arise as a nonIndigenous person committed to pursuing social justice for Indigenous peoples. In
Unsettling the Settler Within, Paulette Regan challenges non-Indigenous peoples to
confront their privileged status as settlers:
The significant challenge that lies before us is to turn the mirror back upon
ourselves and to answer the provocative question posed by historian Roger
Epp regarding reconciliation in Canada: How do we solve the settler
problem?44
In “Ethical Space of Engagement”, Cree ethicist, Willie Ermine shares a similar
perspective on the need for non-Indigenous peoples to internalize the observable
injustices:
Currently, the situation, and very often the plight of Indigenous peoples,
should act as a mirror to mainstream Canada. The conditions that
Indigenous peoples find themselves in are a reflection of the governance and
legal structures imposed by the dominant society. Indeed, what the mirror
can teach is that it is not really about the situation of Indigenous peoples in
this country, but it is about the character and honor of a nation to have
created such conditions of inequity. It is about the mindset of a human
community refusing to honor the rights of other human communities.45
Barker observes that, to the extent that Indigenous peoples are confronted with the
imperative to overcome historic injustices, settler peoples are equally confronted with the

44

Paulette Regan, Unsettling the Settler Within (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010) at 11 [Regan].
Willie Ermine, “The Ethical Space of Engagement” in (2007) 6 Indigenous L J 193 at 200 [Ermine
(2007)].
45
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imperative to overcome the adverse impacts of colonization in order to realize freedom
and dignity.46
Regan contemplates what it means to become a “settler-ally” and concludes that it
requires her to “continuously confront the colonizer-perpetrator in myself, interrogating
my own position as a beneficiary of colonial injustice.”47 Regan notes that this
commitment to being an ally is necessarily an uncomfortable and difficult journey.
Those settlers who think that no reconciliation is necessary or that a cheap
reconciliation is enough may never aspire to change the socio-political
relationships, structures and institutions of colonialism. Taiaiake Alfred
reminds us that, “from the perspective of the Onkwehonwe struggle, the
enemy is not the white man in racial terms, it is a way of thinking with an
imperialist’s mind.” Thus it is possible and necessary for those settlers who
would be Indigenous allies to reject the imperialist’s mind in favour of
living in truth, accepting that we will struggle and be discomforted and
unsettled.48
Relying upon Regan’s framework, Barker states that to become a meaningful ally, a
Settler must resist the temptation to “re-establish comfort” and instead continue to ask
“What do we do?” from a “profoundly uncomfortable place”.49 This inquiry must
continue to be guided by “an honest inquiry into the causes and effects of colonialism,
and our individual responsibility for colonization”.50 Barker concludes that being a
settler-ally involves recognizing the place of privilege and power that one holds due to
one’s settler status and then placing those resources at the disposal of Indigenous peoples.
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Adam Barker, “From Adversaries to Allies: Forging Respectful Alliances between Indigenous and Settler
Peoples” in Lynn Davis, ed, Alliances: Re/Envisioning Indigenous-Non-Indigenous Relationships (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2010) 316 at 318 [A Barker].
47
Regan, supra note 44 at 236
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Ibid at 233
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A Barker, supra note 46 at 323.
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It also requires allies to give up their need to control Indigenous peoples’ actions or
goals.51
From an academic perspective, research that involves Indigenous perspectives
should set out to make a positive difference for Indigenous peoples.52 Regan concludes
that:
…. we must also work in respectful and humble partnership with Indigenous
people to generate critical hope – vision that is neither cynical nor utopian
but rooted in truth as an ethical quality in the struggle for human dignity and
freedom.53
As a settler, I acknowledge that I inevitably carry my cultural biases with me even while I
try to overcome historical and ongoing prejudices. While I am aware of the possibility
that I could misinterpret or misunderstand the words of Indigenous scholars, I have also
been raised to believe that it is important to find the courage to cross these bridges of
understanding in an effort to initiate dialogue on issues that are vital to humanity.54 My
research is my attempt to actively listen to what Indigenous scholars have said on these
issues while acknowledging the limitations of my own understanding.55 While
Indigenous lawyers and advocates are bound to bring a clearer perspective on this
subject, I embark on this project with Robert B. Porter’s encouragement that “the bigger
issue is commitment to bridging the cultural chasm and serving the needs of the client”56.
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1.5

Conclusion
The United Nations cautions that governance of our limited freshwater resources

in the face of escalating global demand is one of the most pressing issues facing the
world in coming decades.57 Yet, international water law “remains remarkably weak to
remedy problems involving international rivers”.58 Moreover, international law of
transboundary rivers and related mainstream discourse is out of step with post-imperialist
values that have been affirmed in other international instruments. This thesis critically
examines the intersecting relationship between international water law, the doctrine of
sovereignty and Indigenous peoples. By adopting Critical Race Theory as my theoretical
framework, I deconstruct the UN Watercourse Convention and demonstrate how the
requirement of sovereign status operates to systemically exclude Indigenous peoples from
participating in the application and development of transboundary water law at the
international level. I then offer alternatives to our traditional understanding of
sovereignty by considering Indigenous peoples’ relationship with sovereign status in
order to demonstrate that sovereignty is nothing more than a man-made construct that has
been designed and manipulated for political and economic purposes. Finally, I consider
how Indigenous laws, wisdom and values might be accessed to inform a reconstruction of
international water law that supports the mutual respect and dignity of all peoples in the
governance of transboundary water.

57
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See generally, “UN-Water Documents”, online: UN-Water <http://www.unwater.org/>.
Paisley & Hearns, supra note 7 at 7.
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Chapter 2:

International Water Law: A Deconstruction

The first step in a Critical Race Theory analysis is to deconstruct the law or legal
principle in question from the perspective of the oppressed group to demonstrate how it
has operated to “subordinate the interests” 59 of that group. The first part of this chapter
reviews the international law of transboundary watercourses and examines the central
role that the doctrine of sovereignty has played in the formation of international
guidelines regarding transboundary rivers. From a state perspective, the UN Watercourse
Convention is perceived as progressive in its departure from the strict application of
absolute territorial sovereignty and codification of a form of “sovereign equality” 60 vis-àvis shared watercourses. However, from an Indigenous perspective, the emphasis upon
sovereignty in international water law operates to prevent the application of established
water ethics to Indigenous peoples. Because they are not recognized by states as
possessing sovereign status within international law, Indigenous peoples are excluded
from membership in the international community that is guiding the evolution of
international water law principles. This chapter locates Indigenous peoples within
international water law and within the context of two transboundary rivers: the Columbia
and the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra. The chapter concludes by considering how the emphasis
on sovereignty in international water law not only fails to acknowledge and protect
Indigenous peoples’ affirmed international rights but may also exacerbate conflict in
areas where disputed or unresolved claims over territory fuel ongoing geopolitical
conflict.
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2.1

International Water Law and the Doctrine of Sovereignty
By their very nature, transboundary rivers are focal points for conflict.61 All

peoples require water to survive and yet demands over limited supplies of freshwater are
increasing as a result of population growth, climate change. McIntyre considers the
potential for conflict in terms of increasing population growth and anticipated demand
upon transboundary rivers:
Taking population growth alone, the United Nations has issued startling
predictions for several major international river systems. For example,
along the Tigris and Euphrates, the populations of Iraq and Syria are
predicted to more than double, and that of Jordan to nearly triple, between
1955 and 2025. On the Nile, the population of Egypt is predicted to rise
from 60-90 million and that of Sudan to more than double from 24-56
million in the same period. Similarly on the Ganges, the population of
Bangladesh is expected to nearly double and that of India to increase by 50
percent. More recently, the WCD has estimated that world population will
reach a peak of between 7.3 billion and 10.7 billion around 2050 before total
population begins to stabilize or fall and, further, that by 2025 there will be
approximately 3.5 billion people living in water-stressed countries.62
Sufficient water flows are required for irrigation, hydroelectricity, fish populations and
ecosystem health all of which will be further impacted by the demands of population
growth. In addition to increased demand, transboundary rivers are subject to competing
state development projects, the adverse impacts of pollution, and reduced flows due to
melting glaciers and climate change.
Beach et al. (2000) analyzed dozens of transboundary rivers to identify patterns of
possible water conflict with the purpose of helping to anticipate emerging conflict. The
authors describe the typical pattern of emerging conflict as follows:
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…riparians of an international basin implement water development projects
unilaterally first on water within their own territory, in attempts to avoid the
political intricacies of the shared resources. At some point, as water demand
approaches supply, one of the riparians, generally the regional power, will
implement a project that impacts on at least one of its neighbours. … In the
absence of relations or institutions conducive to conflict resolution, the
project that impacts on one’s neighbours can become a flashpoint, and
conflict among various parties is imminent.63
Despite the critical importance of fresh water, international water law is ill equipped to
address or remedy conflicts over transboundary rivers.64
The UN Watercourse Convention is the only international treaty directed at
transboundary rivers.65 The Convention outlines procedural and substantive guidelines
for riparian member states to establish agreements for the optimal and sustainable
utilization of transboundary watercourses. Developed over 27 years by the United
Nations International Law Commission, it has not yet entered into force due to a lack of
signatories.66
Despite its failure to be ratified, the Convention is accepted as setting out the
customary international law of transboundary rivers and codifying “the fundamental
principles and rules governing the rights and duties of watercourse states.” 67 While
bilateral and multilateral agreements between states remain the primary source of
customary international law, the UN Watercourse Convention is considered a guiding
document and establishes “a basis for future international treaties”.68
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2.1.1

UN Watercourse Convention
The customary international law of transboundary watercourses, as reflected in the

UN Watercourse Convention, is limited in its scope to the rights and obligations of
sovereign states vis-à-vis other sovereign states. Article 2 of the Convention defines the
following terms:
“Watercourse” means a system of surface waters and groundwaters
constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole and
normally flowing into a common terminus;
“International watercourse” means a watercourse, parts of which are situated
in different States;
“Watercourse State” means a State Party to the present Convention in whose
territory part of an international watercourse is situated, or a Party that is a
regional economic integration organization, in the territory of one or more
of whose Member States part of an international watercourse is situated;
“Regional economic integration organization” means an organization
constituted by sovereign States of a given region, to which its Member
States have transferred competence in respect of matters governed by the
present Convention and which has been duly authorized in accordance with
its internal procedures, to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to it.”69
Article 4(1) states that, “[e]very Watercourse State is entitled to participate in the
negotiation of and to become a party to any watercourse agreement that applies to the
entire international watercourse, as well as to participate in any relevant consultations.”70
Several provisions of the Convention set out procedural guidelines for cooperation,
information sharing, notification of possible adverse effects, consultation, protection of
ecosystems and responses to emergency conditions. Article 33 sets out a dispute
resolution procedure whereby Member Watercourse States agree to submit disputes to the
International Court of Justice or submit to the arbitration procedures set out in the
Appendix to the Convention. The above definitions and provisions serve to limit the
scope of the UN Watercourse Convention to the relationships between states. It does not
69
70
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provide any recourse or mechanisms for dispute resolution for non-state actors such as
Indigenous peoples. Nor are the equitable principles contained in the Convention
intended to have any application to non-state actors.
In addition to the procedural guidelines, the UN Watercourse Convention codifies
two key substantive principles: (1) the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization,
and (2) the obligation not to cause significant harm to any party.71

Article 5 and Article

7 state:
Article 5 Equitable and reasonable utilization and participation
Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize an international
watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. In particular, an
international watercourse shall be used and developed by watercourse
States, with a view of attaining optimal and sustainable utilization thereof
and benefits therefrom, taking into account the interests of the watercourse
States concerned, consistent with adequate protection of the watercourse.
Watercourse States shall participate in the use, development and protection
of an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. Such
participation includes both the right to utilize the watercourse and the duty
to cooperate in the protection and development thereof, as provided in the
present Convention.
Article 7 Obligation not to cause significant harm
Watercourse States shall, in utilizing an international watercourse in their
territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant
harm to other watercourse States.
Where significant harm nevertheless is caused to another watercourse State,
the States whose use causes such harm shall, in the absence of agreement to
such use, take all appropriate measures, having due regard for the provision
of article 5 and 6, in consultation with the affected State, to eliminate or
mitigate such harm and, where appropriate, to discuss the question of
compensation.
The equitable utilization and no-harm principles are perceived as an attempt to provide a
“dynamic process” for equitably balancing the rights and duties of upstream and
71

Ibid at Art 5 & 7. Also see Richard Paisley, “Adversaries into Partners: International Water Law and the
Equitable Sharing of Downstream Partners” (2002) 3 Melbourne J of Int’l L 280 [Paisley]; Brown &
Odeh, supra note 9 at 14. For a full list of rules governing transboundary rivers, see McCaffrey (2007),
supra note 5 at 384-480.

26

downstream riparian states.72 These principles have evolved as a reflection of states’
competing perspectives on the proper duties and obligations that should attach to the
doctrine of sovereignty.73

Together, they reflect recognition by states that, within the

context of transboundary waters, the limitation upon absolute territorial sovereignty is
justified on principles of fairness and equity.74

2.1.2

The Doctrine of Sovereignty
The doctrine of absolute territorial sovereignty in international law provides that

sovereign nations have the exclusive right to the use and control of the land and resources
within their borders.75 However, the strict application of the doctrine of sovereignty to
shared water resources, while tempting, gives rise to “obvious difficulties”.76 Competing
theories regarding the rights and duties which should exist between states in international
water law have given rise to debate about the appropriate degree of sovereignty that
should apply to shared water resources, whether that is conceived of as absolute territorial
sovereignty, absolute territorial integrity, limited territorial sovereignty or community of
interests.77
The doctrine of absolute territorial sovereignty provides that each sovereign state
has exclusive jurisdiction over the land and resources within its borders, “regardless of
any transboundary consequences”.78 While absolute territorial sovereignty is not upheld
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in customary international water law, it remains an important and influential underlying
principle of international law.79 It is typically adopted as the initial negotiating position
of powerful upstream states.
On the other end of the spectrum, the principle of absolute territorial integrity
supports the argument that a state may not impact “the natural flow of water to the
downstream State.”80 Downstream states tend to adopt the principle of absolute territorial
integrity as their opening negotiating position. McCaffrey contrasts the two competing
theories as follows:
While the doctrine of absolute territorial sovereignty insists upon the
complete freedom of action of the upstream state, that of absolute
territorial integrity maintains the opposite: that the upstream state may do
nothing that might affect the natural flow of the water into the downstream
state.81
The “middle ground” approach is the principle of limited territorial sovereignty, a
generally accepted principle of international water law that acknowledges both rights and
duties.82 It is “substantively interpreted as the right to territorial sovereignty and the
corollary duty not to cause significant harm to the sovereign rights of other States.”83
A fourth theoretical perspective is that international watercourses are the common
property of the states that share the watercourse.84 The concept is derived from the
notion “that a community of interest in the water is created by the natural, physical unity
of a watercourse.”85 Grotius promoted the concept of a river as a common public
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property in the early 17th century.86 McCaffrey cites Henry Farnham’s work [1904] as
follows:
A river which flows through the territory of several states or nations is their
common property … It is a great natural highway conferring, besides the
facilities of navigation, certain incidental advantages, such as fishery and the
right to use the water for power or irrigation. Neither nation can do any act
which will deprive the other of the benefits of those rights and advantages.
… The gifts of nature are for the benefit of mankind, and no aggregation of
men can assert and exercise such right and ownership of them as will
deprive others having equal rights, and means of enjoyment. … [T]he
common right to enjoy the bountiful provision of Providence must be
preserved. … 87
In the Oder River decision (1929), the Permanent Court of International Justice
recognized the “community of interests” in the river shared by the riparian states:
[the] community of interest in a navigable river becomes the basis of a
common legal right, the essential features of which are the perfect equality
of all riparian States in the use of the whole course of the river and the
exclusion of any preferential privilege of any one riparian State in relation to
the others….88
In the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case (1997), the International Court of Justice confirmed
that a community of interests applies to non-navigational uses as well as navigational
uses of a river.89 McCaffrey observes that while there is little ambiguity about the
meaning and application of concepts such as absolute territorial sovereignty, absolute
territorial integrity and limited territorial sovereignty, the notion of “community of
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interests” is still somewhat ambiguous in international water law.90 Further attention is
required to define and understand “community” and “interests”.91 The notion of
community may simply be an acknowledgement of the interdependence of states
however, it is not simply a matter of “co-ownership” of a river. Rather it evokes the
concepts of “shared governance” and “joint action”.92 McCaffrey notes that the
community of interests approach does not inform international water law as much as it
may provide insights to how states should work towards processes of community
management.93 McCaffrey states,
… the legal obligations governing the relations between riparian states
reinforce the existence of a community among them, even if they do not
spring from that community. It will be seen later that these obligations
include the duty to cooperate with other riparian states in the use,
development and protection of an international watercourse system. … the
essence of cooperation is working together. In the context of international
watercourses, this suggests a relationship between the co-riparians based
upon respect for each other’s interests. Respect would be manifested
through observance of such principles as prior notification, consultation, and
negotiation concerning changes in uses of the watercourse, and use of the
watercourse in a manner that is equitable and reasonable vis-à-vis other
riparian states. These are, in turn, all fundamental obligations of states
sharing international fresh water resources.94
At its core, the principles of international water law reinforce mutual respect between
sovereign members of the international community.
The UN Watercourse Convention is recognized for its departure from traditionally
restrictive applications of absolute territorial sovereignty. Thorson characterizes the
“equitable utilization” and “no-harm” principles adopted in the UN Watercourse
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Convention as a codification of “limited territorial sovereignty” as it attempts to balance
both the rights and duties that accompany sovereignty. Some scholars have suggested
that the principle of limited territorial sovereignty codified in the UN Watercourse
Convention demonstrates a radical departure from the principle of absolute territorial
sovereignty. McCaffrey takes the position that the UN Water Convention:
… thoroughly rejects any notion that sovereignty over shared water
resources is part of international law. Moreover, the International Court of
Justice in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case also rejected such an idea.
The Court referred to a state’s “basic right to an equitable and reasonable
sharing of the resources of an international watercourse.” A right to share in
a common resource is difficult, at best, to reconcile with the notion of
“sovereignty” over that resource.95
While the UN Watercourse Convention received considerable support in the drafting
stage,96 its failure to come into force may be attributed to its attempt to codify a departure
from absolute territorial sovereignty. China in particular voted against the Convention as
an unacceptable rejection of absolute territorial sovereignty.97 Others argue that the
Convention does not depart significantly from the traditional doctrine of sovereignty.
Thorson argues that, in practice, the principle of limited territorial sovereignty merely
attempts to “juxtapose” rights and duties rather than significantly amend or diminish
rights associated with territorial sovereignty. Arguably, duties have not been accorded
equal weight to rights. The duty not to cause “appreciable” harm is perceived by some as
subservient to the rights of territorial sovereignty.98
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Furthermore, Thorson notes that state reaction to the UN Watercourse Convention
is evidence that the entrenchment of territorial sovereignty continues to dominate state
objectives and dictate state actions regarding international watercourses.
… that the responses to the 1997 UN Convention, as well as the State treaty
practice [in the Himalayas], split so clearly along lower riparian versus
upper riparian lines is meaningful. It evinces a strong underlying current of
territorial sovereignty and territorial integrity. No State that has within it
valuable natural resources wants to subsume its liberty to act according to its
best interest of any other State that may be affected. … and, in this way,
territorial sovereignty remains the dominant limiting factor in defining the
scope of international water law.99
Thorson concludes that while international watercourse law provides for limited
territorial sovereignty, “the core concept of territorial sovereignty remains influential and
dominant in defining the parameters of international water law.”100
Moreover, the doctrine of sovereignty remains paramount to the extent that
sovereign status is required in order to access international water law. Indigenous
peoples who lack sovereign status cannot access the equitable principles codified in the
Convention. While McCaffrey has suggested that the UN Watercourse Convention and
state practice do not support the notion of sovereignty over shared water, from an
Indigenous perspective, the doctrine of sovereignty continues to dictate who may make a
claim to a legitimate interest or right to the shared water in international negotiations.

2.1.3

State Agreements and The Mutual Gains Approach
The UN Watercourse Convention has never been ratified. The legal discourse

regarding international custom centres on the analysis of existing bilateral and
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multilateral state agreements regarding transboundary watercourses.101 Legal scholars
participating in the GEF Global Transboundary International Waters Research
Initiative102 observe that the growing number of transboundary river agreements is
indicative of a growing trend towards cooperation among states.103 Regardless of any
sense of legal obligation, states are increasingly recognizing the mutual benefits that can
be derived through collaboration. The discourse regarding state negotiations emphasizes
a “mutual gains approach” which focuses on the "reciprocal sharing of benefits" and
"mutual gain through cooperative development of water resources."104 Grzybowski et al.
notes that the documented trend towards collaborative approaches to river agreements
may constitute “a shift away from [the] limiting impacts on sovereignty”.105
Paisley identifies “the principle of equitable sharing of downstream benefits”106 as
signaling a new era of cooperation and reciprocity in transboundary law. According to
Paisley,
There are a growing number of international agreements which provide for
the return, either in kind or in monetary form, of a share of the benefits
received in a state or states as a result of acts done in another state or
states.107
Similarly Grzybowski et al. advocate a "mutual gains approach" to negotiating
international watercourse agreements:
Beyond customary international legal obligations lie treaties and other
agreements that are negotiated between states in an effort to address
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particular watercourse management issues, to clarify how customary
obligations will be met, and in some cases to jointly develop opportunities
that neither state could fully capitalize on if acting independently.108
Grzybowski et al. argue that the opportunities presented through a mutual gains approach
provide powerful incentives for cooperation over transboundary watercourses.109 The
authors assert that, “[t]he focus of negotiation can shift away from limiting impacts on
sovereignty, to planning and devising ways and means of maximizing benefits.”110 States
are willing to consider joint investments and cooperation on development projects that
will provide benefits that neither state could achieve acting alone. Incentives help
counteract the strong tendency states have towards protecting their independence and
sovereignty.111
However, from an Indigenous perspective, this perceived tendency by states to
move away from the entrenchment of the doctrine of sovereignty is largely illusory. The
primacy of state interests remains central to the legal discourse and the principles that
guide transboundary water law continue to be derived from the agreements between
sovereigns. Indigenous peoples, as non-state actors, are excluded from these sovereign
contracts. As a result, they are also excluded from contributing to the development of
customary international water law.

2.1.4

The Sovereign Contract in Transboundary Water Law112
The UN Watercourse Convention is intended as a mechanism to govern the

economic and political relationships between sovereign states. Likewise, customary
108

Grzybowski et al, supra note 6 at 143.
Ibid.
110
Ibid.
111
Ibid.
112
The phrase “sovereign contract” is an allusion to classical social contract theory. For a critique of social
contract theory from a critical race theory perspective, see Charles W Mills, The Racial Contract, 2nd ed
(London: Cornell University Press, 1997) [Mills].
109

34

international water law has developed as a reflection of the principles that have emerged
from state agreements and presumes that sovereign states, existing as a ‘community of
sovereigns’, are the rightful owners and beneficiaries of transboundary watercourses.
The doctrine of sovereignty is firmly entrenched in the legal discourse. While the trend
towards cooperation through “mutual sharing of benefits” has been characterized as “a
shift away from limiting impacts on sovereignty”113, this is misleading given that
sovereign interests dictate the content of regional agreements. The “mutual benefits”
gained through cooperation reflect the maximization and preservation of primarily
economic state-interests with little regard paid to the impact of such developments upon
Indigenous peoples. State interests such as economic development, optimal utilization
and the preservation of state sovereignty continue to dominate the discourse of
international water law. The reliance upon state bilateral and multilateral agreements as
the sole source of international water law principles perpetuates the dominance of state
interests over Indigenous people’s interests.
From a Critical Race Theory analysis, it is not transboundary water law that is
unjust but rather the injustice lies in the fact that it is limited in its application to a
community of sovereigns. The equitable utilization and the no-harm principles, as well
as the notion of equitable sharing of benefits, appeal to equity, reciprocity, cooperation,
fairness and reasonableness. Together they represent an attempt to strike a reasonable
middle ground to guide sovereign relations and resonate with the notion of “sovereign
equality.”114 McCaffrey considers Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes comments regarding
the philosophical underpinnings of the equitable utilization rule and states:
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A river is a “treasure” that “offers a necessity of life.” Therefore, when it
flows through more than one jurisdiction, it “must be rationed among those
who have power over it.” It would be intolerable for the upstream state to
cut off all the power from the downstream state, or for the latter to require
the former to “give up its power altogether.” Thus Holmes effectively
rejects both the absolute territorial sovereignty and the absolute territorial
integrity theories. He recognizes that “both states have real and substantial
interests” and that these interests “must be reconciled as best they may,”
rather than simply declaring one state the absolute winner and the other the
absolute loser. The object of this process of reconciliation “always is to
secure an equitable apportionment”.115
An appeal to ethics is at the heart of international water law. Yet, the UN Watercourse
Convention fails to apply equity beyond the dominant social contract of state-to-state
relations.116 If it were “intolerable” for an upstream state to cut off a downstream state,
why is it not equally unjust for an upstream “peoples” to cut off a downstream “peoples”?
The equity aspired to within international water law remains constrained by the sovereign
contract.
It is misleading to engage in the discourse regarding equitable utilization, no harm
rule and benefits sharing without also acknowledging that Indigenous peoples are
excluded from the international community of sovereigns to which they apply. For
Indigenous peoples, transboundary water law remains inaccessible because of the
enduring impacts of their unilateral exclusion from the sovereign community during the
height of colonialism. The marginalization of Indigenous interests in transboundary
rivers cannot be justified simply by asserting that Indigenous peoples’ interests should be
subordinate to state interests and addressed as domestic or local issues. Any suggestion
that states will or do represent Indigenous peoples’ interests in the governance of
transboundary rivers fails to fully appreciate the oppressive reality of colonialism
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throughout the world. Furthermore, Indigenous peoples’ rights have been repeatedly
affirmed within international law and can no longer be dismissed as a purely domestic
issue. Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, Beverley McLachlin noted in 2002
shortly after being appointed to her position as head of the Supreme Court of Canada,
“Whether we like it or not, aboriginal rights are an international matter.”117
The above section has examined the relationship between international water law
and sovereignty. The remainder of this chapter locates Indigenous peoples within the
legal discourse regarding the international law of transboundary watercourses and within
the context of two transboundary rivers.

2.2

Locating Indigenous Peoples in International Water Law
Despite the prominence of Indigenous rights in international law, a review of

international water law and discourse reveals that there are few references to Indigenous
peoples in any context. For example, there are no references to Indigenous issues in the
index of McCaffrey’s, The Law of International Watercourses, 2nd ed. (2007), the preeminent textbook on international water law.118 Indigenous peoples and issues are also
absent from the Working Group that negotiated the UN Watercourse Convention as well
as from state agreements concerning transboundary rivers.119 In this section, I adopt a
critical Indigenous lens to deconstruct the UN Watercourse Convention and the related
legal discourse and consider the limitations of relying upon sovereignty to define rights
and duties in a transboundary context.
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2.2.1

UN Watercourse Convention
The UN Watercourse Convention makes no express reference to Indigenous

peoples or issues although a few sections do encourage states to consider adverse impacts
on human populations and human needs. For examples, Article 6 lists several factors that
are relevant to the determination of what constitutes “equitable and reasonable
utilization” of transboundary watercourse.

Article 6 Factors relevant to equitable and reasonable utilization
1. Utilization of an international watercourse in an equitable and
reasonable manner within the meaning of article 5 requires taking into
account all relevant factors and circumstances, including:
a. Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and
other factors of a natural character;
b. The social and economic needs of the watercourse States
concerned;
c. The population dependent on the watercourse in each
watercourse State;
d. The effects of the use or uses of the watercourses in one
watercourse State on other watercourse States;
e. Existing and potential uses of the watercourse;
f. Conservation, protection, development and economy of use of
the water resources of the watercourse and the costs of measure
taken to that effect;
g. The availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a
particular planned or existing use.
…
3.

The weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its
importance in comparison with that of other relevant factors. In
determining what is reasonable and equitable use, all relevant factors
are to be considered together and a conclusion reached on the basis of
the whole.120

Presumably, Indigenous interests are subsumed by subsection (c) and are weighed
equally against all other factors including state interests. However, McIntyre notes that
120
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the International Law Commission’s commentary on the draft articles states that “the
concept of dependence referred to in Article 6(1)(c) encompasses the size of the
population dependent on the water course, as well as the degree of its dependence.”121 It
is unclear how this provision would apply in regions where Indigenous populations are
minority populations or how much weight would be accorded to Indigenous peoples’
interests in the face of other enumerated factors such as the needs of the states concerned.
McIntyre does note that state practice indicates that the use of water for certain basic
needs like drinking, domestic purposes, and sanitation are generally accorded priority.122
However, it is not clear how this applies to resolve conflicts between Indigenous peoples
needs for drinking water versus states’ needs for drinking water.
Article 10 makes reference to “vital human needs” as deserving of “special
regard”.
Article 10 Relationship between different kinds of uses
1. In the absence of agreement or custom to the contrary, no use of an
international watercourse enjoys inherent priority over other uses.
2. In the event of a conflict between uses of an international watercourse, it
shall be resolved with reference to article 5 and 7, with special regard
being given to the requirements of vital human needs.123
Notably, this recognition of “vital human needs” is not triggered unless there is a conflict
regarding the uses of a watercourse. In other words, human rights are not an issue in
those circumstances where states agree on the development plans.
As set out above, Article 5 refers to the principle of equitable and reasonable
utilization while Article 7 refers to the no-harm rule. Article 7 expressly provides that
there are some circumstances where it would be appropriate for harm to be addressed
121
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through compensation. While never expressly mentioning Indigenous peoples, the
Convention guidelines may be interpreted as stating that (i) “harm” suffered by
Indigenous peoples under a transboundary agreement should be weighed against several
factors including state economic needs; and (ii) that there may be situations where
transboundary harm suffered by Indigenous peoples could be reasonably addressed by
having the state which caused the harm pay compensation to the state in which the
Indigenous peoples live. Only member states can access the dispute resolution process set
out under Article 33. Presumably, it is up to states to seek compensation from other
states for transboundary harm caused to Indigenous populations, either through
agreement or through the dispute resolution process.
Non-state actors are entitled to seek compensation from another state for
transboundary harm under Article 32.
Article 32 Non-discrimination
Unless, the watercourse States concerned have agreed otherwise for the
protection of the interests of persons, natural or juridical, who have suffered
or are under a serious threat of suffering significant transboundary harm as a
result of activities related to an international watercourse, a watercourse
State shall not discriminate on the basis of nationality or residence or place
where the injury occurred, in granting to such persons, in accordance with
its legal system, access to judicial or other procedures, or a right to claim
compensation or other relief in respect of significant harm caused by such
activities carried on in its territory.124
Under this provision, states are prohibited from discriminating against individuals from
neighbouring states in allowing them access to the domestic legal system to assert their
rights “to claim compensation or other relief” with respect to the transboundary harm.
However, Bourquain observes that the effect of this provision is to create a procedural
right only to access courts that may or may not recognize the individual or collective
124
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rights of Indigenous peoples. It does not provide for any substantive rights for non-state
actors.125
The Convention does not expressly mention Indigenous peoples or interests and
does not ensure water security for non-state actors. This is not surprising given that the
Convention reflects the international custom found in bilateral and multilateral state
agreements.

2.2.2

State Agreements and The Mutual Gains Approach
The mutual gains approach to transboundary agreements holds that two or more

states can achieve greater benefit through cooperation and joint development of shared
water than by further entrenchment of absolute territorial sovereignty. However, the
mutual gains approach is largely premised upon maximizing economic interests through
state agreements and offers no protection to Indigenous peoples. Grzybowski et al., note
only one example of states’ voluntarily invoking the human right to access to water.
Upon reviewing the case example of the Senegal River Basin, Grzybowski et al. note:
It also contains the following innovative provision, one of a number of
progressive features of the agreement: “The guiding principles of any
distribution of the River’s water will guarantee to the populations of the
riparian States the full enjoyment of the resources, with respect for the
safety of the people and the works, as well as the basic human right to water,
in the perspective of sustainable development.” 126
According to the authors, this is the sole example of states voluntarily recognizing human
rights in transboundary water governance. Even if human rights or Indigenous peoples
were voluntarily added to a bilateral agreement, states remain the sole parties to such
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agreements and would be required to implement and enforce such provisions on behalf of
Indigenous peoples.
The mutual gains approach to transboundary negotiations illustrates the bias
towards states’ economic interests. It is dominated by the assumption that economic gain
and collaborative resource development are the best incentives for state cooperation.
However, in this framework, Indigenous peoples interests are marginalized as costs of
development. For example, Grzybowski et al. cites Sanderson’s analysis of the inherent
success of the Columbia River Treaty between Canada and the United States which
allows for a sharing of downstream benefits in return for upstream development:
The great attraction of this approach was and is that it focuses on the
gross benefits and eliminates the need for each country to calculate net
benefits. It recognizes that determining what the net benefits and costs
of a particular project might be in a way that is acceptable to both
countries will often be impossible. The wisdom of finessing the need
for the parties to agree on valuing intangible attributes such as species
at risk or reconciliation with First Nations is amply demonstrated by
the difficulty the entities had in agreeing to the quantification of the
CE [Canadian Entitlement] spelled out in the Treaty. By allowing
each party to assess its own benefits and costs, the Treaty provides a
solution which recognizes this limitation and leaves both countries to
seize opportunities that make them better off than they would have
otherwise been according to their own values and thus in a position to
enthusiastically support whatever initiative is being undertaken.127
Indigenous peoples are mentioned solely within the context of states' inability to quantify
a “reconciliation with First Nations”; such reconciliation is presumably necessitated by
development projects that adversely impact Indigenous peoples’ territories. In this
context, "reconciliation with First Nations" is listed as a potential cost of resource
development (along with "species at risk"), which is a challenging cost to quantify.
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However, the mutual gains approach encourages states to overcome these costs by
sharing benefits that they would not be able to achieve if acting independently, to
maximize profits and to "reap benefits from the development". In this context,
Indigenous peoples are referenced solely in terms of a cost of development to be included
in the overall cost-benefits analysis. It further suggests that the costs of the
“reconciliation with First Nations”, while difficult to quantify, can be successfully
managed if states work together to maximize profits.
Taking the UN Watercourse Convention and state agreements together, one must
ask whether, under current international water law principles, it would be acceptable for
one state to receive a portion of downstream benefits as compensation for action that
constitutes a violation of the internationally affirmed rights of Indigenous peoples?
While presumably the answer must be no, the current Convention and discourse do not
acknowledge the internationally protected status of Indigenous rights and do not provide
any mechanism for ensuring that States are not complicit in undermining UNDRIP or
international human rights law generally. Even more progressive river governance
approaches aimed at integrated basin-wide participatory processes have a tendency to
marginalize the rights of Indigenous peoples by placing their interests on equal footing
with industry and other non-governmental stakeholders.

2.2.3

Integrated Watershed Approach
In stark contrast to international water law, emerging global water governance

strategies promote a participatory approach to decision-making. Distilled from principles
first articulated in the Rio Declaration, international agencies such as the World Bank,
Global Environmental Facility, Global Water Partnership, Environmental NGOs,
43

international water practitioners and scholars advocate multi-stakeholder, cross-sector
governance and participatory decision-making.128 One of the most popular approaches is
Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM), which is defined by the Global Water
Partnership as follows:
[It] is a process which promotes the coordinated development and
management of water, land and related resources in order to maximize
economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising
the sustainability of vital ecosystems and the environment.129
This approach to governance recognizes “the fundamentally interconnected nature of
hydrological resources” 130 and promotes holistic management of water. Most notably,
the cornerstone of this approach is multi-stakeholder governance and public participation.
These principles of governance are in stark contrast to international water law’s emphasis
on sovereign authority and centralized decision-making. However, even within this
framework, practitioners often neglect to recognize the international rights of Indigenous
peoples. Indigenous peoples are often characterized as having equal footing with “other
stakeholders” such as non-profit organizations or industry thereby undermining their
collective rights in international law.
For example, the International Joint Commission, which manages transboundary
water issues between Canada and the United States, has embraced the International
Watersheds Initiative (IWI) which, “promotes an integrated, ecosystem approach to
issues arising in transboundary waters through enhanced local participation and
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strengthened local capacity.”131 However, a review of the IJC’s Third Report to
Governments entitled, The International Watersheds Initiative: Implementing a New
Paradigm for Transboundary Basins (2009), reveals that Indigenous peoples are granted
only a peripheral status within this governance model.132 The only reference to
Indigenous peoples in the Report is found in the IJC’s Key Findings:
The watershed approach is changing the way the IJC does business.
Implementing a watershed approach along the international border entails
more than just a change in emphasis and tone. It is a paradigm shift that has
the potential to transform how our two countries view and manage
transboundary waters. The IWI experience has reinforced a recognition of
the complex interplay of economic, sociological and environmental factors
that affect the quantity and quality of our shared waters. Dealing effectively
with these complex interrationships will require new ways of sharing
information and data, new technologies, and a renewed commitment to
involve and engage local citizens, Native Americans, First Nations, private
sector, academia, provinces, states, and federal agencies for a truly
integrated watershed approach. 133
The IJC makes only passing reference to Indigenous peoples as participants in
transboundary river governance and only in the same context as other ‘stakeholders’ such
as the private sector and academia. The effect is to marginalize and undermine the
affirmed rights of Indigenous peoples in international law.
Furthermore, the Global Water Partnership neglects to even mention Indigenous
peoples as stakeholders in its Strategy 2009-2013:
It is well understood that managing water resources in an integrated way is
everybody’s business and that a range of ‘social actors’ from different
sectors of society and with different economic interests must be involved.
As a multi-stakeholder partnership that includes government agencies,
private companies, non-governmental agencies, professional organizations,
131
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gender and youth groups, and bi- and mulit-level development agencies
among others, the GWP network is uniquely placed to draw everyone
together for dialogue and action.134
Given the GWP’s stated mandate to ‘empower, convene and connect stakeholders’ by
establishing inclusive platforms for dialogue, the failure to expressly acknowledge
Indigenous peoples in this context is striking.135 While these initiatives towards
integrated, participatory and decentralized decision-making are important milestones in
transboundary governance, Indigenous peoples’ rights are marginalized within the
discourse.
Despite an almost complete absence of representation of Indigenous interests in
international water law, Indigenous peoples are the most vulnerable to state decisionmaking regarding transboundary rivers and may also be a formidable source of
opposition and conflict with respect to state-initiated development. The next section
considers some of the geopolitical complexities surrounding transboundary rivers and
locates Indigenous peoples’ interests within the context of two transboundary rivers.

2.3

Case Studies: Indigenous Peoples’ Interests in Two Transboundary Rivers
This section considers Indigenous peoples’ interests in two transboundary rivers:

the Columbia River shared by Canada and the United States, and the TsangpoBrahmaputra River, originating in the Tibet Autonomous Region and traveling through
China, India, Bhutan and Bangladesh. The former represents an example of successful
mutual cooperation and stable bilateral relations between states and involves relatively
134

Global Water Partnership, Strategy 2009-2013 (2009), online: Global Water Partnership
<http://www.gwp.org/Global/About%20GWP/Strategic%20documents/GWP_Strategy_20092013_final.pdf > [Global Water Partnership (2009)]. Also see page 9 and page 16 regarding the Strategic
Goals 2009-2013 Outcome 3b, which states, “Stakeholders, including governments, finance and planning
ministries, NGOs, the private sector and youth, have better access to relevant and practical knowledge, and
more capacity to share that knowledge.”
135
Ibid at 5.

46

empowered Indigenous peoples with established legal rights. The latter is the site of
geopolitical instability involving two rising regional superpowers and politically
vulnerable Indigenous populations. Both regions demonstrate the urgent need for a new
international water law framework that acknowledges and integrates international
Indigenous peoples’ rights and offers mechanisms for protecting those rights.
These two case studies have been included for two purposes: (1) to locate
Indigenous peoples and interests within transboundary rivers, and (2) to demonstrate how
the requirement of sovereign status in international water law not only fails to protect
Indigenous rights but may undermine peace in the region by exacerbating tensions
between states and Indigenous peoples where sovereign jurisdiction is in dispute.

2.3.1

Columbia River (North America)
… the Columbia River does not flow, it is operated.136
The 2,000 kilometre long Columbia River travels from the Columbia Lake in the

East Kootenay region of British Columbia (BC), Canada, crosses the border into the
United States (US), and passes through Washington and Oregon before flowing into the
Pacific Ocean.137 (See map of Columbia River Basin at Figure 1.) With over 400 dams
throughout the Columbia, including 13 on its main stem, it is the most hydroelectrically
developed river system in the world.138 The Grand Coulee Dam in particular is the
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largest dam in the United States and one of the largest in the world.139 The US Pacific
Northwest obtains roughly 65% of its power needs from Columbia River dams,140 while
BC obtains approximately 50% of its power from dams located in the Canadian portion
of the Columbia River.141
The Columbia River was once the greatest salmon producer in the world,142
supporting between 7 and 30 million salmon, and upwards of 500,000 salmon in the
Canadian portion of the basin alone.143 Failure to construct fish passage facilities on the
Grand Coulee Dam and the Chief Joseph Dam have resulted in the complete elimination
of anadromous salmon from the Canadian Columbia River Basin.144 In the Columbia
River Basin overall, some 55% of the original extent of salmon and steelhead habitat has
been lost due to dam construction.145 Despite these losses, the Columbia River is often
cited as a success story as it is the subject of a progressive bilateral state agreement.
a)

The Columbia River Treaty
The Columbia River Treaty (“CRT”) signed by the US and Canada in 1961 is often

cited as a model of cooperative transboundary water management, in which the interests
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of both parties are successfully incorporated into a complex bilateral agreement.146 The
US benefited from increased protection from flooding as well as increased power
production. Canada was entitled to receive 50% of the financial benefits that were
realized by the US in return for building three dams on the Columbia main stem.147 In
1964, BC received a one-time payment of US $64 million in return for the projected
flood control benefits of Canadian storage over the 60-year lifetime of the CRT. In 1964,
BC, as owner of the benefits, opted to sell the first 30 years of benefits for a lump sum
payment of US $254 million in order to finance the construction of the Canadian dams.148
While there is no official expiry date for the CRT, the power part of the agreement can be
terminated or renegotiated beginning in 2024, if either party serves notice of the intent to
negotiate ten years prior (in 2014).
The Columbia River Treaty is repeatedly held up as a model of successful
cooperation and “mutual gains” in the governance of an international watercourse.149
However, the CRT dams and previous hydroelectric developments along the Columbia
have had devastating impacts upon the Indigenous peoples in the region.150
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b)

Indigenous Peoples in the Columbia River Basin
Indigenous peoples have lived within the Columbia River Basin for more than

10,000 years.151 Within the Canadian portion of the Columbia River Basin, the Ktunaxa,
Okanagan and Secwepmec (Shuswap) Nations are the three main tribal groups whose
traditional territories extend throughout the watershed.152 Within the US portion of the
Columbia River Basin, 14 tribal groups are recognized today:153
Burns Paiute Tribe
Coeur d’Alene Tribe
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation
Confederated Tribes of the Coliville Reservation
Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community of Oregon
Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation
Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Orgegon
Kalispel Tribe of Indians
Kootenai Tribe of Idaho
Nez Perce Tribe
Shoshone Bannock Tribes of the Fort Hall Reservation
Shoshone-Paiute Tribes of the Duck Valley Reservation
Spokane Tribe of Indians
Some of the US tribal groups were historically united with and related to Canadian tribes
prior to the establishment of an international border between Canada and the US.154
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For thousands of years, Indigenous peoples in the Columbia Basin have lived in a
close interrelationship with the land, obtaining their food, medicines and material needs
largely through hunting, fishing and gathering. Salmon played an especially important
role in the culture of many First Nations, both as a food source and for spiritual and
ceremonial reasons. As noted by members of the Columbia River Treaty tribes:
Salmon and the rivers they use are part of our sense of place. The Creator
put us here where the salmon return. We are obliged to remain and to protect
this place. Without salmon returning to our rivers and streams, we would
cease to be Indian people.155
Arguably, it was the construction of the Grand Coulee Dam in 1941 that had the most
significant and widespread impact on First Nations in the Columbia River Basin.
Downstream of the dam the fishery was largely destroyed, and upstream it was
completely eliminated, as fish passage facilities were not constructed at the dam site.156
Thousands of Indigenous peoples were forced to relocate as the loss of salmon meant the
loss of an integral part of their diet and culture.157
In Canada, First Nations were not even notified of the plans to build the Grand
Coulee Dam and the impending loss of their fishery, nor were they compensated for it.158
With the closing of the gates at Grand Coulee, Sinixt Nation people who were dependent
on Columbia River salmon stocks migrated to live with the Colville and Kootenay tribes
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in the US.159 The Ktunaxa note that the Federal Government promised to provide them
with canned salmon as compensation, but never did.160 Indigenous peoples were
“disproportionately affected by the loss of the salmon from one of the world’s largest
salmon producing river systems.”161
First Nations communities suffered the most devastating impacts of hydroelectric
development prior to the CRT agreement. However, the CRT exacted further impacts,
with the loss of numerous archaeological and burial sites under newly created
reservoirs,162 and the decline of resident fish populations of importance to First Nations
due to dam construction.163 First Nations rights and interests were not recognized during
the negotiation of the Columbia River Treaty. The dominant values considered in the
Treaty negotiations were state interests involving power and flood control, with only
cursory consideration to other values.164
Indigenous peoples have expressed an enduring and persistent interest in
protecting and restoring their Indigenous rights, and in seeing salmon return to the waters
of the Columbia River.165 In 1993, members of the Ktunaxa, Okanagan and Secwepmec
Nations formed the Canadian Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fisheries Commission
(“CCRIFC”), for the purpose of considering their options in relation to the loss of the
159
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traditional anadromous fishery, as well as the significant damage inflicted on the resident
fishery by power operations.166 For over a decade the CCRIFC has been working on a
strategy to persuade the US to restore salmon runs.167 This work culminated in a
submission to the International Joint Commission (IJC)168 in 2003 in which they
requested,
…an Order convening a panel of experts and initiating a public process to
identify and assess the damage caused by the Grand Coulee dam and to
investigate options for mitigation and compensation and for restoring
salmon to the Canadian portion of the Columbia River Basin.169
CCRIFC argued that the IJC has the jurisdiction to request such an Order, since there is
evidence that the conditions of their 1941 Order related to the approval of the Grand
Coulee Dam were never met, especially those which required “the protection and
indemnification of interests in British Columbia by reason of damage to the salmon
fisheries, culture and economy of First Nations resulting from the construction and
operation of the Grand Coulee Dam”.170
In March and June 2006 the US and Canada governments responded to the IJC’s
request for comment with letters from the Office of Canadian Affairs of the U.S. State
Department and the U.S. Relations Division of Foreign Affairs Canada, respectively.
Both governments advised that the IJC did not have jurisdiction to consider the
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CCRIFC’s claim. A few months later, the IJC confirmed by letter that the CCRIFC
should discuss the issue with Foreign Affairs Canada, as that was the “appropriate”
avenue for their claim.171
In 2006, the Secwepmec Nation, Okanagan Nation and Ktunaxa Nation formed
the Upper Columbian Aquatic Management Partnership with the stated goal: “to conserve
and enhance healthy aquatic ecosystems, wild indigenous fish communities, and
aboriginal fisheries in the Columbia Basin.”172 The Partnership is based on the
following principles from each Nation.
•
•

•

Secwepemc: Tknémentem Secwepemcúlecw “Respect the earth and do not waste
natural resources in our traditional territory.”
Okanagan: Tel kqoolentsooten swhitzetzxtet ee toomtemtet, ksnpee-eelsmentem,
kstxetdentim oothl kskgethlkchiwhentem. The creator has given us our mother, to
enjoy, to manage and to protect. Loot penkin koo tdeks ntzespoolawhax. Peentk
kstxtdiplantem ee tel toomtem an hchastantet koo kgel yayart, tel arpna oothl
tdeswhoois. We will survive and continue to govern our mother and her resources
for the good of all for all time.
Ktunaxa: The universal laws that guide us in our society, particularly in
relationship to the land: …173

In the United States, the Columbia River Inter-tribal Fisheries Commission (“CRIFC”)
represents the Nez Perce Tribe, the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian
Reservation, the Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon, and
the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation.174 The Upper
Columbia United Tribes (“UCUT”) was formed by the Coeur d’Alene, Kalispel,
Kootenai, Spokane and Colville Tribes for the purpose of uniting their resources to
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protect the tribes on issues regarding the treaty rights, sovereignty, fish, wildlife, habitat,
education and ecological development. Indigenous peoples in the US have been active in
protecting the Columbia River Basin from transboundary pollution by Canadian industry.
In Pakootas v Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd.,175 members of the Colville Tribe initiated
litigation against Canadian mining company in a successful attempt to apply United
States environmental legislation against a Canadian company. Justice Gould concluded:
Teck owns and operates a lead-zinc smelter ("Trail Smelter") in Trail,
British Columbia.[5] Between 1906 and 1995, Teck generated and
disposed of hazardous materials, in both liquid and solid form, into the
Columbia River. These wastes, known as "slag," include the heavy
metals arsenic, cadmium, copper, mercury, lead, and zinc, as well as
other unspecified hazardous materials. Before mid-1995, the Trail
Smelter discharged up to 145,000 tons of slag annually into the
Columbia River. 176
In considering the extraterritorial application of the U.S. Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), the court held that, “applying
CERCLA here to the release of hazardous substances at the Site is a domestic, rather than
an extraterritorial application of CERCLA, even though the original source of the
hazardous substances is located in a foreign country.”177
The examples of the CCRIFC’s application to the IJC and the Colville tribes
litigation against Teck Cominco are illustrative of the sophisticated efforts that
Indigenous peoples on both sides of the US-Canada border are bringing to bear in an
effort to address and mitigate the transboundary impacts of development upon their rights
in the Columbia basin. It is notable however that Indigenous rights and interests within
this transboundary basin continue to be framed in terms of domestic issues.
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c)

Discussion
In future negotiations over the Columbia River, Canada and the United States are

likely to be aligned with respect to hydropower, flood control and the maximization of
financial benefits from development through cooperation. While negotiations are likely
to be complex given the financial interests involved and the complicating factors of
climate change and growing domestic demands, their positions will likely be
ideologically aligned. At issue is how to integrate Indigenous peoples’ interests, rights
and values into the negotiations regarding transboundary development. Davidson &
Paisely summarize Indigenous peoples’ interest in future negotiations as follows:
First Nations also seek to minimize the erosion impacts of water and wind
on potential archaeological zones; maintain the cultural, aesthetic and
ecological context of important cultural resources and spiritual sites;
minimize the impact of destructive human behaviour (eg. Traffic) on
potential archeological zones, and maximize abundance and diversity of fish
and wildlife populations to support First Nations harvesting and associated
activities.178
Not surprisingly, Indigenous peoples seek to apply Indigenous principles to the
governance of the Columbia River basin. Davidson & Paisely observe, that the Ktunaxa
hope that “three values, in particular, will inform water governance in the post-treaty
environment: (i) the sacred, life sustaining value of water; (ii) a holistic, ecoystemic
view; and (iii) a long-term perspective.”179
From the perspective of current international water law discourse, the cooperation
between Canada and the United States regarding development of the Columbia Basin is
illustrative of successful state negotiations. The peaceful commitment to mutual gains
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through cooperative development is held up as a successful model for transboundary river
governance. It is a story of cooperation, reciprocity and mutual gains.180
The impact upon Indigenous peoples is downplayed within the context of
international law and discourse. While the emergence of domestic legal rights for First
Nations peoples in both Canada and the United States will dramatically impact the nature
of future negotiations over the Columbia Basin, Indigenous peoples have no recourse
within international water law.181 The UN Watercourse Convention fails to situate
Indigenous peoples, interests and principles within transboundary governance or provide
an effective avenue for the assertion of their internationally recognized legal rights.
Indigenous peoples’ efforts to assert their rights and status within transboundary river
development remains defined by domestic policies, domestic laws and is treated as a
domestic issue, albeit an extremely complex one.
Moreover, Indigenous rights and interests in the Columbia Basin continue to be
characterized as part of the cost of development that is weighed against the benefits of
cooperative state development. Historically, Canada and the US have addressed claims
by resident Indigenous peoples by considering or providing compensation for past
infringements.182 The existing ethos of “mutual gains” and “optimal utilization” within
the Columbia River Basin begs the question of whether the adverse impacts of future
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developments on Indigenous peoples can be simply quantified and characterized as a cost
of development.183
Indigenous peoples within the Columbia River Basin tell a very different story
about the Columbia River. Their livelihoods and culture have been irreparably harmed
by past development, with little compensation, and their interests regarding future
development are constrained by national policies that subordinate their claims to state
interests. While the rights of Indigenous peoples have been affirmed under UNDRIP and
other instruments, they currently have no recourse to protect those rights under
international water law.
Notwithstanding outstanding aboriginal title and traditional territorial claims,
Indigenous peoples within the Columbia River Basin are relatively empowered through
the Canadian and American legal systems to pursue their rights to consultation and
participatory decision-making. However, Indigenous peoples in other regions of the
world are even more vulnerable to state development of transboundary rivers in those
regions where they have no recourse to either national or international law.
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2.3.2

Yarlung Tsangpo-Brahmaputra River (Asia)
The mighty Brahmaputra, holy site of the great synthesis, has for untold
centuries been propagating the message of unity and harmony . . . 184
Bhupen Hazarika, PhD
Assamese singer and lyricist
The Brahmaputra, the river normally neglected by most writers,
is probably the most significant in the present day geopolitical context.
Dr. S.D. Mishra185
The largest river in Tibet, the Yarlung Tsangpo (Tsangpo) River emerges from

the sacred Kailash mountain range in the Himalayas of western Tibet at an elevation of
5300 meters and flows east across the heights of the Tibetan Plateau.186 Deep within the
jungles and gorges of eastern Tibet, the river arches in a great horseshoe bend (the “Great
Bend”) and travels north, northeast and then south and southwest into the Indian province
of Arunachal Pradesh where it is known as the Dihang or Siang.187 (See map of the
Tsangpo-Brahmaputra Basin at Figure 2). It then joins the flow of two other TransHimalayan rivers, the Dibang and the Lohit, where it becomes known as the
Brahmaputra. The Brahmaputra then passes through the Indian state of Assam before
winding south to Bangladesh as the Jamuna River where it joins with the Ganges and the
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Mengha and forms part of the world’s largest river delta in the Bay of Bengal.188 In total,
the Basin drains an area of approximately 651,000 square kilometres and the entire
journey is 2880 kilometres.189
The Tsangpo-Brahmaputra holds many distinctions within the natural world. The
Brahmaputra basin is one of the most ecologically diverse areas in the world. Within
Assam alone, there are 51 different forest types and subtypes occurring in the region.190
It also holds the distinction of traversing one of the most earthquake-prone regions in the
world.191 Scientists have concluded that the region around the Brahmaputra crosses the
Indian and Eurasian tectonic plates. It is the convergence of these two plates that has
resulted in the formation of the Himalayan mountain range.192
The Tsangpo is also the highest river in the world as it passes through the Greater
Himalayas, averaging 6000m, before emerging as the Brahmaputra on the plains of
Arunachal Pradesh. Only recently surveyed in its entirety, in 1999, the Tsangpo flows
through the world’s deepest gorge (the “Great Canyon”), estimated to be eight times as
steep and three times as deep as the Grand Canyon in Colorado.193 At the eastern most
point of the river in Tibet, the river flows through the Great Bend before plummeting
over 3000 km in approximately 200km. Its hydropower potential is unprecedented. The
river is also unique in the world for never having been developed. Recently, however, it
has become the focus of proposed mega-development projects by two global super
188
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powers. Both China and India have plans to harness the river to support their burgeoning
populations.
Transboundary management of the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra River poses unique
challenges to the political actors involved and the world at large. First, the geopolitical
relations between China, the Tibetan Government in Exile, and India is rife with
unresolved conflict regarding sovereignty, political boundaries and uncooperative water
management. In addition, the power dynamics are unique in that there exist not one but
two regional powers that are also quickly emerging as the highest consumers of energy
and resources in the world.194

a)

State Interests in the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra River Basin
There are four states that share the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra Basin: China, India,

Bangladesh and Bhutan. While the interests and issues confronting Bangladesh and
Bhutan are formidable as vulnerable downstream states, this case study is limited to a
consideration of the interests and agendas of the two regional superpowers, China and
India as they may impact upon Indigenous peoples in the Basin.
i) China
All of China’s water resources are under stress.195 China’s river basins are
plagued by numerous environmental problems, including unregulated toxic dumping,
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flooding caused by deforestation, severe water shortages, unsustainable river basin
management, and aggressive big dam development.196 The country currently holds 22%
of the world’s population but only 8% of the global freshwater resources.197 In addition,
42% of China’s farmland is located in the semi-arid north that contains only 8% of the
country’s freshwater runoff.198
China’s population is expanding at an extraordinary rate and its growing
consumption of resources and demand for energy to fuel economic development is
exacting a high toll on the global environment.199 Increasingly, China has turned to
hydropower to meet this demand. Since 1949, China has built approximately 22,000 of
the world’s 45,000 large dams.200
China continues to demonstrate a “paradigmatic faith” 201 in large-scale water
development projects. The World Commission on Dams published a report in 2000 in
which it questioned the utility and desirability of large dams, however China dismissed
those findings as biased and impinging on its absolute territorial sovereignty.202 China’s
ethos of big dam development is most aptly exemplified by its construction of the Three
Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River, which has displaced millions of people, making it the
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“largest human relocation effort in world history”.203 Critics of the project have also
raised concerns regarding the adverse impact of the dam on local communities,
archaeological sites, cultural relics and the environment.
China has recently expressed interest in developing the Great Canyon of the
Tsangpo River in the Tibet Autonomous Region to satisfy the nation’s demands for water
and hydropower.204 The power potential available from a hydroelectric plant at the Great
Bend would generate 40,000 megawatts, more than twice the electricity produced by the
Three Gorges Dam.205 There are also reports that China intends to divert water
northward to China’s arid northwestern provinces of Xinjiang and Gansu (Gobi Desert).
There are now reports that China is considering the development of a 38 gigawatt
hydropower plant at the Great Bend “ that would be more than half as big again as the
Three Gorges dam, with a capacity nearly half as large as the UK's national grid.”206
Tsering reports that China is also considering another 28 along the Tsangpo. The
construction of a mega dams along the Tsangpo represents a direct threat to the
Indigenous peoples of eastern Tibet and Arunchal Pradesh as well as the water security of
millions of people living downstream in India, Bhutan and Bangladesh. Aside from the
203

Tsering (2005), supra note 186 at 34.
The Economist, “Unquenchable Thirst: A growing rivalry between India, Pakistan and China over the
region’s great rivers may be threatening South Asia’s peace” The Economist (19 November 2011), online:
The Economist <http://www.economist.com/node/21538687> [The Economist]; Tsering, (2005) supra note
186; Claude Arpi, “Dams on the Brahmaputra,” (1 May 2010), online: Claude Arpi Blogspot
<http://claudearpi.blogspot.com/2010/05/dams-on-brahmaputra.html> [Arpi (2010)]; Claude Arpi,
“Diverting the Brahmaputra: Declaration of War?” Rediff (23 October 2003), online: Rediff
<www.rediff.com///news/2003/oct/27spec.html> [Arpi (2003)]; Danielle Mitterand, “Tibet Set to Become
Next Flashpoint” TibetNet (14 June 2004), online: Students for a Free Tibet
<www.studentsforafreetibet.org/article.php?id=271> [Mitterand].
205
The Economist, ibid; Tsering (2005), supra note 186; Claude Arpi, “Himalayan Rivers: Geopolitics and
Strategic Perspectives” Indian Defence Review (17 February 2011), online: Indian Defence Review
<http://www.indiandefencereview.com/geopolitics/Himalayan-Rivers-Geopolitics-and-StrategicPerspectives.html> [Arpi (2011)].
206
Jonathan Watts, “Chinese engineers propose world's biggest hydro-electric project in Tibet” The
Guardian (24 May 2010), online: The Guardian
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/may/24/chinese-hydroengineers-propose-tibet-dam>.
204

63

spiritual significance of the region to local Indigenous peoples, Arpi notes that the
construction of the project will bring immense hardship to the Indigenous people living in
the canyon, as they will “be forced to leave their ancestral lands.”207 Given that China
has typically not acknowledged the rights of Indigenous peoples or consulted with
downstream states with respect to engineering projects on transboundary watercourses,
there is legitimate cause for concern.208
Historically, China has exhibited a pattern of non-cooperation with respect to
transboundary rivers and has emphasized its absolute sovereign right to exploit rivers in
its territory. China was one of only three countries to vote against the UN Watercourse
Convention on the basis that the text did not reflect the absolute territorial sovereignty of
a riparian state over the watercourse that flowed through its territory.209 China’s noncompliance with international norms is illustrated by China’s diversion of the Black
Irtysh River away from Kazakhstan, which Sievers characterized as a violation of
customary international law both “in its conception and in China’s dealings with coriparians”.210 In addition, China’s failure to become a member of the Mekong River
Commission is often perceived as indicative of China’s “isolation policy”.211
China, as a powerful upstream riparian, is likely to maintain its position regarding
absolute territorial sovereignty and this, in turn, may undermine transboundary
cooperation and regional environmental protection in the region.
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ii)

India

In India, rivers are sacred. The Brahmaputra received its name as the son of Lord
Brahma and it is unique in being the only ‘male’ river in India.212 In addition to its
cultural and spiritual significance, India’s primary interests in the Brahmaputra include
hydropower, flood control, irrigation, navigation and water quality.213 Irrigation is
currently the dominant use of water in India with 92% of present usage devoted to
agriculture.214 The Brahmaputra holds the distinction as holding the greatest potential
for India and also being the least developed.215 As of 2004, only about 3% of the river’s
potential had been harnessed. India’s central challenge is to utilise the hydropower
potential of the river and transfer that power to other regions.216 In addition, population
growth is greater in northeast India than in the rest of the country and will be home to an
estimated 80 million people by 2050.217 The development of the Brahmaputra is
particularly important given that these northeastern provinces have suffered from lack of
development and social unrest. 218 It is generally believed that tapping the
Brahmaputra’s potential holds the greatest potential for invigorating and sustaining these
depressed regions of India.
The Northeastern regions of India are particularly vulnerable to China’s water
projects. A controversial breach of a dam in Tibet in 2000 resulted in devastating floods
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in Arunachal Pradesh.219 There is also concern that China will withhold water for power
generation and irrigation during the dry season while releasing water during the flood
season. In addition, India is currently engaged in a project to transfer water from surplus
regions to deficit basins by linking 30 rivers by 2020 (the “River-linking Project”).220
However, China’s threatened diversion of the Brahmaputra would render India’s River
Linking Project redundant and would severely jeopardize India’s water security.
According to one media source, “[i]f Beijing goes ahead with the Brahmaputra project, it
would practically mean a declaration of war against India.”221 .
Despite the potential for conflict, Ojha & Singh conclude that there exists a good
possibility of cooperation between India and China.222 Specifically, the authors note that
the river drops from 3,350m in the Tibetan Plateau to 800m in India, such that the ability
to efficiently harness the river’s greatest hydropower potential requires cooperation of
both countries:
The valley characteristics are such that the river at the point of diversion is
in China, and the site of the powerhouse is in India. Therefore it requires
the cooperative effort of both countries to generate energy from the
colossal ‘Power Store House’.223
A Sino-Indian bilateral agreement may appeal to both regional powers. 224
However, the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra River Basin is located in a hypersensitive
political zone. Arunachal Pradesh was also the location of the 1962 Border War between
China & India. China continues to regard India’s control of Arunachal Pradesh as an
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illegal occupation and refers to the area as South Tibet. While the parties tentatively
observe a Line of Actual Control,225 the conflict over Arunachal Pradesh remains the
greatest potential source of conflict between China and India. 226 Recently, China’s
developments on the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra dangerously close to the Sino-Indian border
have renewed concern for the threat that China poses to India.227
b)

Indigenous Peoples’ Interests in the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra River Basin
According to Tibetan legend, the Great Bend of the Tsangpo is the heart of the

mythical Shangri-La. In the sacred texts of Tibetan Buddhism, this mysterious land holds
the promise of an existence without “poverty, hatred, hypocrisy, cheating or death”.228
Tibetans believe the Great Bend to be the home of the Goddess Dorje Pagmo, Tibet’s
Protecting Diety.229 Tibetan scholar, Tashi Tsering, describes the significance of the
Tsangpo:
To the Tibetans, the Great Bend region is known as Pema Koe, the most
sacred beyul blessed by Guru Rinpoche, Padmasambhava, the Indian
Buddhist yogin credited with firmly establishing Buddhism in Tibet.
Generations of visionary Tibetan Buddhist masters have revealed "hidden
treasures" … and made journeys through the different layers of spiritual
doors of beyul Pema Koe.230
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For many, the question of Tibet’s status within China has never been adequately
resolved. China has enjoyed de facto control over the Indigenous peoples of Tibet since
the invasion by the People’s Liberation Army of China in 1949.231 China bases its claim
to Tibet on historical events dating back to the height of the Mongol imperial expansion
and the influence of Manchu Emperors in the 18th century. However, the Government of
Tibet in Exile and its supporters, assert that at the time of China’s invasion, Tibet was an
independent state recognized under international law.232 While Tibet sent an urgent
appeal for help to the United Nations, the General Assembly did not take any action for
fear of provoking a full-scale attack by China. However, in the years following China’s
military occupation of Tibet, many countries continued to recognize Tibet’s
independence during full debates on the issue in the United Nations General Assembly in
1959, 1960, 1961, and 1965. Further, in 1959, 1961 and 1965, the UN issued Resolutions
condemning the violation of Tibetan peoples’ fundamental rights and freedoms.233 Since
that time however, the United Nations has failed to adequately address the issue of
Tibet’s statehood. The lack of international resolve regarding the issue of Tibetan
peoples’ rights to self-determination and China’s human rights violations in that region
must be viewed within the context of China’s current initiatives to exploit Tibet’s natural
resources. The United Nations cannot easily facilitate negotiations towards a regional
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transboundary agreement in this watershed without also addressing the rights of the
Indigenous peoples of Tibet.234
The issue of Tibetan peoples’ self-determination has implications beyond those
raised by the Tsangpo Project. The Tibetan Plateau is the principal watershed in Asia and
the source of its 10 major rivers.235 According to Claude Arpi, “Tibet’s waters flow
down to eleven countries and are said to bring fresh water to over 85 percent of Asia’s
population, approximately 50 percent of the world’s population.”236 Environmental
governance in Tibet is therefore of paramount concern in Asia and throughout the world.
The international importance of Tibet’s resources prompted the spiritual leader of
Tibetans, the Dalai Lama, to propose a 5 Point Peace Plan to turn Tibet into a zone of
“Ahimsa”, a Sanskrit word meaning “non-violence.”237 The Dalai Lama set out his
proposal in his 1989 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech:
This included the conversion of the entire Tibetan plateau into a Zone of
Ahimsa, a sanctuary of peace and nonviolence where human beings and
nature can live in peace and harmony. … Any relationship between Tibet
and China will have to be based on the principle of equality, respect, trust
and mutual benefit.238
Maintaining the health of Tibet’s water resources is vital to the future of Asia as a whole.
Moreover, Tibetans rely upon Tsangpo and their natural environment for their spiritual
and cultural continuity.
In addition to the very high-profile plight of the Tibetan struggle for selfdetermination, there are hundreds of lesser-known Indigenous communities that live
234
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along the Brahmaputra in Arunachal Pradesh, Assam and Bangladesh. Approximately
65% of the Arunachalis belong to 20 major-collective tribes and 82 smaller tribes, many
of which are either of Tibetan or Thai-Burmese origin. The other 35% of the population
are immigrants. Similarly, Assam is characterized as “multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multireligious, multi-caste, multi-cultural, and multi-lingual”.239 This region is beset with
ongoing internal conflicts throughout the river valley.240
In September 2010, fifty-one organizations representing Indigenous peoples and
local communities in India’s Northeast signed on to a letter to India and China in an
appeal to stop the damming of the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra:
We submit this memorandum to the leaders of two of the largest economies
on this earth, India and China, hoping that there will be sanity and boldness
in dealing with the proposed dams in upper and lower reaches of Yarlung
Sangpo/Siang/Brahmaputra Rivers. Several communities in this stretch of
river identify it by several names and [attach] spiritual, cultural and
economic importance to Nature, and they are first users and in fact the
defender and protector of the river and its ecosystem. We fear that this being
not only one of the finest rivers but also the finest ecosystems on earth, the
communities surviving on this ecosystem will be destroyed by the politics of
water and energy and the game of one-upmanship of these great nations. 241
The signatories perceive the growing conflict between China and India for dominance
over the river basin as a growing threat. They further state:
We have witnessed painful conflict between India and China in the sixties
and we do not want to see the conflict continue or escalate as ultimately it is
the people [who] suffer (like those who live in Arunachal, in particular). We
see that there is already an additional conflict brewing due to the dams
proposed both by China and India. For this reason both [countries] must
refrain from building any dams in the whole stretch of this river. This will
help build peace and trust between the two countries. Building dams on

239

M Hussain, “Society in the Brahmaputra Valley” in Singh et al, supra note 186, 336 at 336.
Ibid at 349.
241
North East Peoples Alliance, “Memorandum to India and China Against Dams on Yarlung Tsangpo”, 17
September 2010, online: North East Peoples Alliance, <http://nealliance.net/nepa/memorandum-to-indiaand-china-against-dams-on-yarlung-tsangpo/>.
240

70

Siang or in Yarlung Sangpo will therefore be considered as seeking
conflict.242
The groups make two proposals:
1. Stop all existing and proposed dam construction activities on Siang River
both in China and India.
2. Collectively agree to hold these river(s) as Heritage Rivers for all future
generations to come.243
The signatories include several organizations representing Indigenous interests including:
Nefa Indigenous Human Right Organisation, Arunachal Pradesh; Forum for Indigenous
Perspectives and Action, Manipur; Dialogue on Indigenous Culture and Environment,
Nagaland; United Tribal Development Project, Manipur; Indigenous People Foundation,
Arunachal; World Mountain Peoples Forum, Meghalaya; All Tribal Student Union,
Manipur; and the Sinlung Indigenous Peoples Human Rights Organization.

c)

Discussion
The Tsangpo-Brahmaputra is a potential flashpoint for conflict in Asia. Both

China’s Tsangpo Project and India’s River-Linking Project threaten the water supply to
downstream riparians affecting millions of people and threatening the environment for
future generations. The situation is complicated by unique geopolitical dynamics that
include two regional superpowers on the one hand and extremely vulnerable Indigenous
populations on the other. The impact of the proposed projects must also be considered
within the context of climate change, flooding, deforestation, erosion and seismic
activity, which will require joint study and information sharing.
The geo-political dimensions surrounding the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra River Basin
are unique in the world. Unlike most transboundary disputes that involve one regional
242
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power, the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra is shared by two regional superpowers, which are also
emerging global powers. Between them, China and India have 40% of the world’s
population.244 Both China and India are experiencing massive population growth,
unprecedented economic development and an unsustainable demand for natural
resources. While China and India have incentives to cooperate in the development of the
Tsangpo-Brahmaputra, they also have a recent history of armed conflict in this Basin. In
addition, China’s claim to Tibet is still contested by human rights and Indigenous
activists. The development of the Tsangpo by China has the potential to further politicize
and polarize these issues within the international community and lead to further violent
conflict. Any approach to facilitating transboundary governance in this region must allow
all peoples to engage in cooperation without requiring any group to accede its position
regarding sovereignty and rights to self-determination.
In particular, the stakeholders will be challenged to overcome unique power
inequities, disputes regarding sovereignty, and the current lack of capacity for
transboundary and participatory approaches to decision-making. In addition to a myriad
of issues confronting this region, ongoing disputes regarding sovereignty in the region
make the application of international water law principles problematic in this region.
Any attempt to enforce the rights and obligations of sovereign nations regarding this river
triggers issues regarding sovereignty and potentially exacerbates tensions regarding
China’s controversial domination over Tibet and ongoing conflict between China and
India regarding disputed territories. China has expressly rejected the principles of
customary international water law as an infringement on its absolute territorial
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sovereignty.245 China might be persuaded to see the merits of a bilateral agreement with
India but historically, China has simply acted with impunity as an upstream riparian.
While the potential for a ‘mutual gains’ approach to negotiations might persuade China
and India to strike a mutually beneficial deal which is compatible with international water
law principles, it would pose considerable risk to the Indigenous peoples along the river
who will be adversely impacted by such joint development. Indigenous peoples have no
protection under international water law.
The ‘reasonable and equitable use’ doctrine and the ‘no harm’ rule codified in the
UN Watercourse Convention do not provide any protection to Tibetans or the local tribes
of Arunachal Pradesh and Assam. It is simply assumed that riparian states will represent
the best interests of the people and environment within their territory. The current
structure, “excludes minority political or ethnic groups, as well as a whole range of
political, environmental and special interest groups who may have a stake in an
international agreement.”246 The current focus on sovereignty is inconsistent with the
preservation of the internationally affirmed rights of Indigenous peoples and
environmental protection and must be revisited.247 The key may be to reframe the issue.
Green Cross International proposed that.
…instead of grappling for a restrictive middle ground between upstream
and downstream riparian claims, and mutually unsatisfactory compromise,
the problem should be reformulated and directed away from questions of
different degrees of sovereignty towards a vision of cooperation.248
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The focus on sovereignty as the organizing principle of international water law and
governance fails to adequately address the complexity of transboundary cooperation in
the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra River basin.249
In addition, advocates of participatory models of water governance will encounter
unique issues in the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra River basin given the unresolved issues
regarding sovereignty. Any encouragement or requirement for a state to adopt
participatory approaches in a region implicitly assumes that the state has the legitimate
right to govern and develop the resources in that region. There may be unintended
consequences to advocating China or India’s adoption of participatory governance in
regions that are in dispute such as Tibet or Arunachal Pradesh. For example, if the World
Bank or United Nations encourages China to adopt participatory approaches or other
specific governance strategies in Tibet, are they inadvertently legitimizing China’s claim
to sovereignty over Tibet? Could Tibetan peoples meaningfully participate in local
governance initiatives without formerly acceding to China’s claims to absolute
sovereignty? To borrow from Professor Christie’s characterization of Indigenous
peoples’ struggles in Canada, “…Aboriginal nations find themselves forced to welcome
the opportunity to be consulted about how their own lands will be exploited.”250 Even if
one accepts that China’s claim to Tibet as settled, the people of Tibet possess rights under
the international law of Indigenous peoples.251 The challenge to the international
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community is therefore how to create international laws regarding transboundary river
governance in a manner that ensures meaningful cooperation and dialogue without
inadvertently legitimizing and encouraging further colonial domination.

2.4.

Conclusions: The Problem With Sovereignty
The focus on territorial sovereignty leads to a domination of rich states over
poor, of today’s interests over tomorrow’s and of human needs over
environmental needs. This ‘logic of self-extermination’ is bound to fail and
must be replaced by a different logic. 252
Klaus Bosselmann
The doctrine of sovereignty is an obstacle against, rather than a vehicle for the

peaceful governance of transboundary rivers.253 A critical analysis of the UN
Watercourse Convention, related mainstream discourse and two case examples
demonstrates the inability of international water law to recognize the international rights
of Indigenous peoples.
The prevailing theory of international watercourse rights and obligations today is
“limited territorial sovereignty,” which dictates that “the sovereignty of a state over its
territory is said to be ‘limited’ by the obligation not to use that territory in such a way as
to cause significant harm to other states”.254 This principle is codified in the UN
Watercourse Convention and has been supported in international courts and tribunals in
cases involving international watercourses. It is generally accepted that customary
international law imposes limitations on a state’s freedom with respect to the portion of
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an international watercourse within its territory.255 This limitation upon absolute
territorial sovereignty has been heralded as an indicator of international cooperation and
sharing of resources signalling a new era of transboundary governance. However, a
closer examination of the discourse surrounding international water law reveals that
“territorial sovereignty remains the dominant limiting factor in defining the scope of
international water law.”256
The UN Watercourse Convention has been hailed by both its supporters and
detractors alike as a landmark departure from the doctrine of historical sovereignty.257
However its reliance upon sovereign status continues to operate as a barrier to Indigenous
peoples’ participation in the development and application of transboundary water law.
Indigenous peoples’ rights are not mentioned in the UN Watercourse Convention;
accordingly, they have no access to dispute resolution mechanisms under the Convention.
The equitable principles codified in the Convention simply do not apply to Indigenous
peoples. The Convention does not require states to recognize Indigenous rights ratified in
other international agreements or to obtain Indigenous peoples’ informed consent for
decisions that might impact them.258 Likewise bilateral and multilateral state agreements
that drive the evolution of customary international law principles simply do not
acknowledge or mention Indigenous rights and instead focus on maximizing mutual gains
through state cooperation. In this paradigm, Indigenous peoples’ rights are reduced to a
cost of development. The mainstream discourse and texts regarding international water
law often neglect to acknowledge Indigenous peoples’ interests in transboundary
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disputes. While transboundary water governance theories such as IWRM and IWI are
more conducive to Indigenous peoples’ participation in environmental decision-making,
Indigenous peoples are still often lumped together with other “stakeholders” such as
industry and NGOs, thereby undermining their international status and collective rights.
The issues confronting Indigenous peoples are further revealed in the two
transboundary case examples cited above. In the context of the Columbia River,
Indigenous peoples are relatively empowered with strong national legal rights. However,
their transboundary claims for compensation for past harms are routinely dismissed as a
domestic issue. While both the United States and Canada have sophisticated legal
regimes protecting Indigenous rights, both nations have been slow to acknowledge
Indigenous peoples’ international rights under UNDRIP and Canada continues to assert
that, despite its endorsement of UNDRIP, it is not customary international law.259 In this
context, Indigenous peoples’ international rights to participate in environmental decisionmaking in transboundary rivers are only realized to the extent that states agree to
recognize them. International water law does not require states to recognize or even
acknowledge Indigenous rights. Under the UN Watercourse Convention, two states
could reach a mutually beneficial agreement and proceed to develop a transboundary
river without ensuring Indigenous peoples’ participation and informed consent. They
could be well within the parameters of customary international water law while violating
a number of other ratified international conventions. Indigenous peoples are left to seek
compensation after-the-fact reinforcing the notion that their legal interests can be reduced
to a cost of development.
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In the context of the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra River, extremely vulnerable
Indigenous populations are at the mercy of two major superpowers with disputed borders,
both of which are pursuing mega-dam developments. While an agreement between
China and India would be consistent with the objectives of the UN Watercourse
Convention, a bilateral agreement emphasizing a mutual gains approach would likely be
disastrous for Indigenous populations. Even participatory approaches to governance
could have the effect of undermining long-standing claims to sovereignty asserted by
Indigenous peoples by presuming state responsibility to manage consultation processes.
One of the most glaring omissions in international water law today is the lack of a
dispute mechanism for transboundary water disputes that can be accessed by Indigenous
peoples and which integrates international environmental laws. Wolf states:
One of the greatest gaps in international water dispute resolution is the lack
of just such recognized authority. Wescoat (1992) describes the elaborate
process by which the International Law Commission, the United Nations
legal body, has taken to design a draft code of international waters. The 24year effort, only recently approved by the General Assembly, includes terms
defined by politics rather than science, vague and contradictory doctrines,
and no enforcement mechanism. Even approved, international law applies
only to States, and therefore ignores many of the ethnic minorities who
might claim water rights. Furthermore, the International Court of Justice
requires not only that both parties to a dispute agree to the Court’s
jurisdiction, but also that they agree to the specific point of law to be
decided.260
This deconstruction of the Convention, the discourse and the case examples, illustrates a
disturbing lack of acknowledgement for the international status and rights of Indigenous
peoples.261 The roots of this inequity can be traced to the emphasis on sovereignty as the
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organizing principle of international water law. The emphasis placed upon sovereign
status may operate to adversely impact upon Indigenous peoples in the following ways:
(1)

It excludes Indigenous peoples from international negotiations regarding
transboundary rivers and from participating in the development of international
water law principles;

(2)

It presumes that Indigenous peoples’ interests in transboundary rivers are a
domestic issue, thereby reinforcing Indigenous peoples as subordinate to the states
oppress them and perpetuating ongoing colonization of Indigenous peoples by
states;

(3)

It undermines international conventions and declarations that have affirmed the
rights of Indigenous peoples to fully participate in environmental decision-making;
and

(4)

It may exacerbate conflict over disputed territories and unintentionally encourage
states to expand their territories.

In addition to the impacts discussed above, the exclusion of Indigenous peoples from
participating in international governance has led to the exclusion of Indigenous values
from the development of customary international law of transboundary watercourses.
Customary international water law has been, and continues to be, largely distilled from
the bilateral and multilateral agreements between states. The Convention and discourse
are predicated upon Western perspectives of sovereignty and ownership of resources,
which perceives rivers primarily as a resource for economic exploitation.262 State
agreements are largely agreements to mutually develop and govern the river in an effort
to maximize states’ economic interests. The presumption of gains, development and
utilization dominates the discourse and negates the notion of valuing the river in its
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undeveloped state or the inherent value of conservation and protection of the watershed.
The spiritual or cultural importance of rivers throughout the world is largely absent from
the discourse.263 By relying solely upon states’ interests and a Western classical notion
of sovereignty, international water law is predicated upon values that contradict and
exclude an understanding of Indigenous peoples’ experience of sovereignty and
relationship with water.
Wouters & Tremblay caution that a critical analysis of international water law
aimed at identifying its failure to address human rights must also recognize the historical
context of both areas of law. The authors state that the UN Watercourse Convention:
… hails from the UN Charter’s higher-level objectives of maintaining
‘international peace and security’, and achieving ‘international cooperation’. Thus through treaty and state practice, rules evolved that came
to govern trans-boundary waters traversing national borders. The core focus
in this area of public international law has been the peaceful management of
shared resources – as complementary to other rules that might evolve under
the law of nations, such as ‘promoting and encouraging respect for human
rights’. Thus the origins of the discourse for each of these areas of public
international law were quite distinct and must be understood more deeply
within this context.264
While I duly acknowledge that, to date, international water law has evolved
independently from the discourse on human rights and indigenous peoples’ rights, this
purpose of this thesis is to consider how it might be improved upon in the future from an
Indigenous perspective. The first step in such an analysis must involve identifying its
shortcomings in this regard.

Critical Race Theory has informed my analysis and deconstruction of
transboundary water law to identify how the UN Watercourse Convention and the
263
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doctrine of sovereignty have operated to subordinate Indigenous peoples. The next
chapter explores several perspectives regarding Indigenous peoples’ relationship with the
concept of sovereignty. A review of the literature reveals how sovereignty has been
intentionally constructed to exclude Indigenous peoples from the dominant social
contract. It considers not only how the concept of sovereignty was manipulated and
developed by Western lawmakers to dominate Indigenous peoples and exploit natural
resources but also acknowledges the multiplicity of ways that Indigenous peoples
understand and experience sovereignty. These alternate narratives show that sovereignty
is a “social creation”265 that is both culturally and historically dependent. Once we
appreciate our role in creating and defining sovereignty, we can acknowledge our ability
to transform it and consider alternatives to transboundary governance that are premised
on mutual respect for all peoples and a vision of cooperation.
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Chapter 3:

Sovereignty as a Social Construct: Indigenous Perspectives
Sovereignty, then, is a social creation.266
Taiaiake Alfred, Mohawk

From an Indigenous perspective, the inequity that exists in transboundary water
law is rooted in the operation of the historical doctrine of sovereignty. This doctrine has
evolved to unilaterally exclude Indigenous peoples from the international legal order and
subordinate Indigenous peoples’ interests to state interests. Within the context of current
international law, the doctrine of sovereignty refers to a nation’s territorial integrity,
exclusive jurisdiction and authority over a geographic area.267 The doctrine has become
so embedded in our understanding of the modern world that it may at first seem absurd to
challenge its foundational position as a pillar of international law. However, Barker
contends that the meaning of ‘sovereignty’ can only be understood within its cultural and
historical context:
… sovereignty is historically contingent. There is no fixed meaning for
what sovereignty is – what it means by definition, what it implies in public
debate, or how it has been conceptualized in international, national or
indigenous law. Sovereignty – its related histories, perspectives, and
identities – is embedded within the specific social relations in which it is
invoked and given meaning. How and when it emerges and functions are
determined by the “located” political agendas and cultural perspectives of
those who rearticulate it into public debate or political document to do a
specific work of opposition, invitation, or accommodation.268
At its essence, the doctrine of sovereignty is a social construct designed and defined by
humans to reflect cultural values and achieve political gains. There is ample evidence
266
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that the doctrine of sovereignty has evolved within the Western legal system as a tool of
colonialism to intentionally negate Indigenous rights and gain control over land and
resources.269 In the process, the dominant discourse on sovereignty has also greatly
diminished and endangered Indigenous epistemologies, culture and identity.270 By
engaging and articulating the varied and diverse Indigenous perspectives on sovereignty
and exploring other potential modalities of sovereignty,271 a process of epistemological
and cultural reclamation is also occurring.
How we understand sovereignty is ultimately a reflection of deeply held personal
and cultural beliefs about one’s place in the world and our relationship to others. Alfred
asserts that “[t]he reification of sovereignty in politics today is the result of a triumph of a
particular set of ideas over others – no more natural to the world than any other manmade project.”272 The term is socially constructed and historically dependent.273 It is
both amorphous and unassailable. It is personal, spiritual and political. It is derived from
harmonious relations and exploited for domination and oppression. A review of the
literature reveals that Indigenous views of sovereignty are as varied and complex as
Indigenous cultures.
In this chapter, I review some of the varied understandings of sovereignty within
Indigenous scholarship. Taken together, the resulting narratives provide a counterpoint to
the dominant legal discourse and demonstrate that sovereignty is a human-made
construct, which is neither objective nor neutral. Once we understand that sovereignty is
269
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a “social creation”,274 we can begin to recognize our collective ability and responsibility
to create new laws that are inclusive of Indigenous perspectives. Historical context is
particularly relevant to a critical Indigenous analysis of the doctrine of sovereignty and
the recognition of Indigenous peoples’ rights. Richardson, Imai & McNeil observe:
We should nonetheless be vigilant of the historical context of Indigenous
rights, as failure to make the connection between the continuing impact of
past government policies and the contemporary plight of Indigenous peoples
can foster antagonism in wider society towards necessary remedial and
special measures. Moreover, some people wrongly regard the Indigenous
struggle for rights as a recent phenomenon … In fact, Indigenous resistance
to colonialism and its legal machinery has been waged for centuries, and
continues today…275
A brief review of historical Western understandings of sovereignty provides context for
exploring Indigenous peoples’ experience and understanding of sovereignty.

3.1

Providing Context: Sovereignty in Western Traditions
By art is created that great Leviathan,
called a commonwealth or state, (in Latin civitas)
which is but an artificial man …
in which the sovereignty is an artificial soul.276
Thomas Hobbes, in Leviathan (1651)

Today, the doctrine of sovereignty is deeply entrenched in international law and is
correlated with territorial integrity, exclusive jurisdiction and authority to control a
geographical area.277 However, the notion of sovereignty is an ancient one.278 Aristotle
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meditated on who should be entitled to wield moral authority over a city in his chapter on
Justice & Sovereignty in The Politics as early as 4th century BCE.279 In different
historical contexts, sovereignty has been invoked to describe an individual’s authority
over oneself, to refer to the power of God or other deities over humanity and to affirm the
inherent power of feudal lords and monarchs over their citizens. Over time, the notion of
state sovereignty evolved as a pillar of the law of nations. Barker summarizes the early
theoretical debates over sovereignty:
In some early debates, it was argued that sovereignty emanated from
individuals (citizens). Individuals possessed rights to personal freedoms that
informed their collective rights to rule themselves as nations.
…
In other debates, sovereignty was linked to the “law of nations.” Therein
nations were based on the collective rights of individuals to civil society,
life, happiness, property, justice, and defense; nations held rights to be free,
independent and respected as equals in the pursuit of securing the collective
rights of their citizens.
…
In both kinds of debates, sovereignty was about figuring out the relationship
between the rights and the obligations of individuals (citizens) and the rights
and obligations of nations (states). Sovereignty seemed to belong to nations
but was then understood to originate either from the people who made up
those nations or as a character of the nation itself (nationhood).280
Ultimately, sovereignty is about power; where it is located and why. Far from being
fixed, the concept of sovereignty is both culturally and historically dependent even within
Western classical traditions.281 This section does not endeavour to provide a
comprehensive review of Western classical traditions regarding the notion of
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sovereignty.282 Rather, it is intended as a brief overview of the evolution of Western
legal tradition of sovereignty to provide context for considering indigenous perspectives.
3.1.1

Feudal Europe
Prior to the “law of nations”,283 sovereignty was typically considered the domain

of the church as mediator of God’s will as the only “true sovereign”.284 Monarchs and
feudal lords exploited its religious associations and claimed that their right to rule was
derived from God’s will.285 In feudal Europe, individual rulers claimed sovereignty over
peasants and lesser feudal lords as a form of “absolute power over everyone and
everything” within their claimed territory.286 According to Anaya:
In the Europe of the high Middle Ages, sovereignty and political loyalties
were fragmented, resulting in shifting and overlapping political
communities. Against this backdrop of evolving political interdependencies
and the perception of a normative order applying throughout humanity,
theorists discerned rights and duties as applying beyond limited
denominations of human association such as “nation,” “state,” or
“kingdom.”287
Citizens were perceived to consent to the sovereign authority of their lords and monarchs
in return for their armies’ protection.
3.1.2

European Conquest and the New World
The discovery of the New World by Christopher Columbus radically shifted the

way Europeans conceived of sovereignty. European theorists such as Dominican clerics
Bartolomé de las Casa (1474-1566) and Francisco de Vitoria (1486-1547) raised moral
282
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and legal issues regarding the legitimacy of conquest of the New World.288 As a Roman
Catholic missionary who had spent years living among the Indigenous peoples of the
New World, de las Casas defended the “essential humanity of the Indians”. He was
outspoken in his condemnation of the brutality of Spanish conquest and questioned the
moral limits of the politics of conquest.289 De Vitoria, a theology professor who had
never traveled off the continent, took a more theoretical interest in colonization and set
about defining the rules of conquest. Anaya summarizes his contributions as follows:
Vitoria held that the Indians possessed certain original autonomous powers
and entitlements to land, which the Europeans were bound to respect. At the
same time, he methodically set forth the grounds on which Europeans could
be said validly to acquire Indian lands or assert authority over them.290
Vitoria is credited with developing “a theory of just war” to justify Spanish claims which
became pivotal to the European legitimization of conquest.291 Anaya describes how the
contributions of Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) further developed this European view of
conquest.

… Grotius affirmed that the ability to enter into treaty relationships is a
necessary consequence of the natural rights of all peoples, including
“strangers to the true religion”: … Grotius likewise endorsed the concept of
just war, … Grotius identified three broad “justifiable causes” for war or
conquest: “defence, recovery of property, and punishment”.292
Grotius’ affirmation of the rights of Indigenous peoples’ to enter into treaties was a
precursor to the European tendency towards establishing treaties with Indigenous
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peoples.293 Likewise, his elaboration of the theory of just war formed the rationalization
for colonization and domination of Indigenous peoples.294
3.1.3

Post-Westphalian Era 1658
The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 is perceived by many to signal the beginning of

the “era of the independent territorial state”295 marking as it did not only the end of the
Thirty Years War but also the political domination of the Roman Catholic Church.
Harris describes the impact of the Peace of Westphalia on our current Western
understanding of sovereignty:
The acquisition of sovereignty involved establishing and defending a
territorial claim within which the state held supreme law-making authority.
The Peace of Westphalia (1648), which established a temporary reprieve
from decades of conflict in Europe, is widely considered the moment when
emerging nation-states established the principle that each was sovereign.
The basis of political authority had shifted away from a set of personal
relationships between the sovereign and subject, and towards a notion of
exclusive jurisdiction within defined territories.296
Anaya observes that the post-Westphalian period signalled a new era in theorizing about
the state as a dichotomy emerged between individual rights and state rights.297 Anaya
identifies philosopher Thomas Hobbes and diplomat Emmerich de Vattel as key
contributors to the emerging theory of statehood.
The English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), in his major work,
Leviathan (1651), posited that individuals lived in a warlike state of nature
prior to joining civil society, represented by the state. Prominent theorists …
accepted Hobbes’s vision of humanity as a dichotomy of individuals and
states, and they began developing a body of law focused exclusively on states
under the rubric of “the law of nations”.298
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According to Hobbes, individuals lived naturally in a state of anarchic self-interest
without any natural tendency towards peace and order. Individuals were therefore drawn
towards association and entered into a “social contract” whereby a state was formed to
protect the accumulated wealth of the individuals. States derived their rights to govern
through the consent of those being governed.
In the mid-18th century, Swiss diplomat Emmerich de Vattel (1714-1769)
published The Law of Nations, or The Principles of Natural Law (1758).299 According to
Anaya:
… he defined the “Law of Nations” as “the science of the rights which exist
between Nations or States, and the obligations corresponding to these rights.
… The individual/state dichotomy underlying Vattel’s construct has
powerfully affected the tradition of Western liberal thought. In contrast to
the views of earlier naturalist theorists, the individual/state framework
acknowledges the rights of the individual on the one hand and the
sovereignty of the total social collective on the other. But it is not alive to
the rich variety of intermediate or alternative associational groupings
actually found in human cultures, nor is it prepared to ascribe to such
groupings any rights not reducible either to the liberties of the citizen or to
the prerogatives of the state.300
Anaya attributes Vattel with establishing “the foundation for the doctrine of state
sovereignty, with its corollaries of exclusive jurisdiction, territorial integrity, and nonintervention in domestic affairs”.301 Based as it was on European models of governance,
Indigenous peoples were by definition excluded from statehood.302 Anaya observes the
exclusive nature of Vattel’s definition of statehood:
The concept of the nation-state in the post-Westphalian sense is based upon
European models of political and social organization whose dominant
defining characteristics are exclusivity of territorial domain and hierarchical,
centralized authority. By contrast, indigenous peoples of the Western
299
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Hemisphere and elsewhere, at least prior to European contact, typically have
been organized primarily by tribal or kinship ties, have had decentralized
political structures often linked in confederation, and have enjoyed shared or
overlapping spheres of territorial control.303
Europeans thereby constructed the self-affirming theoretical underpinnings of
sovereignty in a manner that, from the outset, excluded Indigenous peoples from
participating in the development of international law.

3.1.4

The Marshall Trilogy
Theory was transformed into law by a trilogy of cases that came before Chief

Justice Marshall of the United States Supreme Court in the mid-19th century. These
three cases shaped American and European notions of sovereignty while providing legal
justification of their rights to colonial conquest.304 In Johnson v M’Intosh (1823), Chief
Justice Marshall concluded that the colonists obtained title to the land simply through its
“discovery” and that the “Indians” were left with only a right of occupancy.305 Barker
describes the impact of the case as follows:

… the doctrine [of discovery] established that American Indians were not
the full sovereigns of the lands that they possessed but were rather the users
of the lands that they roamed and wandered over for purpose of shelter and
sustenance. … While it was accepted that Indians maintained particular
rights associated with their status as the original inhabitants of the land, the
exclusive rights of property in the land belonged to the nation who
discovered the lands. Discovery was demonstrated by the appropriation for
agriculture.306
Barker observes how this self-affirming rationalization of colonialism became legal
precedent as “Marshall invoked [the doctrine of discovery] as though it were a well303
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founded legal principle of international law.”307 It was then integrated into American and
European policy as if it were an unassailable fact.
In Cherokee Nation v Georgia (1831), Marshall characterized Indigenous
populations as “domestic dependent nations” and likened their relationship with the
United States government as that of ward and guardian.308 The decision had the effect of
making “Indian tribes” a domestic concern and severed the link between Indigenous
peoples and international law along with any presupposed or theoretical rights Indigenous
peoples may have had to “treaties, nationhood, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and
jurisdiction”.309
In Worcester v Georgia (1832), Chief Justice Marshall further elaborated upon the
doctrine of discovery to establish that the United States government had full authority
over the lands and the people within its territory.310 Notably, Chief Justice Marshall
pointed to the Cherokee’s treaties with the United States as evidence that the Cherokee
recognized the sovereign authority of the United States.311
This trilogy of cases marked the first legal treatment of sovereignty and was
quickly incorporated into European policy in Canada, New Zealand and Australia.312
Barker observes:
The entire self-fulfilling narrative of legal, moral and social superiority
offered in such claims to doctrine as Marshall’s discovery reinvented a
sovereignty for indigenous peoples that was void of any of the associated
rights to self-government, territorial integrity, and cultural autonomy that
would have been affiliated with it in international law at the time.313
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The Marshall trilogy therefore marked the end of any consideration of Indigenous
peoples as nations under international law. Anaya points to several assumptions of the
positivist school of thought that contributed to the legitimization of colonialism as a legal
right.
The first premise … that international law is concerned only with the rights
and duties of states. … A second and related premise … that international law
upholds the exclusive sovereignty of states, which are presumed to be equal
and independent, and thus guards the exercise of that sovereignty from outside
interference. … a third premise at the core of the positivist school was that
international law is law between and not above states, finding its theoretical
basis in their consent. And a fourth premise ... was that states that make
international law and possess rights and duties under it make up a limited
universe that excludes a priori indigenous peoples outside the mold of
European civilization.314
International law quickly evolved to reinforce European entitlement to conquest and
negate Indigenous rights to sovereignty.315 Harris observes that “[c]onflict over territory
lies at the heart of colonialism.”316 By extension, conflict over territory also lies at the
heart of Western notions of sovereignty.

3.1.5

Limits of Sovereignty
Today the doctrine of sovereignty remains a foundational pillar of international

law.317 However, there is also increasing recognition of the limits of sovereignty in light
of human rights offences. Robert Odawi Porter points to the atrocities of the first and
second World Wars as marking a new era in international commitment to protect human
rights.318
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Global consensus began to emerge that there was a limit to state
sovereignty. To the extent that individual human rights might be violated by
the actions of a particular state, there evolved a belief that it was appropriate
and necessary as a matter of international law that other nations be allowed
to interfere in a state’s internal affairs.319
Porter also points to globalism as operating to erode a nation’s territorial integrity and
authority. He observes that “[i]n an era of modern commerce, communications, and
technology, the notion that there is a “sovereign” territory impervious to influence by
other nations has become increasingly absurd.”320 However, Alfred & Corntassel caution
that globalization is also another form of empire building that operates to limit
indigenous autonomy.321

3.2

Indigenous Sovereignty
We must begin to say the ‘S’ word.322
Dr. Harold Cardinal, Cree writer,
political leader, teacher, and lawyer
The concept of ‘Indigenous sovereignty’ is still in its infancy. As an emerging

and dynamic social construct, it is bound to evolve over time. Indigenous sovereignty is
referred to loosely as “self-sufficiency”323, “autonomy”324, “the most basic right of people
to govern themselves without undue influence” 325 or the right to “self-determination”326,
319
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although the latter term is mired in complexity given its association with Western legal
rhetoric.327 According to McCue, “[t]he meaning of sovereignty has yet to undergo
significant Indigenous and political treatment, definition and elaboration…”.328 Yet,
there is also a growing recognition that the development of a unified strategy regarding
sovereignty is critical to Indigenous peoples’ survival.329
According to Mohawk, there are currently two dominant views of thought
regarding Indigenous sovereignty. One holds that “Indian sovereignty”330 was created by
US Chief Justice John Marshall about 150 years ago. The other holds that Indigenous
sovereignty existed long before colonisation. Mohawk characterizes the viewpoints as
follows:
These two approaches, or points of view, have tended to divide people into
two camps. In one camp, the U.S. legal definition is what is important. As
these people see it, the pragmatic thing is to approach the subject as a topic
(or subtopic) of U.S. law, and to seek answers for a definition of Indian
nation sovereignty in court decisions and statute laws.
…
On the other side of the coin, there are Indian nationalists of many
persuasions who feel that U.S. law or Canadian law do not define
Indian sovereignty, that this sovereignty existed previously and under
its own definitions.331
RO Porter observes that, at its core, there is general consensus that Indigenous
sovereignty “rests upon the right of Indigenous peoples to define and carry out an
existence separate and apart from other peoples.”332 Beyond that, however, Indigenous
interpretations of sovereignty diverge and cover the whole range of political perspectives
from ultra-nationalists asserting absolute autonomy to neo-colonists promoting
327
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assimilation.333 Some scholars have suggested that discussion of Indigenous sovereignty
has lost its meaning within the sea of disparate opinions on the subject.334 However,
Barker observes that within the diversity of Indigenous interpretations of sovereignty
there are valuable insights to be learned about the nature of Indigenous identity. She
states:
In the historical complexities and cultural richness and diversity of these and
all indigenous communities is the truth of the heterogeneity of indigenous
identity, not only in how indigenous peoples identify themselves and their
cultures but in how their self-definitions inform the character of their unique
political perspectives, agendas and strategies for sovereignty.335
Plurality emerges as a theme and key insight into Indigenous understandings of
sovereignty and becomes a counterpoint to the “narrow fiction of a single sovereignty”336
which has historically operated to negate Indigenous identity.
The spectrum of perspectives on sovereignty poses unique challenges to a literature
review of the subject. I have attempted to present these perspectives thematically while
also remaining conscious of the potential of an unintended colonising effect that might
result by over-simplifying these perspectives or trying to categorize them. With that in
mind, I have loosely divided my literature review into three broad sections:
1. Sovereignty, Identity & Indigenous Epistemologies – In this section, I review
perspectives on Indigenous ways of knowing and explore the inextricable link
between identity and sovereignty.
2. Asserting Sovereignty – In this section, I review some Indigenous perspectives of
sovereignty within the Western legal framework both in terms of defining and
333
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asserting sovereignty as well as considering Indigenous concerns about the
potential for ”auto-colonization”.337
3. Transcending Sovereignty – In this section, I review several Indigenous scholars
who assert that discussions of sovereignty are no longer useful to Indigenous
struggles and that Indigenous scholarship and action must transcend current
Western legal frameworks.
Ultimately, these three sections are illustrative of key strategies in the struggle for
Indigenous peoples’ emancipation and survival. At their root, all of these intellectual
approaches are aimed at the common purpose of redefining Indigenous-settler
relations.338
RO Porter observes that the term sovereignty can be utilized for both offensive
and defensive purposes.339 Internationally recognized states regularly assert sovereignty
to enforce their territorial integrity, dominance and control over their land and resources.
However, RO Porter asserts that, “as used by Indigenous peoples, the term serves instead
as a basis for promoting the establishment of consensual, rather than unilateral, assertions
of state authority within their territories.”340
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3.2.1

Sovereignty, Identity and Indigenous Epistemologies
Our creation stories are one of our sources of sovereignty.
June McCue, Ned'u'ten341

Indigenous perspectives regarding sovereignty and self-determination are
inherently different from those arising from within the Western classical tradition.342
Rather than accept the Western legal definition of the term, many Indigenous scholars
have started to explore what Indigenous sovereignty means within Indigenous culture and
epistemology. There are inherent barriers to trying to articulate Indigenous ways of
understanding in an English literature review. As McCue notes, “Indigenous
understandings of sovereignty are best articulated and transmitted in the languages of the
Indigenous peoples.”343

Fairbanks also emphasizes the link between language and

sovereignty and asserts that the loss of language is ultimately a loss of sovereignty.344
The importance of language to understanding epistemology is well respected in Western
classical traditions. Students of philosophy have for centuries undertaken to learn Latin or
Greek in order to better understand the teachings of great Western philosophers with the
recognition that meaning is inevitably lost in translation. Likewise, the nuances of
Indigenous notions of sovereignty are inextricably linked to the language of the elders
who still carry ancient wisdom in the form of stories. As a non-Indigenous person who
does not know any Indigenous languages, I readily concede that this review of
Indigenous scholarship can only skim the surface of Indigenous understandings of the
subject.
341
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Sovereignty, as a social construct, is ultimately a reflection of a group’s values
regarding their place within the world and their relationship with others. As a culturally
derived construct, an understanding of sovereignty must begin with a respect for the
values and epistemologies underlying Indigenous culture and identity. Different
perspectives of sovereignty can ultimately be traced to divergent cultural and
philosophical approaches to power. Alfred contends:
Nowhere is the contrast between indigenous and (dominant) Western
traditions sharper than in their philosophical approaches to the fundamental
issues of power and nature. In indigenous philosophies, power flows from
respect for nature and the natural order. In the dominant Western
philosophy, power derives from coercion and artiface – in effect, alienation
from nature.345
McCue echoes this sentiment and draw a distinction between power and force:
From an indigenous perspective, sovereignty is not just human-centred and
hierarchical; it is not solely born or sustained through brute force. Indigenous
sovereignty must be birthed through a genuine effort to establish peace,
respect and balance in this world.346
Indigenous notions of sovereignty, then, are not based in authority or domination over
land but rather derived through balance and harmony with the natural environment.
Cheyfitz observes that a wide range of Indigenous cultures emphasize the importance of
kinship with the natural world.
… the fundamental Western opposition of nature/culture is not a category of
Native thinking because extended kinship incorporates the universe into the
social and thus conserves it with the same care that one practices with all
one’s relatives.347
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Groenfeldt notes that Western worldviews tend to characterize the environment purely as
a resource, a form of property, which can and should be valued within an economic
perspective of the world.348 Christie asserts that an appreciation of Indigenous
relationships with the natural world is central to understanding the nature of conflict
between Indigenous and Western modes of thought.
Aboriginal visions of land are often, however, of a different order. The vision
of land as a partner in a relationship – if the land is treated properly, with
appropriate respect, it provides for people. People accommodate their
behaviour to the social fabric built into the land and its spirits, with the
understanding that humans are a part of this land and the larger social fabric
and are thereby obligated to live according to the principles and rules that
maintain the societal order and harmony.349
Alfred also emphasizes the central importance of this “partnership principle”350 to
understanding indigenous sovereignty:
Indigenous philosophies are premised on the belief that the human
relationship to the earth is primarily one of partnership. … The partnership
principle, reflecting a spiritual connection with the land established by the
Creator, gives human beings special responsibilities within the areas they
occupy, linking them in a natural and sacred way to their territories.351
This ‘partnership principle’ can be characterized as a pillar of Indigenous philosophical
thought, which informs traditional Indigenous ideals about the markers of successful
nationhood. Mezey asserts “… ancient teachings inform Indians that the true mark of a
civilization is its ability to live in a location with a minimum disruption to its features.”352
The conflict between the Western settler states and Indigenous nations then, is therefore
not a competition over resources as many Westerners perceive it to be but rather a
348
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conflict of ideals stemming from divergent beliefs about humanity’s relationship to the
land and what it means to be ‘civilized’.
Christie cites Joy Harjo of the Creek people, for her insights into Indigenous
relationships with the natural world.
All landscapes have a history, much the same as people exist within cultures,
even tribes. There are distinct voices, languages that belong to particular
areas. There are voices inside rocks, shallow washes, shifting skies; they are
not silent. And there is unseen swirl through the heavens, but other motion,
subtle, unseen, like breathing. A motion, a sound, that if you allow your inner
workings to stop long enough, moves into the places inside you that mirror a
similar landscape; you too can see it, feel it, hear it, know it.353
The primacy of the ‘inner world’ is a central theme in Indigenous philosophy. In
“Aboriginal Epistemology” (1995), Ermine explores the notion that the larger community
is a physical manifestation of inner space and the wisdom gained from introspection. In
this context, “inner space is that universe of being within each person that is synonymous
with the soul, the spirit, the self or the being.”354 Ermine recognizes the role of language
and culture to transmit the wisdom and teachings derived from explorations of the inner
space:
The Old Ones had experienced totality, a wholeness, in inwardness, and
effectively created a physical manifestation of the life force by creating
community. In doing so, they empowered the people to become the ‘culture’
of accumulated knowledge. The community became paramount by virtue of
its role as repository and incubator of total tribal knowledge in the form of
custom and culture.355
Ermine states that a key insight to these teaching has been the interconnectedness of all
of creation. This wisdom permeates language, culture, identity and understandings of
sovereignty. Ermine contends that the pervasiveness of Western epistemology
353
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undermines and adversely impacts Indigenous epistemology, culture and identity by
introducing a ‘fragmentary self-world view’. Arguably, Western assumptions of
sovereignty not only negate Indigenous peoples’ access to land and resources in the outer
world but also promote “the dogma of fragmentation” in the inner world, indelibly
harming Indigenous peoples’ “capacity for holism”, which is central to Indigenous
epistemology.356 Ermine concludes that the teaching of holism is embedded within
Indigenous languages and that it is only by engaging Indigenous languages that
Indigenous epistemologies can be reclaimed.357 King clearly illustrates this point as he
observes, “[t]here really is no word for sovereign in our Lakota language. The closest we
have is Oyate or Nation which is closer to unity.”358
Deeply embedded cultural values such as the “partnership principle”,359
interconnectedness and the relevance of the “inner space”360 inform Indigenous relations
with the environment and with other peoples. The notion of Indigenous sovereignty
emerges from, and is inextricably linked to, Indigenous values, languages and identities.
From this perspective, sovereignty is “inherent” or derived “from within a people or
culture”.361 Horse & Lassiter define inherent sovereignty as follows:
Inherent sovereignty means having those rights like language and buffalo
medicine, rights that form the very foundation of who we are as Kiowa
people. Kiowas like myself hold these rights to be as self-evident and
unalienable as those rights upon which the United States was originally
founded. These are our rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.362
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Similarly, Harjo asserts, “… sovereignty is about our histories, our languages, our
religions, our elders, our ancestors, our children, our future, nationhood.”363
As with Western classical traditions, Indigenous ideas about sovereignty are often
understood in religious or spiritual terms.

The Nuxalk Nation declares that their

sovereign powers are derived from the Creator.
Their Aboriginal Title and Right to self-determination are confirmed and
strengthened by their understanding that sovereign powers [are] vested in
them by the Creator. The Nuxalk territorial lands, waters, air and all its natural
resources were given to the Nuxalk people by the Creator to provide for their
essential needs.364
Indigenous creation stories and mythology are important to understanding Indigenous
sovereignty.365 Davis points to the many Indigenous traditions that believe that the earth
itself exists only because “it is breathed into being by human consciousness”366 and that
many Indigenous peoples believe that it is their sacred responsibility to act as guardians
to the natural world. Sovereignty is defined in terms of one’s duties to the land rather
than rights to exploit the land.367 Indigenous rituals, sacrifice and rites of passage then
reinforce this sacred relationship between the human, spiritual and natural worlds.368
Indigenous scholar, teacher and poet, Peter Cole illustrates this interconnectedness (best
read aloud):
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as first peoples of this land our responsibilities include
to take into accountability not just measurability
our relationships with the rest of creation
we follow our original instructions as orally passed on
as well as continually relearned in our ceremonies rituals daily protocols
we work to regenerate mutual relationships interpenetrating considerations
ethics is not an add-on or a form to fill in
it is intimate integration with the deep structure of our understanding
of creation including its ongoingness its pre- co- and post-emptiveness . . .
do we dare move a stone knowing that it has a spirit
knowing it has been t/here a thousand millennia
do we dare dig into our mother the earth our earth the mother
even with our hands even with our thoughts our metaphors
and not remember we are all related369
Groenfeldt contends that many of the conflicts between Indigenous peoples and Western
forces can be traced back to the Western world’s negation of Indigenous spirituality
through its preoccupation with economic development. In this way, conflict is borne out
of the domination of Western values over Indigenous values.
McCue cautions that European-derived notions of power, sovereignty and
colonialism operate at the “expense of human and ecological diversity.”370 Groenfeldt
argues that Indigenous value systems must be preserved to ensure “value diversity” and
provide alternatives to Western culture as it becomes increasingly apparent that the
Western economic value system is unable to cope with the growing litany of problems
that confront the world.371

Davis similarly calls for the protection and preservation of

the world’s “ethnosphere”, the cultural equivalent to the biosphere which he defines as
“the sum total of all thought and dreams, myths, ideas, inspirations, intuitions, brought
into being by the human imagination since the dawn of consciousness”. Davis asserts, “it
is not change or technology that threatens the integrity of the ethnosphere. It is power:
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the crude face of domination.”372 As Alfred observes, “Indigenous perspectives offer
alternatives, beginning with the restoration of a regime of respect.”373
The intellectual struggle to develop a unified strategy around sovereignty can be
seen as a key part of a larger battle for Indigenous emancipation; to be free from
domination – from a political perspective but also from an intellectual and cultural
perspective. RO Porter contends that the battle being fought over sovereignty is
essential to the survival of Indigenous peoples:
From my perspective, sovereignty is the fundamental basis for the existence
of Indigenous societies. This perspective is rooted in the view that without
such autonomy, there is no long term ability to shape one’s own destiny, and
thus no way to live a distinct existence.374
To the extent that institutions built upon Western notions of sovereignty continue to
propagate the domination, control and exploitation of land, resources and people, then
Western classical sovereignty is arguably a weapon in an ongoing “ethnocide”375 and
assimilation of peoples through its implicit negation of Indigenous values and culture.
A review of the literature suggests that inherent Indigenous sovereignty is derived
from culture, language, religion, values and identity. Vine Deloria asserts that
Indigenous sovereignty consists “more of continued cultural integrity than of political
powers and to the degree that a nation loses its sense of cultural identity, to that degree it
suffers a loss of sovereignty”376 However, Corntassel & Primeau argue that expanding
the concept of sovereignty to include cultural integrity simply complicates the debate and

372

Davis (2003), supra note 366 at 15:05.
Alfred (2005), supra note 40 at 46.
374
RO Porter, supra note 10 at 231.
375
Davis (2003), supra note 366 at 16:20.
376
Vine Deloria, Jr, “Self-Determination and the Concept of Sovereignty” in Roxanne Dunbar Ortiz, ed,
Economic Development in American Indian Reservations (New Mexico: University of New Mexico, 1979)
22, reprinted in RO Porter, supra note 10, 52 at 54.
373

104

“serves to dilute the meaning of sovereignty in international law.”377 They also note
Indigenous peoples’ right to preserve their cultural integrity is already enshrined in
international law. The debate may therefore be reduced to one of semantics.
Regardless, of how inherent Indigenous sovereignty ultimately informs strategies
within international legal discourse, valuing the plurality of unique expressions of
Indigenous sovereignty is nevertheless an important step in reclaiming Indigenous
epistemology and preserving Indigenous values.378 Barker observes that Shawnee
scholar, Glenn T. Morris, Mohawk scholar Taiaiake Alfred and other Indigenous theorists
are calling for the advancement of “intellectual sovereignty” as an emerging field of
inquiry aimed at de-colonizing Indigenous epistemologies of law and methodological
perspectives by moving beyond “the colonial legacies of concepts like sovereignty and
nationhood.”379 This can best be achieved by returning to Indigenous epistemologies and
languages and disengaging completely from the dominant legal discourse regarding
sovereignty. In stark contrast to this intellectual approach, other Indigenous activists and
scholars continue to pursue their autonomy and assert their claims for sovereignty within
the dominant Western framework.
3.2.2

Asserting Sovereignty
The majority of Indigenous scholars and activists to date have engaged sovereignty

from a political and legal struggle rather than an epistemological one. This section
reviews Indigenous perspectives regarding the quest for autonomy by asserting the
existence of sovereignty in a manner consistent with Western colonial rhetoric. Anaya
identifies two primary arguments for claims to Indigenous sovereignty. One he calls the
377
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“historical sovereignty approach” while the other involves pursuing rights of selfdetermination within the lexicon of human rights law (human rights approach).380 This
section will consider only the former approach. Anaya characterizes the “historical
sovereignty approach” as follows:
Under this approach, self-determination is invoked to restore the asserted
“sovereignty” of an historical community that roughly corresponds to the
contemporary claimant group. This approach generally accepts the premise
of Western theoretical origins of a world divided into territorially defined,
independent or “sovereign” states. However, this approach perceives an
alternative and competing political geography based on an assessment of
historically based communities.381
The aspiration of most of the world’s Indigenous peoples has been to establish their
autonomy “within the framework of existing states.”382
Western conceptions of sovereignty are most often correlated with autonomy383,
power,384 control,385 authority,386 and self-governance387. RO Porter defines sovereignty
with reference to European norms regarding the law of nations.
“Sovereignty” is, after all, an English word referring to the power of a
particular nation to exercise governmental authority over a particular territory.
It is a classic term of European international law referring to the absolute and
inviolate power of a nation to manage generally its own affairs and, in
particular, its internal affairs.388

380

S James Anaya, “The Capacity of International Law to Advance Ethnic or Nationality Rights Claims”
(1990) 75 Iowa LRev 837 as reprinted in RO Porter, supra note 10, 681 at 684 [Anaya (1990)].
381
Ibid at 682-683 [emphasis added].
382
Akwesasne Notes, supra note 10 at 715 [emphasis added].
383
RO Porter, supra note 10 at 231.
384
RO Porter, supra note 10 at 3.
385
Christie, supra note 250 at 28.
386
RO Porter, supra note 10 at 3.
387
Gourd, supra note 325 at 705.
388
RO Porter, supra note 10 at 3. However, the etymology of the word sovereignty derives from a French
word. According to the Online Etymology Dictionary it is “from Anglo-Fr. sovereynete, from O.Fr.
souverainete, from soverain (see sovereign), meaning "authority, rule" and is recorded from late 14c.; sense
of "existence as an independent state" is from 1715.” See Online Etymology Dictionary
<http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=sovereignty>.

106

Ultimately, sovereignty refers to decision-making authority regarding a
discrete geographic area. Christie defines Indigenous sovereignty as
follows:
The appropriate definition of Aboriginal sovereignty, then, must aspire to
capture the essential notion of linkages between political (i.e. decisionmaking) communities and discrete tracts of land. For the purposes of this
project Aboriginal sovereignty can describe (a) the ability of an Aboriginal
nation to control and exercise the processes that go into the ongoing project of
establishing and maintaining a collective identity and (b) the ability of this
nation to use this collective self-identity to make decisions regarding how its
people, collectively and individually, relate to its territory.389
Within international law, the test of sovereignty is evidenced, in part, by a
nation’s ability to enter into agreements with other nation states. Gourd sets
out the internationally accepted criteria for sovereignty as follows:
Sovereignty, at a minimum, is the right to self-government. In addition, a
group must meet a set of internationally accepted criteria to possess all the
attributes of sovereignty:
(1) A group must have citizens
(2) The group must have territory over which the government has civil
and criminal jurisdictional authority;
(3) The group must have a process to establish public policy (…)
(4) The capacity to enter into foreign relations. That government, then,
must have relationships with other “recognized governments”.390
Many Indigenous scholars point to treaties and the treaty making process as evidence that
settler states expressly recognized Indigenous peoples’ pre-existing sovereignty.
Foreign relations and the existence or lack of existence of treaties between settlers
and Indigenous peoples has become central in assertions of Indigenous sovereignty. On
the one hand, scholars assert that settlers expressly recognized Indigenous peoples’ preexisting sovereignty through extensive treaties, complex trading agreements and express
recognition of Indigenous rights to occupancy. 391 On the other hand, other Indigenous
peoples have pointed to the lack of treaties in many cases to demonstrate that there has
389
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never been any cessation of land or implied forfeit of sovereignty. Both of these
approaches to asserting historical sovereignty face legal limitations and practical
challenges.
a)

Prior Sovereignty as Evidenced by Treaty Making Process
The treaty making process is taken as de facto evidence that colonial powers

recognized the existing sovereignty of Indigenous nations. Corntassel & Primeau
consider the strategy of using the treaty-making process as a means to assert “prior”
sovereignty392.
“Prior sovereignty” refers to the argument that antecedent to the invasion of
the North American continent by the European powers, Indian communities
exercised sovereignty over themselves and that, at least in the initial stages
of contact, this sovereignty was formally recognized by the colonial powers
via the treaty-making process.393
Barker notes that the issues of territorial boundaries and jurisdiction were the primary
subjects of such treaties.394 Oneida argues that Europeans recognized sovereignty of
Indigenous populations within their own legal framework when they entered into treaties,
established trading relationships and recognized “Indian right of occupancy”.395

This

approach can utilize the vast and documented history of Indigenous-colonist relations to
support an argument for pre-existing Indigenous sovereignty.
However, Corntassel & Primeau caution that there are problems with this
approach. First, they note that the argument is flawed to the extent that it relies upon
treaty making as evidence of the international community’s collective acknowledgement
of Indigenous peoples’ prior sovereignty. The authors cite the maxim pacta sunt
392
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servanda,396 which underlies all treaty law and refers to the obligation of parties to a
treaty to carry out the terms of the treaty as binding and perform their obligations in good
faith.397 If the international community sincerely recognized the legal force of treaty
making and the prior sovereignty of Indigenous peoples, then there should have been
some outrage or consequence in light of the settlers’ repeated failure to honour those
treaties. There was not.
The lack of response on the part of the international community to the
abrogation of these treaties should speak volumes as to the status of
indigenous populations within the Community of “civilized” nations at that
time.
…
The fact that pacta sunt servanda was not adhered to by the colonial powers in
their dealings with indigenous groups does much to undermine the central
premise of the strategy advocating the “trail of broken treaties” as a means of
reclaiming “prior sovereignty”. 398
Secondly, Corntassel & Primeau note that the prior sovereignty argument is not an
inclusive one as there are a vast number of Indigenous groups that were not invited to
participate in the treaty-making process.399

For many other Indigenous peoples’, the

process of treaty making became nothing more than a process of rubber-stamping their
relocation to reserves.400 The authors conclude:
A treaty-based approach is legally questionable and ultimately has limited
applicability – it addresses the situation of a small minority of the world’s
indigenous populations, and could only exacerbate an already nearly
intractable state-centric system.401
Even where treaties do exist, there continues to be on-going disputes regarding their
interpretation and enforceability.
396
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b)

Prior Sovereignty As Evidenced by Lack of Treaty
There are also some Indigenous nations who can point to a long trail of historical

documents asserting their nationhood and their legal right to sovereign control over their
territories. In 1997, the Lil’wat Nation (also known as the Lillooet Tribe) sought
membership into the United Nations asserting that “we have not signed any treaties or
have not been conquered in warfare thus our title and rights to the land have not been
extinguished.”402 They also assert that the Canadian government does not represent their
people nor is it able to speak on their behalf. In support of their application, the Lil’wat
Nation attached “The Declaration of the Lillooet Tribe”, signed by their Ancestral Chiefs
on May 10th, 1911 which read:
STATEMENT OF REAFFIRMATION OF THE 1911 LILLOOET TRIBAL
DECLATION403
WE, THE SOVEREIGN STL’ATL’IMX NATION do in our name and the
name of our fore-bearers affirm and reaffirm the May 10, 1911 Lillooet
Declaration. We speak the truth, and we speak for our whole people from
ancient time to the times yet uncounted.
WE, REAFFIRM that as a People we are the Rightful owners of our land
which has been our home since time immemorial. It is our duty as a people
to respect and live with our brothers the fish, bear, deer, wolf, raven, eagle,
and the others among our brothers. We are bound by our Stl’atl’imx laws,
to respect and live with the trees and other plants of our land. We are bound
to protect and use well those things in nature which have been given in our
trust.
WE REAFFIRM that as a People we have a duty to ourselves to protect,
defend, comfort and care for the well-being of all our generations past,
present and future. We declare that we are and intend to remain
economically, culturally, socially, linguistically, spiritually, selfdetermined.
WE REAFFIRM that as a sovereign people, we are obligated to ensure only
one system of government in our original title to Stl’atl’imx territory waters
and resources. As a People, we accept the duty to ensure the common well
being of our Nation and reaffirm our inherent right to govern ourselves in
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accordance with our traditional institutions and customs and law in so
doing, to promote and defend our right to survive as a People.
WE REAFFIRM that as a People we seek peaceful and friendly relations
with our neighbours and peoples throughout the world. It is our duty to
perfect all of our relations on the basis of sovereign equality.
IN THE NAME OF OUR GRANDFATHERS AND GENERATIONS OF
STL’ATL’IMX YET UNBORN, WE DECLARE OUR SOLEMN
COMMITMENT TO THESE PRINCIPLES AND TO WHATEVER
COLLECTIVE ACTION MAY BE NEEDED TO DEFEND THEM.404
Notably, the Lil’wat Nation’s declaration not only asserts sovereignty but also includes a
corresponding description of the duties that a sovereign nation must abide by under
Stl’atl’imx laws.

Explicit in this declaration is the assertion that sovereignty is

correlated with duties and obligations to the environment and peaceful relations with all
people and all species.
In a letter dated August 25, 1910 to Sir Wilfrid Laurier, then Prime Minister of
Canada, the Chiefs of the Shushwap, Okanagan and Couteau Tribes of British Columbia
outlined the history of their relations with the white settlers and demanded justice be
done.
[The whites] say there are no lines, except what they make. They have taken
possession of all the Indian country and claim it as their own. Just the same
as taking the “house” or “ranch” and, therefore, the life of every Indian tribe
into their possession. They have never consulted us in any of these matters,
nor made any agreement, “nor” signed “any” papers with us. They ‘have
stolen our lands and everything on them’ and continue to use ‘same’ for
their ‘own’ purposes. They treat us as less than children and allow us ‘no
say’ in anything. They say the Indians know nothing, and own nothing, yet
their power and wealth has come from our belongings. The queen’s law
which we believed guaranteed us our rights, the B.C. government has
trampled underfoot. This is how our guests have treated us – the brothers
we received hospitably in our house.405
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The Declaration of the Tahltan Tribe (October 18, 1910) also claims “the sovereign right
to all the country of our tribes” on the basis that no agreement or treaty was ever made
with their peoples.406 One hundred years later and there are still no treaties with these
peoples. Instead, Indigenous peoples in British Columbia and elsewhere have endured
and survived aggressive assimilation policies, which included forcibly removing children
from their families and placing them in residential schools and prohibiting Indigenous
languages and cultural practices.407 In this context, the evolution of Western sovereignty
took place as one part of a comprehensive policy of ethnocide despite repeated and
sophisticated appeals to justice.
c)

Limitations & Challenges of the Historical Sovereignty Approach
Despite the historical documentary evidence and appeals to justice, claims to

sovereignty by Indigenous groups face major limitations to these arguments in
international law. The doctrine of sovereignty is deeply embedded in international law
and, even in an era of post-colonialism, recognition of new states is rare. Anaya asserts
that claims for Indigenous autonomy within the historical sovereignty approach are
limited by three principles of international law. 408

First, the doctrine of intertemporal

law requires that historical events be judged according to the law in effect at the time of
their occurrence. This is problematic to the extent that the doctrines of conquest and
effective occupation were accepted legal tools during the perpetuation of colonialism.
Second, the principle of recognition in international law assumes a state’s entitlement to
sovereignty “when a preponderance of states, international organizations, and other
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relevant international actors recognize a state’s boundaries and corresponding
sovereignty over territory”.409 To the extent that the sovereignty of settler states is
already recognized internationally there is no tendency to question whether the territory
was lawfully acquired. Third, Anaya cites the “normative trend within international legal
process toward stability through pragmatism over instability.”410 Anaya asserts that
together, these three limitations pose a potentially insurmountable barrier to claims for
Indigenous sovereignty within international law.
In addition to the limitations set out be Anaya above, there are practical barriers in
the pursuit of sovereignty, including (i) a peoples’ capacity to govern themselves and (ii)
the ever-present potential for assimilation.
i)

Capacity for Governance

Indigenous sovereignty requires not only an assertion of sovereignty, but also the
ability to act effectively in the capacity of a sovereign nation. RB Porter contends that
Indigenous sovereignty is comprised of three facets: “(i) the degree to which Indians
believe in the right to define their own future, (ii) the degree to which Indians have the
ability to carry out those beliefs, and (iii) the degree to which tribal sovereign acts are
recognized both within the tribe and by the outside world.”411 RB Porter contends that
the quest for sovereignty is limited by rampant tribal government dysfunction including
“poor administration, dependence and infighting”.412 Each of these factors impacts upon
Indigenous peoples’ ability to act with authority as a sovereign nation. The current
challenges faced by Indigenous peoples to govern themselves are a direct result of years
409
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of cultural oppression living under colonial rule. Modern-day tribal governments have
little resemblance to traditional Indigenous institutions and face the onerous task of
uniting fragmented communities, which have endured years of aggressive assimilation:
Quite literally, if a tribal community is comprised of people who were raised
in traditional way, speak the native language, and practice the traditional
religion, then the tribal members who were educated in the missionary
school, know little of the traditional culture, and live an assimilated lifestyle
might as well be from another planet. It is hard to imagine a greater chasm
of identity between people all professing to be living together in the same
community. It is against this backdrop that tribal government must function.
The mechanism set in place to channel the passion and power of our
increasingly diverse communities – our governments – is wholly inadequate
to meet the challenges of our modern tribal nations.413
Claims for Indigenous sovereignty can be undermined if effective and unified tribal
governments do not accompany them. RB Porter contends that effective internal
governance structures are a critical part of a strategic claim for sovereignty. This does
not mean that Indigenous peoples need to agree all the time in order to be seen as
effective, but he asserts that “we should be able to find a way for all of our members to
agree as to the process by which we govern ourselves. Only when we have all of our
people working together will be able to maximize our sovereign potential, and thus allow
our future generations to survive.”414 RB Porter places particular importance on the role
of tribal laws and dispute resolution mechanisms to the realization of sovereignty:
… sovereignty means that the Indians themselves must resolve their own
problems and manage their own affairs. The first step in that process is for
Indian nations to realize that the tribal dispute resolution mechanism has
everything to do with how tribal members interact with one another, how
capable they are of working with each other on common endeavors, and
thus, how strong their families, clans, communities, and nations will be.415
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Throughout this literature review, there has been surprisingly little attention paid
to what sovereignty would actually look like given that Indigenous nations are situated
within internationally recognized sovereign states. Christie provides several examples of
what state-to-state relations sharing geographic territory could look like416 and several
scholars provide insight into strategies for obtaining sovereignty but overall, there is very
little attention paid to the pragmatics of governance when sovereignty is actually
obtained. An emerging issue is whether the citizens of sovereign Indigenous nations
would lose the protection of civil liberties embedded within the settler state’s
constitutions.417 The loss of constitutional rights such as the freedom of expression would
be particularly threatening in communities divided by tribal family politics.
ii)

Sovereignty and Auto-colonization

Perhaps the most provocative challenge to sovereignty claims predicated upon
international law is the vocal criticism from Indigenous scholars and leaders that the
perpetuation of Western legal concepts and institutions is a dangerous form of selfassimilation.

RO Porter describes “auto-colonization” as “the process by which

colonized people may adopt and engage in behaviors that are rooted in the policies of the
colonizing nation but which are rationalized as one’s own.”418 Indigenous political
leaders are also susceptible to corruption and neo-colonialism. According to Adams,
neo-colonialism occurs when the privileged governing elite within an Indigenous nation
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are given benefits by the settler state “in return for their help in pacifying the
majority.”419
Alfred contends that the quest for sovereignty is a red herring that merely leads to
further integration with the colonial agenda. He argues that the state has created
“incentives for integration” by offering token financial contributions and inconsequential
measures of self-administration.420 Alfred asserts that Western concepts of power are
ultimately incompatible with Indigenous epistemology and values, and cites Boldt &
Long for the proposition that the “endorsement of hierarchical authority and a ruling
entity constitutes a complete rupture with traditional indigenous principles.” 421 Alfred
observes:
Traditional indigenous nationhood stands in sharp contrast to the dominant
understanding of “the state”: there is no absolute authority, no coercive
enforcement of decisions, no hierarchy, and no separate ruling entity. In
accepting the idea that progress is attainable within the framework of the
state, therefore, indigenous people are moving towards acceptance of forms
of government that more closely resemble the state than traditional
systems.422
Alfred contends that a claim to sovereignty can unintentionally lead to Indigenous
peoples framing their political goals with reference to Western ideals and “the common
criteria of statehood – coercive force, control of territory, population numbers,
international recognition – come to dominate discussion of Indigenous peoples’ political
goals as well.”423 The state readily exploits these “theoretical inconsistencies”.424
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Alfred concludes that up till recently, sovereignty has been an effective vehicle for
critiques of colonialism but that ultimately Indigenous emancipation is best served by
undermining the “myth of state sovereignty”.425

3.2.3

Transcending/Reclaiming Sovereignty
Sovereignty carries the horrible stench of colonialism.426
Joanne Barker, Lenape

Alfred, Corntassel, Barker and others have strongly argued that the quest for
sovereignty is not only inconsistent with Indigenous values but also a major obstacle in
the struggle for decolonisation.427 These scholars contend that once you engage the
epistemological roots of sovereignty it becomes apparent that there is no way to engage
sovereignty without perpetuating the colonial machine. Correlated as it is with
assumptions of entitlement, domination, hierarchical authority and control over territory,
Western sovereignty undermines and effectively oppresses Indigenous epistemologies
and traditional Indigenous relationships with the natural world.428 It operates to limit the
way Indigenous peoples are able to think about themselves.429 Barker explains:
… translating indigenous epistemologies about law, governance, and culture
through the discursive rubric of sovereignty was and is problematic.
Sovereignty as a discourse is unable to capture fully the indigenous
meanings, perspectives, and identities about law, governance, and culture,
424
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and thus over time it impacts how those epistemologies and perspectives are
represented and understood.”430
Indigenous identity then becomes defined in reaction to colonialism and the quest for
sovereignty becomes a quest to be accommodated “within a ‘legitimate’ framework of
settler state governance.”431
Alfred cautions that it is dangerous to assume that sovereignty is an appropriate
political objective or model for governance for Indigenous peoples.432
… sovereignty is an exclusionary concept rooted in an adversarial and
coercive Western notion of power. Indigenous peoples can never match the
awesome coercive force of the state; so long as sovereignty remains the goal
of indigenous politics, therefore, Native communities will occupy a dependent
and reactionary position relative to the state. Acceptance of “Aboriginal
rights” in the context of state sovereignty represents the culmination of the
white society’s efforts to assimilate indigenous peoples.433
Alfred calls for a rejection of the concept of “indigenous sovereignty” and argues that
“[t]he next phase of scholarship and activism … will need to transcend the mentality that
supports the colonization of indigenous nations…”.434 He also calls upon people
committed to transcending colonialism “to de-think the concept of sovereignty and
replace it with a notion of power that has as its root a more appropriate premise.”435
Alfred & Corntassel assert that:
As Indigenous peoples, the way to recovering freedom and power and
happiness is clear: it is time for each one of us to make the commitment to
transcend colonialism as people, and for us to work together as peoples to
become forces of Indigenous truth against the lie of colonialism. We do not
need to wait for the colonizer to provide us with money or validate our
vision of a free future; we only need to start to use our Indigenous languages
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to frame our thoughts, the ethical framework of our philosophies to make
the decision to use our laws and institutions to govern ourselves.436
At the same time, RO Porter asserts that there is also an imperative to protect and defend
Indigenous sovereignty as the loss of sovereignty can lead to the extinction of distinct
Indigenous peoples.437 Porter cautions that the stakes are high and that how Indigenous
groups strategically engage sovereignty requires careful consideration to overcome to
challenges posed by “auto-colonization” and limited resources.438 The challenge then is
to continue to defend Indigenous sovereignty while simultaneously disengaging from
European-derived notions of sovereignty and power.
There are two clear voices in Indigenous scholarships: one that calls for a
rejection of sovereignty while the other demands that Indigenous peoples engage the “S
word”439 as a matter of survival and cultural integrity. Semantics becomes critical to
reconciling these two voices. As Corntassel & Primeau assert, Indigenous discourse
regarding sovereignty may actually already captured by the notion of “cultural integrity”
as that is already well-defined within international law.440 Anaya observes that the
international right to “self-determination” is a distinct concept from statehood and a more
appropriate objective for Indigenous peoples:
… a U.N. study has concluded … “ … Self-determination, in its many
forms, is thus a basic pre-condition if indigenous peoples are to be able to
enjoy their fundamental rights and determining their future, while at the
same time preserving, developing and passing on their specific ethnic
identity to future generations.”
…
In my view, self-determination should not be equated with a right to
independent statehood. Under a human rights approach, the concept of self436
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determination is capable of embracing much more nuanced interpretations
and applications, particularly in an increasingly interdependent world in
which the formal attributes of statehood mean less and less. Selfdetermination may be understood as a right of cultural groupings to the
political institutions necessary to allow them to exist and develop according
to their distinctive characteristics.441
Corntassel & Primeau cite Anaya for the proposition that Indigenous peoples can
strategically achieve cultural integrity by invoking the existing international human rights
treaties.442

However, Corntassel & Primeau also contend that “calls for self-

determination, for an absolute right to self-identification, and for sovereignty only
exacerbate tensions between indigenous groups and states.”443 In this context, it would
appear that Anaya and Corntassel & Primeau have diverging understandings of selfdetermination but all agree upon adopting a human rights approach to ensuring cultural
integrity. It becomes increasingly necessary to define these terms clearly to ensure a
unified and consistent approach.
A human rights approach to ensuring cultural integrity is more palatable than
sovereignty claims for several reasons: (i) it allows Indigenous peoples to disengage from
colonial values associated with sovereignty, which undermine Indigenous epistemologies
and identity; (ii) it will be more successful than asserting sovereignty through a treatybased approach which must contend with the constraints enumerated by Anaya, namely,
intertemporality of international law, the lack of recognition and international tendencies
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towards stability;444 and (ii) it allows for a radically inclusive strategy “which is
accessible to all indigenous populations”445
It is difficult to imagine a rational justification for a Western tradition of
sovereignty in a truly post-colonial world. The global community has repeatedly
affirmed its commitment to the elimination of colonialism in all its forms.446 However, all
indications are that the doctrine of sovereignty is still deeply entrenched in international
law.447 Alfred suggests that the challenge “in building appropriate postcolonial
governing systems is to disconnect the notion of sovereignty from its Western legal roots
and transform it.”448
3.3

Conclusion
In this chapter, I have undertaken a literature review of Indigenous peoples’

experiences and perspectives of sovereignty in order to identify some of the alternate
narratives and strategies that exist regarding sovereignty. At its core, sovereignty has
evolved within the Western legal tradition as an instrument of power over Indigenous
peoples, territories and resources. Indigenous peoples have found themselves defined by
this narrow and often-violent conception of power, which, at its heart, is contrary to
Indigenous peoples’ values and epistemologies. This has made it difficult for Indigenous
peoples to engage or assert Western sovereignty without also experiencing a form of
epistemological assimilation. By engaging with the full spectrum of Indigenous
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discourse regarding sovereignty, a process of cultural and epistemological reclamation
can also occur. An articulated vision of Indigenous sovereignty can ultimately allow for
the possibility of genuine social and legal reconciliation.
Applying Critical Race Theory, the alternate narratives provided by Indigenous
leaders, activists and scholars challenge “the myths of neutrality and objectivity” that
surround the doctrine of sovereignty in international law. 449 It also demonstrates how its
use within international water law invokes conflict and confrontation between states and
Indigenous peoples on several levels: politically, culturally and philosophically. The
conflict found in sovereignty discourse is ultimately a conflict of values about power and
how to live and relate to others. A review of Indigenous scholarship reveals key values
within Indigenous epistemology, such as the “partnership principle”,450 the
interconnectedness of all living things, the importance of mutual respect and the value of
cultivating “inner space”451 to achieve harmony and balance.
While themes emerge regarding core Indigenous values that provide insights
regarding Indigenous sovereignty, the literature review also reveals a plurality of
Indigenous perspectives regarding strategies for engaging Western legal sovereignty.
Arguably, this observation is in itself part of the process of decolonizing the debate by
shattering assumptions that Indigenous peoples share a universal or homogenous
relationship with sovereignty. There is considerable debate about how Indigenous
peoples should go about emancipating themselves from the oppressive effects of Western
legal sovereignty. While some Indigenous scholars prefer to engage inherent sovereignty
as a culturally derived phenomenon rooted in language, cultural identity and spirituality,
449
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others strategize on how to achieve sovereign status within a transformed Western legal
paradigm. Some Indigenous leaders emphasize the importance of reclaiming sovereignty
by redefining it at an intellectual level. Others focus on the pragmatic political and legal
challenges of reconciling state sovereignty with Indigenous sovereignty. Some activists
insist that engaging sovereignty discourse is essential to Indigenous peoples’ survival
while others insist that emancipation is best achieved by disengaging entirely from
imperialist values and the related sovereign discourse. There is no clear consensus or
strategy within Indigenous scholarship and there continues to be disagreement regarding
the differences between key definitions such as sovereignty, cultural integrity and selfdetermination. This is not surprising given that the discourse on Indigenous sovereignty,
while rich and diverse, is still an emerging and evolving field of inquiry.452
At their root, all of these approaches and perspectives are aimed at reclaiming
Indigenous sovereignty and redefining Indigenous-settler relations. It is not within the
scope of this paper to resolve or comment upon any of these competing and complex
theories or strategies. Rather the purpose of this chapter has been to allow the current
narratives regarding Indigenous sovereignty to provide an emerging counterpoint to the
dominant legal discourse in order to demonstrate that sovereignty is ultimately a manmade construct. Once we acknowledge sovereignty as a “social creation” [Alfred], we
can undertake to (re)construct new laws in a manner that no longer legitimizes the
domination of imperialist values over Indigenous values.
In this thesis, I have set out to examine the intersecting relationship between
international water law, the doctrine of sovereignty and Indigenous peoples. By
understanding Indigenous perspectives regarding the doctrine of sovereignty, it becomes
452
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apparent how the invocation of sovereign status in the UN Watercourse Convention, to
the exclusion of Indigenous nations, only serves to perpetuate the domination of states
over Indigenous peoples. It also serves to reinforce and legitimize imperialist values and
encourage states’ domination and exploitation of territories and resources at the expense
of others. In the next chapter, I contend that legal reform of the UN Watercourse
Convention is required to create an international law of transboundary rivers that allows
for the inclusion of Indigenous values. I maintain that it is possible to envision an
international water law that disengages from the politics of sovereignty – at least on a
‘without prejudice’ basis – such that Indigenous peoples can engage in international
water law discourse as full participants without any state or peoples being required to
sacrifice their perspectives on sovereignty.
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Chapter 4: Transcending Sovereignty: Reconstructing the International Law of
Transboundary Rivers
The law is not a still pool merely to be tended and occasionally skimmed of
accumulated debris, rather it should be looked upon as a running stream,
carrying society’s hopes, and reflecting all its values, and hence requiring
constant attention to its tributaries, the social and other sciences, to see that
they feed in sustaining elements.453
Former Chief Justice Bora Laskin, Supreme Court of Canada
It is no longer possible to maintain the legitimacy of the premise that there
is only one right way to see and do things.454
Taiaiake Alfred, Mohawk
A deconstruction of the historical doctrine of sovereignty and the UN
Watercourse Convention from a critical Indigenous perspective reveals how sovereignty
has evolved within Western legal thought to exclude Indigenous peoples and dominate
the environment and its resources. Indigenous perspectives regarding sovereignty weave
an alternate narrative that challenges the myth of objectivity, neutrality and power that
currently surround the doctrine of sovereignty and international law generally.

State

interests tend to focus upon the extraction and optimal utilization of natural resources.
Western notions of sovereignty have been historically aligned with conquest, domination
and exploitation of the natural environment. Given the growing scarcity of fresh water
and its importance to all peoples, it is no longer reasonable to assume that states are
willing or capable of managing such a precious resource over the long term for current
and future generations. Indeed, many scholars have suggested that the complexity of the
issues confronting shared water security requires a radically inclusive approach to water
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law and governance.455 Blanket acceptance of the supremacy of state sovereignty and
state values over the experience and knowledge of Indigenous peoples no longer carries
moral legitimacy.
The application of Critical Race Theory to transboundary water laws involves a
deconstruction of the legal principles involved and an account of how these laws have
systemically excluded Indigenous peoples. It also requires a reconstruction of the law in a
manner that remedies that injustice. The question then is how to strategize towards the
reform of international water law in such a way that it is inclusive of Indigenous peoples
and their traditional laws regarding water governance. The first challenge is to overcome
the assumption that international law is not flexible enough to recognize the pre-existing
rights of Indigenous peoples.
The UN Watercourse Convention is concerned only with state interests and
governs the agreements between sovereigns. On the surface, this appears reasonable
given that international law was founded upon the premise that it is comprised of the
rules that govern state relations.456 However, international law has evolved to recognize
the international rights of non-state actors.457 Since World War II, there has been
growing acceptance among states that the doctrine of sovereignty is not paramount where
issues of human rights are concerned.458 International human rights law has evolved
rapidly in recent decades to place checks upon unfettered state interests and to challenge
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the limits of absolute territorial sovereignty.459 Likewise, the rights of Indigenous
peoples in international law has been evolving over the last century to ensure the
protection of the worlds’ most vulnerable and marginalized populations against
exploitation by the state. Notably, international laws protecting human rights and
Indigenous peoples are supported by the majority of sovereigns and reflect the evolving
and emerging values of the global community. I contend that the international law of
transboundary rivers requires critical scrutiny and reconciliation with the affirmed rights
of Indigenous peoples in international law.
In this chapter, I consider the benefits and constraints of pursuing legal reform
using a “human rights approach”460 to assert Indigenous peoples’ rights in international
water law. I will then provide a brief overview of international instruments that affirm
Indigenous peoples’ rights and specifically their right to participate in decision-making
regarding water. I will then consider several potential avenues for the legal
reconstruction of international water law. Ultimately, the process of reconstruction must
include the meaningful participation and consensus of Indigenous peoples. This chapter
concludes with a call for further analysis and development of strategic approaches to
reconstructing international water law in such a way that is inclusive of existing
international Indigenous rights.
4.1

Asserting International Indigenous Rights: Methodology for Reform
How does one transcend the historical doctrine of sovereignty in international

water law and thereby recognize the rights Indigenous peoples’ who have traditionally
been excluded from the evolution of international water law? Arguably, the key to
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shifting the discourse away from the doctrine of sovereignty in international water law
lies within international Indigenous legal theory and methodology. Indigenous scholars
have historically struggled with the entrenchment of the doctrine of sovereignty in
international law and yet have succeeded in persuading the vast majority of sovereign
states to support, at least in theory, their claims for Indigenous peoples’ rights within
international law. Over the last 90 years, numerous international instruments have
integrated Indigenous values and affirmed Indigenous peoples’ rights to selfdetermination, cultural integrity and the right to participate in environmental decisionmaking.461 A review of international law of Indigenous peoples and international human
rights law demonstrates that the international legal system is flexible enough to recognize
the rights of non-state actors and provides a methodology for the legal reform of the
international water law.
Anaya is cautiously optimistic in his analysis of Indigenous peoples’ success in
international law:
Although the words, “all peoples have the right to self-determination” have
made their way into the texts of major multilateral treaties, international law
has yet to clearly embrace claims for political autonomy beyond the context
of classical colonialism. Still the affirmation of self-determination of
peoples has provided a wedge for ethnic autonomy claims to make their way
prominently into contemporary international legal and political discourse.462
Anaya identifies two approaches to Indigenous claims for autonomy in international law:
the historical sovereignty approach and the human rights approach. Under the historical
sovereignty approach, Indigenous peoples assert self-determination in an effort to
reclaim “sovereignty” as it is understood within the Western legal paradigm (ie “a world
461
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divided into territorially defined, independent or ‘sovereign’ states”).463 Anaya rejects
this approach outright as imposing insurmountable “tensions upon the institutional
framework of international law.”464 As previously discussed in Chapter 3 above, Anaya
observes several practical constraints of such an approach, namely the doctrine of
intertemporal law, the principle of recognition, and the tendency towards stability
through pragmatism.465
The second approach is the human rights approach, which will be the subject of
this chapter. Under this approach, “self-determination is not linked fundamentally to
historically derived ‘sovereign’ entities”.466 Instead, Indigenous peoples’ right to selfdetermination arises from international human rights law and is “derived from notions of
freedom, equality, and peace.”467 Anaya contends that ethnic autonomy is more likely to
be achieved on human rights grounds and concludes that claims for independent
statehood should be avoided.468 He observes that:
… international law has not much upheld sovereignty principles when they
serve as an accomplice to the subjugation of human rights or act as a shield
against international concern that coalesces to promote human values.469
On this analysis, it will be more effective to approach the legal reform of international
water law by identifying and reflecting upon the human values upon which transboundary
water law is founded. States’ interests will inevitably be constrained to the extent that
they are contrary or inconsistent with the preservation of human life.
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Corntassel & Primeau also advocate a departure from engaging traditionally
Western ideas regarding sovereignty and instead promote the development of strategies
based on human rights law.470 They argue that, “calls for self-determination, for an
absolute right to self-identification, and for sovereignty only exacerbate tensions between
indigenous groups and states.”471

Instead they call for strategies that do “not threaten

the territorial integrity or political sovereignty of a majority of states in the international
system.”472 The authors contend that international human rights law has already been
sufficiently developed to protect the autonomy of Indigenous peoples.473 Basic reforms
are required to recognize these rights.
In a joint statement to the UN Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples regarding a study on Indigenous peoples’ right to participate in decision-making,
Indigenous representatives made the following recommendation:
Human rights-based approach. It is essential to incorporate a human rights
based approach in such forums and processes, consistent with international
human rights law. In this context, many processes addressing environment
and development issues are in need of basic reforms.474
While sufficient rights may already exist within human rights law to protect Indigenous
peoples’ interests, at issue in this paper is how to ensure that international water law is
reconciled with the existing body of human rights laws. Is it possible to reconstruct
international water law in a manner that recognizes Indigenous peoples’ rights?
In The Individual in the International Legal System (2011), Kate Parlett
undertakes an expansive historical review of the international legal system, including the
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evolution of international human rights laws, with the objective of dispelling “myths
about state-centrism” 475 and understanding the mechanics of how the international legal
system has evolved to recognize the rights of non-state actors. While her research focuses
upon individuals rather than Indigenous peoples, her observations regarding the
flexibility of the international legal system to affirm the international rights of non-state
actors is informative. Specifically, she offers three reflections regarding the potential for
“structural transition in the international legal system”, 476 which can provide guidance in
developing a methodology for pursuing rights for Indigenous peoples. She comments
upon the following themes: (a) the “relative openness and flexibility of the system” (b)
the “forces for structural change: solutions above theories”; and (c) “states in the
international legal system”.477 Each of these observations is summarized briefly below.
Relative openness and flexibility of the system478
Upon tracing the history and mechanics of the emergence of individual rights in the
international legal system, Parlett concludes, “[s]tructurally the international legal system
is now open to any entity on whom rights, obligations and capacities to function and
participate are conferred.”479 Parlett provides several historical examples of the
recognition of the rights of non-state actors within the international system and observes:
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The particular solutions were creative at the time, given that they were not
consistent with the traditional conception of international law as the law
applicable to inter-state relations. These examples and others demonstrate
that the international legal system has been used to serve changing needs
without being constrained by the established understanding of the limits of the
international legal framework.480
Parlett concludes that it is not contrary to international law to pursue international rights
for non-state actors.
Forces for structural change: solutions above theories481
Parlett’s second observation is that change to the international legal system has
not been brought about through reference to theoretical frameworks or historical
injustices. She observes that:
… the international legal system has experienced structural transition as a
result of the need to manage and address practical problems rather than
resulting from any deliberate attempt to effect a structural transformation. The
international legal system does not appear to be developing along a smooth
trajectory from a state-centric international law to a more inclusive
international legal system. The picture which emerges is rather that states
manage practical questions as they arise by adaptation of the international
legal system, and as a result of those practical solutions the international legal
system may be transformed.482
While theorizing is useful for making arguments that the international system
should change, Parlett’s analysis suggests that change to the international system is
more likely to occur by confronting states with the practical issues complicating
transboundary water governance and by demanding creative and collaborative
solutions to complex problems.
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States in the international legal system483
Finally, Parlett observes that, despite the emergence of rights for non-state actors,
the international legal system continues to remain dominated by sovereign states. From
this state-centric perspective, rights are “conferred” onto individuals and other non-state
entities by state agreement and there continue to be systemic limits that ensure that the
international legal system remains within the control of sovereigns.484 The post-1945
international legal system is therefore flexible enough to allow for the creation of rights
for non-state actors but it is ultimately constrained by the process of agreement and the
granting of such rights by sovereign states. Parlett concludes,
While it is increasingly common for individuals to be given rights and
obligations … the conferral of rights and obligations has been exclusively
dependent on the consent of states. … Where rights are conferred by treaty,
they are created by the state parties to the treaty. Where rights are created by
customary international law, that custom is the consequence of state practice –
or at least failure of states to persistently object to the formation of a
customary rule. And while certain rules in the field of human rights have
claim to jus cogens status, they have originated in a rule agreed to or
acquiesced in by states.485
Parlett further cautions:
The conferral of rights and obligations on individuals might, on one view, be
seen as a move away from a state-dominated international legal system. But
another view might be that the conferral of rights and obligations on
individuals –which is exclusively controlled by states – actually reinforces the
dominant position of states in the international legal system, to an extent
which might not have been possible without some concessions or participatory
rights granted to individuals.486
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The ability to affect reform of and access to international water law therefore remains
dependent upon state consent within a state-dominated system and to that extent,
Indigenous peoples remain subordinated by the doctrine of sovereignty.487
In “Indigenous Recognition in International Law: Theoretical Observations”,
Patrick Macklem reviews the evolution of Indigenous peoples rights in international law
over the last 100 years and the relationship between international Indigenous rights and
the doctrine of sovereignty.488 He offers his observations regarding “the legal
requirements of indigenous recognition in international law, the relation between legal
recognition of States and legal recognition of indigenous peoples, and the nature and
purpose of international indigenous rights.”489 Macklem observes that, unlike recognition
of individuals in international law, recognition of Indigenous peoples and tribal
communities has evolved in direct response to their historic exclusion from imperialist
definitions of sovereignty that have formed the basis of the international legal order. He
notes that:
… the process of sovereign exclusion and inclusion is not a one-shot affair,
occurring some time in the distant past when international law accepted the
proposition that indigenous territory constituted terra nullius. It is an ongoing
process of exclusion and inclusion to the extent that it continues to subsume
indigenous populations under the sovereign power of States not of their
making.490
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Upon reviewing the evolution of Indigenous rights over the last century, Macklem
contends that “[d]etermining the criteria for legal recognition of Indigenous peoples
requires taking an interpretive stand on the nature and purpose of international indigenous
rights themselves.”491 One interpretation is that the purpose of international Indigenous
rights is to remove the existing barriers that prevent Indigenous peoples from enjoying
the same human rights that all people enjoy, including the right to self-determination.
Macklem concludes that we should resist the tendency to simply apply a universal human
rights approach to Indigenous peoples’ rights. He states:
What the legal history of international indigenous protection reveals is that
indigenous rights in international law are differentiated rights that recognize
differences, partly denied and partly produced by the international distribution
of territorial sovereignty initiated by colonization, that exist between
indigenous and non-indigenous peoples. International indigenous rights speak
to the consequences of organizing international political reality, including
indigenous political reality, into a legal system that vests sovereign power in
certain collectivities and not others. Not only does this mode of legal
organization exclude indigenous peoples from participating in the distribution
of sovereign power that it performs, it authorizes legal actors to whom it
distributes sovereign power – States – to exercise such power over indigenous
peoples and territory to their detriment. The morally suspect foundations of
these baseline legal entitlements are why indigenous rights merit recognition
on the international legal register. A failure to respect international
indigenous rights in the words of Michael Reisman, “re-enacts the tragedy of
colonialism”.492
International Indigenous rights are not significant simply because of their appeal to
universal human rights but also because Indigenous peoples are defined by an
institutional legal system that was predicated upon their exclusion. Indigenous rights
evolved to mitigate the adverse consequences of colonialism. Therefore, a failure to
implement and recognize those rights perpetuates colonial domination and exploitation of
Indigenous peoples. Indigenous rights embody more than just an appeal to the
491
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universality of human rights but also a commitment to “post-imperial values”.493
Macklem describes the purpose of international Indigenous rights as follows:
The twentieth-century legal history of international indigenous rights from
their origins in international protection of indigenous workers in colonies to
their contemporary expression in the UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, demonstrates that their purpose is to mitigate injustices
produced by the way in which the international legal order conceives of
sovereignty as a legal entitlement that it distributes among collectivities that
it recognizes as States. The criteria by which indigenous peoples can be
said to exist in international law relate to their historic exclusion from the
distribution of sovereignty initiated by colonization that lies at the heart of
the international legal order.494
While Indigenous rights may be characterized as mitigating the adverse impacts of the
distribution of sovereignty, they do not challenge the existing international legal system
or strengthen Indigenous claims for sovereignty. If anything, the assertion of Indigenous
rights requires the on-going recognition of the dominance and authority of states within
international law.495
Macklem’s and Partlett’s observations regarding the flexibility and constraints of
the international legal system provide support for the argument that the best approach to
affect reform is by invoking the current body of human rights and international
Indigenous rights. Rather than asserting sovereignty, the rights of non-state actors are
more likely to be recognized by appealing to human values and by providing creative
solutions to complex issues. Parlett’s and Macklem’s historical analyses and
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observations also point to the requirement of Indigenous peoples to acknowledge the
continued dominance of states as “the crucial actors” in the international legal system.496
The systemic constraints of the state-centred international legal system are not
insurmountable. There is ample precedent both within human rights law and the
international law of Indigenous peoples that exemplify states’ willingness to
acknowledge the international rights of Indigenous peoples. Furthermore, international
agencies are increasingly committed to the implementation of Indigenous peoples rights
across the international legal system. The next section provides a brief overview of these
precedents.

4.2

Recognizing International Indigenous Rights: Precedents for Reform

Over the last century, the majority of states have repeatedly affirmed Indigenous
peoples’ rights in international law. Macklem traces the emergence of international legal
protection of Indigenous peoples back to the 1884 Berlin Conference on Africa at which
imperial powers divided up Africa in an effort to reduce the tensions of competing claims
of sovereignty.497 While simultaneously excluding Indigenous peoples from exercising
sovereignty, there was also a parallel recognition that the sovereigns had a legal duty to
protect the colonies under their control. In 1919, this duty to protect Indigenous peoples
was codified in the Covenant of the League of Nations as sovereigns undertook “to
secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under their control”.498 The
International Labour Organization undertook to establish guidelines regarding the
496
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working conditions of Indigenous peoples as early as 1921.499 More recently, the United
Nations recognized “discrimination against indigenous populations” when the U.N. SubCommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities
commissioned a study through Resolution 1589, to report upon the situation of
Indigenous peoples globally.500 The study which resulted from Resolution 1589, the
Martínez Cobo Report (1983), made several proposals and recommendations regarding
the future of international Indigenous rights.501 Macklem identifies three
recommendations of the report that are of particular significance:
First, it proposed distinguishing between indigenous and non-indigenous
communities on the basis of historical continuity with pre-invasion and precolonial times. …
Second … [i]t noted “the widespread and open rejection by indigenous
peoples of the concept of integration,” and argued that “[s]elf-determination,
in its many forms, must be recognized as the basic precondition for the
enjoyment by indigenous peoples of their fundamental rights and the
determination of their own future.”
Third, it recommended the adoption of the U.N. Declaration on indigenous
rights as an interim step to the adoption of an international convention on the
topic.502
As a result of the Report’s recommendations, the Sub-Commission established the
Working Group on Indigenous Populations, which began work on a draft declaration on
the rights of Indigenous Peoples in 1985. Approximately 22 years later, UNDRIP was
ratified by the UN General Assembly in 2007. It is relevant to provide these historical
milestones to help situate the ratification of UNDRIP and the other international
499
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instruments discussed below within the century-long evolution of Indigenous rights and
also as part of the longer term vision of an international convention on Indigenous
peoples’ rights.
While a thorough historical review of all international instruments that
acknowledge Indigenous peoples’ rights is beyond the scope of this paper, I will briefly
review several of the more prominent instruments below with particular attention paid to
Indigenous peoples’ rights regarding water.503 Specifically, this section will consider
Indigenous peoples’ right to water within the context of International Labour
Organisation Convention No 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of 1989 [ILO No
169]504, UNDRIP, customary international law and norms, and the UN Declaration on the
Human Right to Water.505
4.2.1

ILO No 169
ILO No 169 is a legally binding international instrument, which specifically

addresses the rights of Indigenous and tribal peoples. As of January 2012, 22 countries
had ratified it.506 While ILO No 169 does not expressly reference water, it contains
several provisions that recognize Indigenous peoples’ right to cultural integrity as well as
land and resource rights.507
Article 7 states:
503

For further analysis of international Indigenous rights prior to 2005, see David H Getches, “Indigenous
Peoples’ Rights to Water Under International Norms” (2005) 16 Colo J Int’l Envtl L & Pol’y 259
[Getches]; Macklem, supra note 461; and Lutz, supra note 499.
504
International Labour Organisation Convention No 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries, 27 June 1989, 1650 UNTS 383 (entered into force Sept. 5, 1991) [ILO No 169].
505
General Assembly Adopts Resolution Recognizing Access to Clean Water, Sanitation as Human Right,
by Recorded Vote of 122 in Favour, None against, 41 Abstentions, GA Res GA/10967, UN GAOR, 64th
Sess, 108th Mtg (28 July 2010), online: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/ga10967.doc.htm> [UN
GA Res GA/10967].
506
International Labour Organization, “Convention No C169”, online: ILO <http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgilex/ratifce.pl?C169>.
507
Getches, supra note 503 at 263.

139

1. The peoples concerned shall have the right to decide their own priorities for the
process of development as it affects their lives, beliefs, institutions and spiritual
well-being and the lands they occupy or otherwise use, and to exercise control,
to the extent possible, over their own economic, social and cultural
development. In addition, they shall participate in the formulation,
implementation and evaluation of plans and programmes for national and
regional development which may affect them directly.
…
4. Governments shall take measures, in co-operation with the peoples concerned,
to protect and preserve the environment of the territories they inhabit.
Article 15 reads:
1. The rights of the peoples concerned to the natural resources pertaining to
their lands shall be specifically safeguarded. These rights include the right
of these peoples to participate in the use, management and conservation of
these resources.
Article 32 is particularly relevant within the context of transboundary water governance:
Governments shall take appropriate measures, including by means of
international agreements, to facilitate contacts and co-operation between
indigenous and tribal peoples across borders, including activities in the
economic, social, cultural, spiritual and environmental fields.
Underlying all of the provisions of ILO No 169 is an emphasis on consultation with and
participation by Indigenous peoples in an effort to “stimulate dialogue between
governments and indigenous and tribal peoples”.508

While the Convention has only

been ratified by 22 countries, the adoption of UNDRIP is perceived as exemplifying the
broader acceptance of the principles underlying ILO No 169.509 Getches observes that
there is an argument for the extension of ILO No 169 to all states as it reflects emerging
“customary international law’s recognition of indigenous peoples’ property rights in
natural resources that they have traditionally used”.510
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4.2.2

UNDRIP
UNDRIP was initially adopted on September 13, 2007 with 144 countries in favour,

4 countries voting against and 11 countries abstaining.511 While numerous provisions of
the Declaration affirm an indirect right to water incidental to Indigenous peoples’ rights
to cultural integrity and economic development, Articles 25 and 32(2) expressly affirm
Indigenous Peoples’ rights to water.512

Article 25 Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their
distinctive spiritual relationship with their traditionally owned or otherwise
occupied and used lands, territories, waters and coastal seas and other
resources and to uphold their responsibilities to future generations in this
regard.
Article 32 (2) States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the
indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in
order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any
project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in
connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water
or other resources.513
In addition, Articles 26 and 29 specifically invoke States’ obligations regarding
“protection of these lands, territories and resources” (art. 26) and “protection of the
environment and the productive capacity of their lands or territories or resources” (art.
29). Article 38 provides that “States in consultation and cooperation with indigenous
peoples, shall take the appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to achieve
the ends of this Declaration.”
As a General Assembly resolution, adoption of UNDRIP does not generally
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impose legally binding obligations upon states.514 However, through the process of
implementation of UNDRIP, international agencies and states are strengthening the
argument that the general principles set out in UNDRIP represent customary international
law. In addition, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has relied upon UNDRIP as
persuasive evidence of state legal obligations to Indigenous peoples.515 Arguably, an
argument for Indigenous peoples’ right to water can be made with reference to UNDRIP
and many other international conventions.
4.2.3

Customary International Law
In addition to these major instruments, Getches contends that Indigenous peoples’

rights may be derived from international customs found in both human rights laws and
environmental laws. Getches observes:
Based largely on the content of international human rights conventions and
customs apart from domestic laws, John Alan Cohan argues that “the
international community now regards indigenous peoples as having
environmental rights that rise to the status of international norms” and that
“because indigenous peoples’ way of life and very existence depends on their
relationship with the land, their human rights are inextricable from
environmental rights”.516
Getches contends that customary international law can be invoked to support Indigenous
peoples’ rights to water on several grounds, including (i) protection for Indigenous lands
and resources; (iii) environmental protection; (iii) subsistence rights; (iv) cultural
identity; (v) freedom from racial discrimination; and (vi) right to self-determination.517
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For example, Getches points to Agenda 21 adopted at the 1992 United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro as one example of
international adoption of environmental standards that expressly includes the full
engagement and participation of Indigenous peoples.518
The United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR)519 does not expressly refer to the right to water but it is reasonably
inferred from affirmed cultural, economic and social rights. Article 1 states:
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development.
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth
and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of
international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual
benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its
own means of subsistence.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having
responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust
Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination,
and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations.
Article 11 articulates “the right to share in efficient agrarian systems”, while Article 12
includes “a right to a secure, healthy, and ecologically sound environment.”520 Arguably,
all of these rights are contingent upon healthy water sources.
Principle 20 of the Vienna Declaration adopted by the 1993 United Nations World
Conference on Human Rights specifically calls for the protection of the cultural integrity
of Indigenous peoples. Given the interconnectedness between Indigenous peoples’
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cultural and spiritual identities and their surrounding environment, states’ obligations to
protect Indigenous peoples’ cultural integrity would include a prohibition against the
depletion or contamination of Indigenous water sources.521
Getches also points to the rules and policies of international development
agencies such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Bank, to further argue that
Indigenous rights have become accepted as international norms.522 Institutional support
for the principles of UNDRIP exists throughout the UN system of government. The InterAgency Support Group on Indigenous Peoples (IASG) was established to support the
recommendations of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues.523
IASG’s 31 members include the I.L.O, the World Bank, the European Union, the World
Health Organization, UNICEF, the World Intellectual Property Office (WIPO), the
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the International Fund for Agricultural
Development (IFAD) and the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity
(SCBD).524 Its mandate has been expanded to support the implementation of Indigenous
rights throughout the international system. In 2007, the IASG adopted the following
statement regarding UNDRIP:
The Inter Agency Support Group on Indigenous Peoples’ Issues hails the
adoption of the Declaration on the Rights on Indigenous Peoples by the
General Assembly on 13 September 2007. The Declaration sends out a clear
message to the entire international community, reaffirming the human rights
of the world’s indigenous peoples. This landmark action of the United
Nations bears political, legal, symbolic and moral significance, as well as
521
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constituting a crucial opportunity for the UN System and other intergovernmental organizations to critically reflect upon their engagement with
indigenous peoples’ issues and, according to Article 42 of the Declaration, to
promote respect for and full application of its provisions and follow-up its
effectiveness. The IASG pledges to advance the spirit and letter of the
Declaration within our agencies’ mandates and to ensure that the Declaration
becomes a living document throughout our work.525
The vast majority of sovereigns and international agencies have indicated their
commitment to the principles of UNDRIP and to their support of Indigenous peoples’
rights generally.
While there are only a few express references to water in these international
instruments, an Indigenous right to water can be reasonably inferred from several other
rights that are contingent upon water. The United Nation’s recent affirmation of the
human right to water provides further support for a reconstruction of international water
law with reference to Indigenous peoples’ rights.526
4.2.4

The Human Right to Water
The UN General Assembly’s affirmation of a human right to water provides

further legitimacy to a proposal for reconstructing transboundary water law with
reference to human rights and in a manner that is inclusive of Indigenous peoples.527 On
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July 28, 2010, the United Nations passed a general resolution, which declared that water
is a human right; with 122 countries voting in its favour while 41 countries abstained.528
Specifically, the resolution: “[d]eclares the right to safe and clean drinking water and
sanitation as a human right that is essential for the full enjoyment of life and all human
rights.” On October 1, 2010, the United Nations Human Rights Council (“HRC”)
confirmed that the human right to water is legally binding and “justiciable”.529 The HRC
confirmed that the right to water and sanitation is inextricably linked to the right to an
adequate standard of living, which is already codified in many international human rights
treaties, including the ICESCR.530 In doing so, the HRC clarified “the foundation for
recognition of the right and the legal standards which apply.”531
While some states have argued that the right to water is still ambiguous for the
purposes of state implementation,532 General Comment No. 15 to the ICESCR (Nov.
2002) provides substantive guidelines outlining state obligations and the steps to
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implementing water rights.533 Specifically, General Comment No. 15 sets out the
guidelines for state parties regarding the interpretation of the right to water under Article
11 (the right to an adequate standard of living) and Article 12 (the right to health).534 As
with all human rights, state parties have three obligations under the ICESCR:
i)
Respect: “The obligation to respect requires that States parties
refrain from interfering directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of the right to
water.”535
ii)
Protect: “The obligation to protect requires State parties to prevent
third parties from interfering in any way with the enjoyment of the right to
water. … The obligation includes, inter alia, adopting the necessary and
effective legislative and other measures to restrain, for example, third parties
from denying equal access to adequate water; and polluting and inequitably
extracting from water resources, including natural sources, wells and other
water distribution systems.”536
iii)
Fulfil: “The obligation to fulfil can be disaggregated into the
obligations to facilitate, promote and provide. The obligation to facilitate
requires the State to take positive measures to assist individuals and
communities to enjoy the right. The obligation to promote obliges the State
party to take steps to ensure that there is appropriate education concerning the
hygienic use of water, protection of water sources and methods to minimize
water wastage. States parties are also obliged to fulfil (provide) the right when
individuals or a group are unable, for reasons beyond their control, to realize
that right themselves by the means at their disposal.”537
In addition, Article 16 of General Comment 15 provides specific guidance to states
regarding their obligations to Indigenous peoples: “… State parties should take steps to
ensure that: … (d) Indigenous peoples’ access to water resources on their ancestral lands
533
UN ESCOR, General Comment No. 15: The right to water (arts. 11 and 12 of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), 29th Sess, UN Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (2002) [General
Comment No. 15]. Parmar, supra note 527 at 35 observes that General Comment No 15 is non-binding and
therefore is ‘soft law’ that “expands and clarifies the right to water which is derived and inferred from other
human rights.”
534
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is protected from encroachment and unlawful pollution. States should provide resources
for indigenous peoples to design, deliver and control their access to water.”538
Most of the scholarship regarding an Indigenous right to water focuses on
establishing remedies under international law for violations of international Indigenous
rights that can not be remedied at the national level. I contend that the international
instruments that recognize Indigenous rights may also be relied upon to support a call for
the reform and/or reconstruction of the existing body of international water law in a
manner that recognizes Indigenous peoples’ rights. While state consensus is required for
the creation of new international instruments that recognize the inherent rights of
Indigenous peoples, the evidence demonstrates that the vast majority of states and
international agencies are ready to recognize Indigenous peoples’ rights within the
context of transboundary water law.
4.3

Implications for International Water Law: Proposals for Reconstruction
Based on the methodology and precedents reviewed above, this chapter

promulgates possible strategies for the reconstruction of transboundary water law in a
manner that recognizes and implements the rights of Indigenous peoples in international
law. While theoretical arguments abound for challenging the moral legitimacy behind
the doctrine of sovereignty, the practicalities of the international legal order call for a
pragmatic approach to reform that does not directly challenge state sovereignty at this
time.
In my view, the reconstruction of international water law requires a legal
reconciliation between two co-existing bodies of international law: transboundary water

538

Ibid at Art 16.

148

law and international Indigenous rights. Such reconciliation necessarily requires the full
engagement of Indigenous peoples through internationally recognized agencies such as
the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues and the Expert Mechanism on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples.539 I briefly propose some avenues for reform that may warrant
further exploration and analysis.
First, the UN Watercourse Convention could be amended to require state
recognition of UNDRIP.540 For example, a provision could be inserted to protect
Indigenous peoples rights as follows:
Watercourse States shall, individually and, where appropriate, in
cooperation with other States, take all measures with respect to an
international watercourse that are necessary to protect and preserve the
rights of Indigenous peoples, taking into account generally accepted
international rules and standards, including but not limited to the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.541
The implementation of such a provision would require states to ensure that they obtain
the free and prior informed consent of Indigenous peoples in the development of their
bilateral or multilateral state development agreements as well as recognition of
Indigenous peoples’ legal systems and customs.542 The limitations of such an approach
to reform is obvious. Even if reference to UNDRIP were included in the UN
Watercourse Convention, the ability to enforce the provision on behalf of Indigenous
peoples would remain solely with states, as the only parties to the Convention. Further, it
539
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is highly unlikely that that the Convention would be ratified with this amendment. Even
without amendment, the UN Watercourse Convention has failed to obtain the requisite
number of signatories required for ratification.543 While a call for reform of the
Convention may be justified, it is unlikely to have a practical impact upon Indigenous
rights.
A second and potentially more potent recommendation for reform could involve
targeting bilateral and multi-lateral agreements themselves. As discussed in Chapter 2
above, the principles of customary international water law are largely obtained by
reference to state agreements. Indigenous peoples in some regions such as the Columbia
River Basin have obtained sufficient domestic rights and political power to demand
recognition of UNDRIP and the human right to water in the imminent re-negotiation of
the Columbia River Treaty. While Canada and the United States would likely resist any
attempt to make the principles of UNDRIP contractually binding, the cooperation of
Indigenous peoples on both sides of the border along with the pressure of international
agencies could place such a proposal squarely on the negotiating table. The recognition
of UNDRIP and the human right to water in future bilateral and multilateral state
agreements would also serve the dual purpose of (i) advancing UNDRIP as customary
international law and (ii) advancing the protection of Indigenous rights as a principle of
customary international water law. This approach would provide a valuable precedent
for Indigenous peoples in other river basins to advocate for state recognition of their
rights in transboundary agreements. However, as with a reform of the Convention,
543
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recognition of Indigenous rights in transboundary agreements would be limited by the
reality that Indigenous peoples would remain dependent upon states to enforce their
rights. Notwithstanding this limitation, lobbying for the inclusion of UNDRIP and the
human right to water in transboundary river agreements deserves merit for its potential to
aid in global efforts to recognize Indigenous peoples’ rights.
Arguably, neither of the first two proposals goes far enough to mitigate the
adverse impacts of Indigenous peoples’ exclusion from the sovereign community or
address the complexity of the current challenges regarding transboundary river
governance. Simply demanding that states recognize Indigenous rights does not
necessarily translate into practical reforms to current practices especially without
effective enforcement and dispute resolution mechanisms. In my view, effective legal and
social reconciliation calls for deep systemic reforms that promote collaboration and
cooperative dialogue between Indigenous peoples and states. Given the historical and
ongoing transgressions against Indigenous peoples, it is not enough to simply rely upon
existing structures and legal systems to achieve these ends. Moreover, the scope and
complexity of the issues confronting transboundary governance demands a more organic,
dynamic and cooperative approach to governance and dispute resolution than is currently
offered in international water law. Karkkainen contends that “the problems are simply
too complex and too dynamic” 544 to be addressed through state-based, top-down
approaches to governance. Rather, effective transboundary water governance and the
reconciliation of international water law and the international law of Indigenous peoples
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require the creation of new institutions and equitable processes that promote mutual
respect in transboundary water governance.
River basin organizations (RBOs) offer a template for the development of
transboundary institutions and processes aimed at ensuring that Indigenous peoples are
engaged in the governance of transboundary rivers. Mock defines river basin
organizations as, “forums where governments that share rivers can come together to
coordinate activities, share information, and develop integrated management
approaches”.545 I contend that future international water initiatives should be directed
towards (a) ensuring that river basin organizations are established on every transboundary
river and (b) articulating the values and principles that will guide the development of
these organizations. In this manner, new international institutions and principles could be
co-created with Indigenous peoples in a manner that fully reflects their status as members
of the international community.
Transboundary river basin organizations (RBOs) already exist on transboundary
basins throughout the world as a venue for multi-stakeholder dialogue, information
sharing, knowledge transfer, coalition-building and dispute resolution. Existing river
basin organizations created by state agreements include the Mekong River Commission
(1957), the Indus River Commission (1960), and the Nile River Basin (1999).546 The
latter provides a framework for the equitable sharing of water among 10 countries and
160 million people.547 However, RBOs are not established on all transboundary rivers.
While there are approximately 260 transboundary rivers in the world, the International
545
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Network of Basin Organizations lists only 134 member organizations.548 Neither the
Columbia River nor the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra River has a dedicated transboundary river
basin organization.
RBOs offer the potential to create institutional capacity, which allows multiple
communities and stakeholders to develop integrated basin-wide governance strategies.
They also provide capacity to coordinate and disseminate the vast amount of information
needed to address basin-wide issues such as the impacts of climate change, hydro-power,
flooding, pollution, water scarcity and seismic activity. Most importantly, they provide
the neutral space required to facilitate cross-cultural dialogue, coalition building, and
collaborative problem solving that transcend the sovereign discourse.549
RBOs are a well-documented subject of international water governance, but
further research is required to assess their potential to recognize the rights of Indigenous
peoples. The effectiveness of RBOs varies widely and their success is dependent to a
large extent on the amount of authority vested in them by states and the establishment of
adequate enforcement mechanisms.550 Success is also dependent upon the level of
cooperation and participation by the states in the region. For example, the Mekong
Commission has been weakened by China’s refusal to participate in the Mekong
Commission and by the “diverse political agendas” of the other states in the region.551
Mock notes that “[e]xperience shows that when divisions among basin countries are
likely to be a major obstacle, appointment of a neutral and independent chairperson to the
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commission can facilitate decision-making.”552 Another key element of successful RBOs
is the inclusion of mechanisms to promote public participation, transparency and
accountability.553 Current comparative research on RBOs reveals the key elements of
success. Further comparative research of RBOs is required from an Indigenous
perspective to establish criteria for an international declaration or convention regarding
RBOs that recognizes the rights of Indigenous peoples.
The idea of an international instrument to mandate regional watercourse
organizations is not new. Brown & Odeh propose a Global Transboundary Watercourse
and Aquifer Agreement (GTWAA) to create a global watercourse agreement intended to
establish a river basin organization for each international transboundary watercourse and
aquifer.554 The authors contend that the creation of a GTWAA is required to address the
following three shortcomings of current transboundary watercourse governance:
(i)

absence of watercourse and aquifer institutions and organizations for
every international WAA [watercourses and aquifers];
(ii) limited knowledge transfer of WAA governance, particularly between
states with established international watercourse agreements and those
without prior relationships or agreements; and
(iii) insufficient dialogue and research on potential benefits from cooperation
around international WAA management, especially in light of the
discussion to date that has focused almost exclusively on the economic
costs of joint management.555
The authors envision a GTWAA that mandates the creation of a regional watercourse
agreement on every transboundary watercourse with reference to “fundamental
principles, implementation activities, and soft law, or guiding principles, to which each
signatory subscribes” as well as a basin-wide commission which then implements the
552
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agreement. 556 Each agreement could then be adapted to regional values and
considerations. In support of their proposal, the authors provide a detailed analysis of the
current literature and case examples to demonstrate how the creation of institutional
space is critical to aid in cooperation and reduce conflict. They contend that the guiding
principles of a GTWAA include the following: (i) capacity building; (ii) communication;
and (iii) balancing integrated water resource management with human needs.557 They
also call for regional agreements that create effective mechanisms for dispute resolution
and compliance.558
I agree with their central thesis that there is need for an international
agreement that establishes a watercourse institution on every transboundary
watercourse. However, their proposal fails to recognize the role that
Indigenous peoples must play in the development of these agreements and
organizations and to that extent it requires critical analysis from Indigenous
perspectives to ensure that Indigenous rights are recognized at every level of
development. Further research of RBOs is required to demonstrate the
extent to which existing organizations have engaged Indigenous peoples in
transboundary river governance and Indigenous peoples’ experience of these
organizations. Brown & Odeh’s proposal for a reconstruction of
international water law merits consideration for its potential as a vehicle for
implementing Indigenous rights and values in transboundary river basin
agreements. A comparative analysis of the role and degree of engagement
with Indigenous peoples in current RBOs will provide valuable insight into
future international developments in this regard.
In my view, the codification of RBOs provide a natural forum for the legal
reconciliation that is required between international water law and the existing body of
Indigenous and human rights laws. Such an approach would not attempt to challenge
sovereignty but would instead aim to create an additional inclusive dimension to current
state strategies. Dixon agrees, “practical coordination at the global level is needed” in the
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form of a “global regime framework managed by a permanent and specified global
organization or secretariat”.559 She concludes:
All of this implies the need for a multi-level system of governance that
works above, below and with states. The UNDP itself stresses this, building
partnerships at all levels of governance, from local to NGO and state actors
and creating “linkages between the political processes, development
challenges, and environmental management in transboundary river basins.”
This multi-level governance is becoming more common and more possible
through globalization and the emergence of non-state actors as “states are
too large to solve some local and regional problems, and too small to
address some global challenges.” especially for “the economic, political or
ecological issues linked to water resources.” This does not diminish the
importance of national level governance, but the fact that “more and more
actors are being included in policy formulation, in the implementation, as
well as in monitoring and compliance” indicates that states are willing to
share the responsibility of governance and recognize the legitimacy of actors
working at different levels.560
Dixon advocates for an international institution, such as UN-Water, or another newly
created UN institution, to be responsible for the coordination, implementation and
enforcement of principles for transboundary water management. She further argues that
it is possible to create general principles and dispute resolution mechanisms while still
allowing for regional diversity.561
The creation of a “multi-level system of governance”562 is consistent with Parlett’s
analysis of how systemic changes to the international legal system evolve in response to
particular problems.563 Parlett observes:
… new developments in the international legal system can be seen to have
resulted in a series of grafts onto the existing structure of the international
legal system, rather than a replacement of the existing structure. Thus, the
international legal system has developed multiple structural devices which can
559

Dixon, supra note 543 at paras 1 and 37.
Ibid at para 38.
561
Notably, Dixon, ibid, at para 31, mentions the importance of incorporating the human right to water but
does not acknowledge Indigenous peoples’ rights.
562
Dixon, ibid at para 38..
563
Ibid.
560

156

be used in a particular situation to address particular problems. In any given
situation, more than one structural device may offer possible answers to those
problems.564
In my view, there is considerable merit to the creation of new international instruments
that articulate the guiding values and principles of international water law and call for the
creation of RBOs on every transboundary river. Even at the regional level, it would be
advantageous for Indigenous peoples to demand that states’ enter into bilateral and multilateral agreements for the creation of a river basin organization for the purposes of
coalition building, information gathering and dispute resolution.
The creation of such transboundary institutions would be consistent with the
requirements of Article 32 of ILO No 169 regarding the requirement upon states “to
facilitate contacts and co-operation between indigenous and tribal peoples across
borders”,565 while also providing states with the institutional capacity to meet their
domestic and international obligations to engage in genuine dialogue with Indigenous
peoples to garner their “free and informed consent”. Well-crafted dispute resolution
mechanisms could also alleviate lengthy and costly court actions at the national and
international level. Even in regions where one or more states refuses to participate in the
RBO, which is likely where China is concerned, there would be distinct advantages in
creating a transboundary institution to provide other states, international agencies and
Indigenous peoples with an opportunity to work collectively to overcome the challenges
of such non-cooperation.566
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The creation of such an institution whether globally or regionally, requires the full
participation of Indigenous peoples at every level of development if it is to achieve its
full potential to further cooperation and reduce conflict over water.567 In the next
section, I will consider how an international instrument mandating RBOs on every
transboundary river could promote the reconciliation of international water law and
international law of Indigenous peoples.

4.4

River Basin Organizations as “Ethical Spaces”
… the idea of the ethical space, produced by contrasting perspectives of the
world, entertains the notion of a meeting place, or initial thinking about a
neutral zone between entities or cultures. The space offers a venue to step
out of our allegiances, to detach from the cages of our mental worlds and
assume a position where human-to-human dialogue can occur. The ethical
space offers itself as the theatre for cross-cultural conversation in pursuit of
ethically engaging diversity and disperses claims to the human order.568
Willie Ermine, Cree Ethicist

Space must be created, intellectually and socially –
for peace to be achieved.569
Taiaiake Alfred, Kahnawá:ke, Mohawk Nation

The creation of an international instrument that mandates the formation of a river
basin organization on every transboundary river holds the most potential for promoting
the genuine reconciliation of international water law and the international law of
Indigenous peoples. The creation of new basin-wide transboundary river institutions
567
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built upon “post-imperial values” such as “consent, mutual recognition, and cultural
continuity”570 provides an opportunity for Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples to
engage in addressing some of the complexities of shared water governance while
simultaneously allowing for a departure from the sovereignty discourse, at least on a
‘without prejudice’ basis.
Cree ethicist, Willie Ermine, calls for the creation of “ethical spaces” as a critical
first step in the reconciliation of Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. In describing
“ethical spaces”, he states:
Engagement at the ethical space triggers a dialogue that begins to set the
parameters for an agreement to interact modeled on appropriate, ethical and
human principles. Dialogue is concerned with providing space for exploring
fields of thought and attention is given to understanding how thought
functions in governing our behaviours. It is a way of observing, collectively,
how hidden values and intentions can control our behaviour, and how
unnoticed cultural differences can clash without our realizing what is
occurring.571
If thoughtfully constructed in a manner consistent with the guiding principles set out in
UNDRIP, river basin organizations could provide the neutral “ethical” meeting space
necessary for coalition building to occur on the specific issues confronting shared
transboundary water governance. As Ermine states, “[t]he compelling legal task is to
enable processes so that rights are justly named, described and understood.”572
The process of co-creating an international instrument to guide river basin
organizations will require states and Indigenous groups to reach some consensus on the
articulation of the underlying values and principles that should guide water governance.
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Pradhan et al. consider the nexus between the identification of values and legal right to
water:
Rights to resources derive from law, which in turn has a dialectical
relationship with underlying cultural values, such as those of justice, equity,
solidarity, and hierarchy, on one hand, and cultural meanings and values of
resources on the other.573
The authors conclude,“[c]laims to and recognition of claims over resources are based not
only on specific laws, principles, and rules, but also on wider cultural norms and
values.”574 Increasingly, there is a call to articulate and implement international water
ethics into international water laws. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) issued a report in 2011 entitled Water Ethics and
Water Resource Management in which it concluded that “[g]iven the realities of the
global water stress crisis, we need to adapt acceptable frameworks of environmental
ethics to water resource management.” 575 The authors cite the adoption of the Universal
Declaration of Bioethics and Human Rights [UDBHR]576 by all members of UNESCO in
2005 as well as the World Commission on the Ethics of Science and Technology
[COMEST] report entitled Best Ethical Practice in Water Use and identify several ethical
principles that have evolved into internationally accepted norms including the principles
of human dignity, human equality, equity, inclusiveness and participation among others.
While the report does not mention the collective rights of Indigenous peoples, it
573
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emphasizes the need to develop the field of water ethics in order to address the realities of
the “global water stress crisis.”577 Arguably, reconciliation of Indigenous and nonIndigenous values regarding water must start with recognition of Indigenous peoples’
laws, traditions and recommendations regarding a shared international water ethic.578
While the UDBHR provides a declaration on water ethics from a state perspective, further
analysis and synthesis of Indigenous declarations on water is required to identify water
laws and ethics that may be unique to Indigenous peoples.579 Groenfeldt (2010) notes
that the development of an international water ethic “would not fill a void, but would
rather replace ethical systems already in effect.”580 Ethics are already implicit in
international water law regarding the rights of Indigenous peoples, the doctrine of
sovereignty and the factors that are deemed relevant to decisions regarding transboundary
waters. The process of co-creating an international declaration on water ethics that can
be supported by both states and Indigenous peoples will make the discussion of ethics
explicit and provide the foundation for new laws and legal systems.
An international commitment to river basin organization could create the space
and institutional capacity necessary for the exploration and reconciliation of state and
577
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Indigenous values regarding water and stimulate the co-creation of a shared international
water ethic. This water ethic would then inform the principles that will guide
institutional processes such as the mechanics of dispute resolution, participatory
processes and information sharing.
Transboundary river basin organizations offer a regional forum for the
development of basin-wide dispute resolution mechanisms. One of the most common
criticisms of the current UN Watercourse Convention is its failure to provide any dispute
resolution mechanisms for non-state actors regarding transboundary development.
While some Indigenous peoples may have recourse to domestic courts, many national
systems are still inadequate to address Indigenous peoples’ claims and the rising level of
domestic water conflicts.581 Courts are also often inadequate to address the extraterritorial character of transboundary disputes. To the extent that court remedies are
limited to compensation or reparation, they are arguably inadequate.582 Within the
context of environmental degradation, McCaffrey notes that even the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) recognizes “that traditional remedies for the breach of international
obligations are often of little use where the environment is concerned”.583 McCaffrey
cites the ICJ in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case as follows:
The Court is mindful that, in the field of environmental protection,
vigilance and prevention are required on account of the often irreversible
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character of damage to the environment and of the limitations inherent in
the very mechanism of reparation of this type of damage.584
Given the interconnectedness and synergy between the environment and Indigenous
rights, the recognition of Indigenous rights in transboundary disputes requires regional
dispute resolution mechanisms that also addresses the “irreversible character” of damage
to Indigenous communities. Priority needs to be placed on collaboration and coalition
building prior to development. Established processes for coalition building would also
provide sovereigns with an opportunity to meet their international and domestic
obligations to consult with and obtain the “free and informed consent” of Indigenous
populations prior to development on transboundary rivers.
Participatory processes could also allow for recognition of the full spectrum of
diverse Indigenous perspectives, thereby avoiding the tendency to assume that there is
only one Indigenous perspective on any given issue. Richardson states:
… international environmental law affirms the need for effective participation
of indigenous peoples in determining how to achieve sustainability. Enduring
solutions to this challenge are unlikely to be found if policy reform is framed
solely in terms of enunciating indigenous rights over use of plants and
animals. Rather, the focus should be broadened to require the establishment
of institutional processes that secure indigenous peoples’ involvement in
environmental decision-making systems in an integrated and proactive
manner. This should be accompanied by a shift away from prevailing monocultural approaches to resource management to the forging of new crosscultural strategies that allow for interaction rather than conflict between
indigenous and non-indigenous interests. … The environmental challenge is
one that requires governments, communities, indigenous peoples and others to
cooperate and employ new legal concepts and institutions.585
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While critics will contend that it is not possible to allow everyone a seat at the table,
major multi-stakeholder environmental agreements provide evidence that large multiparty negotiations regarding the environment are possible.586
River basin organizations could also provide the institutional capacity to coordinate
a vast amount of information regarding the entire river basin including scientific data on
climate change, fluctuation levels, seismic activity, and flooding. Moreover, they provide
the opportunity for knowledge transfers as well as the potential to learn from Indigenous
peoples’ traditional knowledge regarding governance strategies in times of water
scarcity.587 Wolf identifies the wealth of untapped traditional knowledge that exists
regarding Indigenous strategies for shared water governance in arid regions throughout
the world.588 His research considers lessons learned from the methods of conflict
resolution adopted by the Berbers of the High Atlas Mountains and the Bedouin of the
Negev Desert, in the face of water scarcity and fluctuation.589 Similarly Professor Alfred
(2005) observes the potential for international law to learn from Indigenous traditions:
Scholars of international law are now beginning to see the vast potential for
peace represented in indigenous political philosophies. Attention focused on
the principles of the Rotinohshonni Kaienerekowa (Great Law of Peace) in the
international arena, for example, suggests the growing recognition of
indigenous thought as a postcolonial alternative to the state sovereignty
model.590
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RBOs could become a natural forum for further understanding of Indigenous legal
systems and customs regarding water governance.
The preliminary research and drafting of an international agreement to guide river
basin organizations demands the full participation and support of international Indigenous
institutions such as the UN Permanent Forum of Indigenous Issues or the Expert
Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in order to ensure that it is founded upon
the basis of mutual respect and that its guiding principles are consistent with Indigenous
peoples’ rights and values. The sincerity of any attempt at collaboration between states
and Indigenous peoples is likely to be questioned in light of states’ long colonial history
and current practices. In “Rethinking Collaboration: Working the Indigene-Colonizer
Hyphen” (2008), Jones interrogates “the logic of ([her] own) White/settler enthusiasm for
dialogic collaboration” and considers the potential for exploitation in any collaborative
undertaking between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples:
The liberal injunction to listen to the Other can turn out to be access for
dominant groups to the thoughts, cultures, and lives of others. … In
attempting, in the name of justice and dialogue, to move the boundary pegs of
power into the terrain of the margin-dwellers, the powerful require those on
the margins not to be silent, or to talk alone, but to open up their territory and
share what they know. The imperialist resonances are uncomfortably apt.591
If river basin organizations are to be the “ethical spaces” imagined by Willie Ermine,
then they must be co-created with the critical engagement and full participation of
Indigenous peoples.
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4.5

Conclusion
Water is a classic common property resource.
No one really owns the problem.
Therefore, no one really owns the solution.592
Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary General
In this chapter, I have argued for the reconstruction of international law of

transboundary watercourses in a manner that is inclusive of Indigenous peoples’ affirmed
rights. To this end, I have set out to counter potential arguments that the international
legal system is limited to state actors and not flexible enough to recognize the inherent
rights of Indigenous peoples. Historical analysis of the evolution of international
Indigenous rights and the international legal system’s recognition of the rights onto nonstate actors illustrates the flexibility of the international system to allow for such rights.
However, it also points to the system’s rigid adherence to the doctrine of sovereignty.
From a state perspective, there exists a need for states’ agreement to “confer” new rights
onto Indigenous peoples. Arguably, from Indigenous perspective, it is not necessary to
argue for the creation of new rights under international law but rather it is a matter of
arguing for the recognition and implementation of pre-existing Indigenous rights within
the context of international water law. While historical and theoretical arguments for
reform are evident, systemic change of the international system tends to occur within the
context of complex problems that require creative solutions. States continue to be the
dominant actors in international law and state consent is required to recognize the rights
of non-state actors, however, there is ample precedent that states and international
agencies overwhelmingly support the implementation of Indigenous peoples’ rights
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throughout the international legal system. In addition to human rights instruments and
declarations that affirm express or indirect individual rights to water, UNDRIP, ILO No
169 and a multitude of other international instruments affirm Indigenous peoples’
collective rights to water.
I have offered several proposals for a reconstruction of the international law of
transboundary rivers that is inclusive of these rights. First, I consider the potential for an
amendment to the current UN Watercourse Convention to reference the human right to
water and UNDRIP in order to ensure that Indigenous peoples’ have the right to “free and
informed consent” prior to developments that will impact their territories. This approach
has limited appeal given that the UN Watercourse Convention has not yet been ratified
and that this limited reform perpetuates Indigenous peoples’ dependence upon states to
enforce their rights. Second, I consider the value of having states voluntarily insert
provisions regarding the human right to water and Indigenous peoples’ rights in their
state agreements. This approach has merit as it would make such requirements
contractually mandatory and help advance the argument that these principles have
advanced into customary international law. However, it fails to provide Indigenous
peoples with access to compliance or dispute resolution mechanisms. Third, I propose a
radically inclusive approach to transboundary water law that envisions a new
international instrument, which calls for the creation of river basin organizations on all
transboundary rivers. These organizations would provide the institutional capacity that is
required to ensure that integrated, holistic, basin-wide approaches to river governance are
implemented in a manner that is consistent with human rights and Indigenous rights.
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Given that individual and collective rights to water are already set out under
human rights laws and being addressed in human rights bodies,593 it is reasonable to
question why reconstruction of international water law is necessary given that Indigenous
peoples have access to dispute resolution mechanisms through established international
human rights bodies. Given the critical importance of water to human life and the
complexity of the issues confronting water security in the 21st century, it is no longer
legitimate to maintain an institutional separation between international water law and
human rights laws.594 The reconstruction of international water law should not simply be
a matter of addressing the appropriate venue for dispute resolution, but also about
creating laws, institutions and processes that ensure the engagement of Indigenous
peoples’ in the development of creative regional strategies towards basin-wide river
governance.595 Moreover, human rights bodies are constrained in their ability to address
transboundary claims. Professor Dinah Shelton, President of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights identifies the “transboundary problem”596 within the
context of Indigenous water rights:
There is a transboundary problem with which human rights bodies have
difficulty, because human rights instruments generally require states to protect
and ensure rights to those within their territory and jurisdiction. This limits
the ability of human rights bodies to examine water problems that stem from
activities outside the territory of the state, whose capacity to ensure
guaranteed rights is thereby affected. ... Solutions to water needs of
indigenous and local communities will require transboundary cooperation and
better fact-finding.597
593
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In addition to the constraints posed by the transboundary nature of many water claims,
Indigenous peoples often lack the financial resources to engage in lengthy protracted
litigation in domestic courts that is generally required prior to accessing international
human rights bodies.598
Shelton enumerates several measures that are needed to "address the water crises
from a human rights perspective":
1. Integrate human rights into development decisions - recognizing the
indivisibility and equal importance of all human rights.
2. Bring the targets of development into the decision-making process as active
participants
3. Adopt more democratic and transparent procedures consistent with human
rights.
4. Promote accountability and capacity-building.
5. Harmonize practical and operational aspects of human rights and
development without compromising the essential values of each domain.
6. Recognize human rights as ends in themselves, even if evidence-based
evaluation of progress is impossible.
7. Include as a part of investment agreements and licenses for development
projects the Voluntary Guidelines599 for the conduct of cultural, environmental
and social impact assessments regarding developments proposed to take place
on or which are likely to impact on, sacred sites and on lands and waters
traditionally occupied or used by indigenous and local communities, thereby
making them legally binding.600
Richardson concurs that petitions to human rights bodies to establish Indigenous rights is
not sufficient to safeguard the environment and concludes:
598
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… reform must also address mechanisms by which Indigenous communities
can collaborate with management institutions at other levels of economic
policy-making and development planning. If Indigenous livelihoods that
respect the environment are to be sustained, an Indigenous voice in local
environmental governance is not enough – it must also be heard in the
institutions that shape the global economy, trade, finance and other
fundamental causes of environmental pressure.601
In my view, the concerns raised by Shelton and Richardson can be addressed by
recognizing individual and collective rights to water in the creation of basin-wide
institutions designed to increase participatory decision-making and coalition-building on
transboundary rivers. Water is at the foundation of all human enterprises including
agriculture, hydropower, oil & gas, tourism, and other economic pursuits.602 As such,
transboundary rivers are fertile ground for the creation of international institutions that
promote inclusive decision-making and coalition building to reconcile the competing
interests and values of globalization and local Indigenous communities.
River basin organizations offer the potential for institutional capacity to allow
multiple stakeholders to develop basin-wide governance strategies and coordinate the
vast amount of information needed to address basin-wide issues such as the impacts of
climate change, hydropower, flooding, pollution, water scarcity and seismic activity.
RBOs could also serve as an “ethical space” to facilitate cross-cultural dialogue,
coalition-building, dispute resolution and collaborative problem-solving that transcends
the sovereign discourse. River basin organizations already exist on hundreds of
transboundary rivers throughout the world, but do not yet exist on all transboundary
rivers. Existing RBOs have been created by voluntary regional state agreements and as
such vary widely in their guiding principles and processes. A comparative study of
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whether existing RBOs are adequately addressing Indigenous peoples’ rights could
provide valuable insight into the development of international guidelines in this regard.
The process of drafting an international agreement to guide the operation of river
basin organizations will require states and Indigenous peoples to collaborate on the
declaration of an internationally accepted water ethic. Writing within the context of
environmental protection, Postel defines “water ethic” as “a guide to right conduct in the
face of complex decisions about natural systems that we do not and cannot fully
understand.”603 Given that water is at the foundation of all human enterprises and all life,
laws regarding water by their very nature require a consideration of ethics. Indeed, it is
imperative for the international community to articulate and codify an international water
ethic for the 21st century that will guide the future development of international water
law.
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Ibid at 222. Also see Ermine (2007), supra note 45, where simply defines “ethics” as “the capacity to
know what harms or enhances the well-being of sentient creatures.”

171

Chapter 5:

Conclusion: A Return to Ethics

The art and practice of equitable distribution of an access to fresh water for
all people in the 21st century, as a fundamental human right and
international obligation, is the mother of all ethical questions of all
transboundary natural resources of a finite nature.604
Thomas R. Odhiambo,
Past President of the African Academy of Sciences

All peoples rely upon water for life. Without it, they die. Competing interests
over fresh water include drinking water, hydroelectric power, fishing, irrigation,
environmental needs and industrial uses. The availability of fresh water is further
compromised by climate change, increasing global population, and large-scale
development projects that dominate local communities and pollute freshwater supplies.
The goal of water security is a matter of international importance that has political,
human and environmental dimensions. Indigenous peoples are particularly vulnerable in
the current global water crisis. On May 16, 2001, UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki-moon
observed, “[m]illions of indigenous peoples continue to lose their lands, their rights, and
their resources. They make up one third of the world’s 1 billion rural poor. And they are
among the most vulnerable and marginalized of any group.”605 Within the context of
international water law, the rights of Indigenous peoples are an issue of fundamental
importance and international concern. Yet, Indigenous peoples’ rights are conspicuously
absent from international water laws and legal discourse.
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In this thesis, I have adopted Critical Race (Indigenous) Theory to confront the
inequities inherent in the UN Watercourse Convention, the doctrine of sovereignty and
related discourse from Indigenous peoples’ perspectives. My methodology has involved:
(i) adopting a theoretical framework informed by Critical Race Theory; (ii)
deconstructing the UN Watercourse Convention and the legal doctrine of sovereignty and
providing two case studies to illuminate Indigenous perspectives in transboundary water
law; (iii) presenting a literature review regarding Indigenous peoples’ relationship to the
doctrine of sovereignty and alternative conceptions of sovereignty; and (iv) offering
proposals for reconstructing international water law in a manner that is inclusive of
Indigenous peoples and invites a return to ethics as the foundation for future reform. A
discussion of ethics and the role of law in shaping the relationship between Indigenous
and non-Indigenous peoples is particularly apt in the context of transboundary water law.
The very nature of rivers and the dependence of all living things upon the hydrological
cycle forces us to acknowledge our interconnectedness at a global level, the fragility of
human life and the relative arbitrariness of state boundaries. Within this context, I have
sought to engage Indigenous perspectives regarding the intersection of international water
law, the doctrine of sovereignty and the international rights of Indigenous peoples.
The UN Watercourse Convention and related legal discourse is aimed solely at
governing the relations between sovereigns. It is premised upon “sovereign equality” 606
and codifies equitable principles aimed at seeking optimal utilization of a shared resource
in a manner that minimizes harm to downstream states. From a state-perspective, the UN
Watercourse Convention is perceived as a departure from the strict adherence to the
doctrine of sovereignty in favour of cooperative state development agreements that
606
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emphasize “mutual gains”. However, when viewed from Indigenous perspectives, the
primacy of sovereignty continues to dictate which peoples may avail themselves to the
equitable principles of the Convention and operates to exclude Indigenous peoples from
the legal discourse.
A critical analysis of the UN Watercourse Convention and related legal discourse
demonstrates that Indigenous peoples are conspicuously absent from both. States are not
held to any international standard with respect to Indigenous peoples when making
agreements under the Convention. Indeed, the Convention appears to place the agreement
and cooperation of states as its primary objective regardless of the agreement’s impact
upon the rights of Indigenous peoples. However, a review of two transboundary basins,
the Columbia River and the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra, demonstrate the devastating impact
of past developments upon Indigenous peoples and the potential for violent conflict in
future developments. Applying Critical Race Theory to deconstruct international water
law, I contend that the emphasis placed upon sovereign status in international water law
may operate to adversely impact Indigenous peoples in the following ways:
(i)

(ii)

(iii)

(iv)

It excludes Indigenous peoples from international negotiations regarding
transboundary rivers and from participating in the development of
international water law principles;
It presumes that Indigenous peoples’ interests in transboundary rivers are a
domestic issue, thereby reinforcing Indigenous peoples as subordinate to
the states that oppress them and perpetuating ongoing colonization of
Indigenous peoples by states;
It undermines international conventions and declarations that have
affirmed the rights of Indigenous peoples to fully participate in
environmental decision-making; and
It may exacerbate conflict over disputed territories and unintentionally
encourage states to expand their territories.

By relying solely upon states’ interests and a Western classical understanding of
sovereignty, international water law is predicated upon values and assumptions that
174

contradict and exclude Indigenous peoples’ experience of sovereignty and relationship
with water.
Locating Indigenous peoples in international water law necessitates an
understanding of the historical context surrounding the doctrine of sovereignty and a
consideration of how Indigenous peoples experience sovereignty. By offering alternative
narratives to the dominant discourse, it becomes apparent that one’s understanding of
sovereignty is a reflection of political, cultural and spiritual values, and one’s place in the
world. The following themes arose from the literature:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

Indigenous perspectives challenge the myths of neutrality and objectivity
that surround the doctrine of sovereignty.
The conflicts surrounding sovereignty discourse are ultimately premised
on a conflict of values.
There is no one universal homogenous perspective regarding Indigenous
sovereignty but rather a plurality of diverse perspectives.
At their root, all the perspectives are aimed at reclaiming Indigenous
sovereignty and inherent power as well as redefining Indigenous-state
relations.

Indigenous narratives regarding the meaning of sovereignty invoke values that accord
with duties, balance, mutual respect and interconnectedness with nature. In contrast, the
Western legal concept of sovereignty evokes values of entitlement, conquest, domination
over nature, territoriality, authority and power over some peoples to the benefit of other
peoples. Once viewed in contrast with Indigenous ways of understanding power, the
perceived neutrality and objectivity of the Western legal definition of sovereignty
dissolves and it becomes apparent that the doctrine of sovereignty is a social construct
designed to achieve the particular goals of colonization and exploitation of peoples and
resources.607 To the extent that the doctrine of sovereignty is a cornerstone of our
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current international legal systems, Indigenous peoples continue to suffer the adverse
consequences of the domination of imperialist values over Indigenous values.
According to Macklem, the international law of Indigenous peoples has emerged
to specifically acknowledge and mitigate the adverse impacts of an international legal
system founded upon Western sovereignty.608 A review of the history of Indigenous
peoples’ rights over the last century has culminated in the codification of their rights to
self-determination in ILO No 169 and UNDRIP, as well as a host of other international
instruments. Supported by the majority of sovereign states and international agencies,
there is a concerted effort to ensure that Indigenous peoples’ rights are recognized
throughout the international legal system. I contend that reform of the UN Watercourse
Convention is also necessary to ensure that Indigenous peoples’ rights are recognized
within the context of international water law and legal discourse. Arguably, a failure to
implement Indigenous rights into all legal systems and institutions simply perpetuates the
colonial agenda upon which they were founded.
Given that international law has historically been concerned only with state-tostate relations, some may challenge my proposed reconstruction of international water
law on the basis that international law should not or cannot accommodate the recognition
of non-state actors. However, historical analysis of the evolution of international
Indigenous rights and the international legal system’s recognition of the rights of nonstate actors demonstrates the flexibility of the international system to allow for such
rights. From a state perspective, there exists a need for states’ agreement to “confer” new
rights onto Indigenous peoples. However, from an Indigenous perspective, it is not
necessary to argue for the creation of new rights under international law but rather it is a
608
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matter of arguing for the recognition and implementation of pre-existing Indigenous
rights within the context of international water law. While states remain the dominant
actors in international law, there is a demonstrated willingness by the majority of states
and international agencies to recognize and implement Indigenous peoples’ rights.
Others may challenge that a reconstruction of international water law is not
necessary given that Indigenous peoples already have access to human rights laws and
organizations and that these existing laws and institutions are sufficient to address any
violation of their rights. However, human rights laws are intended to address the actions
of states that violate the rights of their own citizens. As such, existing human rights
bodies are not adequate to address transboundary claims. I have also argued that it is not
sufficient to simply establish recourse for violations of rights. True legal reconciliation
will require the creation of new processes and institutional capacity that emphasizes
collaboration, participatory processes and information sharing.
Reform of international water law is not likely to be achieved by challenging
sovereignty directly but rather by emphasizing a return to ethics and values that have
informed the emergence of human rights laws and the international rights of indigenous
peoples. Rather than challenge the doctrine of sovereignty, I propose the co-creation of
new international instruments and institutions based on mutual respect and
interconnectedness that operate in parallel with existing laws and institutions. Such a
multi-dimensional, multi-level approach to governance will create space for states and
Indigenous peoples to work together to address the complexities of transboundary water
governance. In my view, existing river basin organizations provide a template for
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creating the institutional capacity necessary to mitigate against the adverse impacts of our
current international legal system upon Indigenous peoples.
In this thesis, I have called for the reconciliation of transboundary water law and
the international law of Indigenous peoples in a manner that transcends the conflict and
violence inherent in the sovereignty discourse. I contend that the conflicts within the
sovereignty discourse and the emerging conflicts over water are ultimately conflicts over
values. The reconciliation of international water law with the international law of
Indigenous peoples necessitates a reconciliation of values and a return to ethics. In my
view, reform of international water law requires two steps:
(1)

the articulation of an international water ethic with the critical engagement of
Indigenous peoples; and

(2)

the creation of institutional capacity and processes consistent with this shared
international water ethic that provide an ‘ethical space’609 for Indigenous
peoples and states to engage each other on the complex issues surrounding
water.

As noted by Groenfeldt, this is not an issue of establishing ethics where none have
existed before. Rather, it is a matter of making the current water ethic explicit. The
current ethic of “command and control”, “economically beneficial use” and “water as
resources principle” is arguably incongruous with the values of Indigenous peoples and
long-term environmental sustainability.610 The development of an international water
ethic is intended to reveal, challenge and discuss the ethics currently informing
international water law with the goal of reconciling them with the values currently
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espoused by the international community as embodied in the laws regarding individual
and collective rights.
The development of an international water ethic will require further analysis of
existing international declarations on ethics such as the Universal Declaration of Bioethics
and Human Rights (UDBHR)611 as well as regional Indigenous declarations on water612 to

identify shared values. This process necessitates grassroots involvement by Indigenous
peoples and critical engagement by agencies such as UN Permanent Forum on
Indigenous Issues and the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to
ensure that the values of Indigenous peoples and their traditional laws are accurately
represented.613 The articulation of an international water ethic can then form the
foundation for the creation of a new convention on water that mandates regional river
basin organizations on every transboundary river in accordance with established ethics.
This convention could establish minimum criteria regarding membership, participation,
dispute resolution, information sharing and enforcement mechanisms, while also
allowing enough flexibility for regional diversity. In this way, new “ethical space”614 can
be created based upon a shared ethic of mutual respect, equality and interconnectedness.
Further research is required to facilitate the reconstruction of international water
law in a manner that recognizes Indigenous perspectives. My thesis has been limited to a
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Critical Race Theory analysis of the law concerning transboundary rivers only.
Additional critical analysis is needed to assess the draft articles on the Law of
Transboundary Aquifers615 as well as popular water governance theories (IWRM) from
Indigenous perspectives. In addition, comparative analysis of the structures and
constraints of existing RBOs from Indigenous perspectives will provide insights into the
existing or potential roles of Indigenous peoples in transboundary river institutions and
provide guidance for drafting international instruments regarding the implementation of
RBOs in a manner consistent with the principles of UNDRIP and ILO No 169. On a
more theoretical level, further consideration is warranted to consider how a “community
of interests”616 approach to water governance might apply to an international community
that is recognized to include Indigenous peoples as well as states.617 For example, can
we develop the meaning of the concepts of “community” and “interests” in a manner that
allows us to develop this theoretical approach within the context of an international water
ethic?
Finally, there is a pressing need for more research and recognition of traditional
knowledge regarding water governance. Indigenous knowledge, legal systems and
ethics, especially in water-scarce regions, may provide key insights into how we address
the current global water stress crisis. How have Indigenous peoples developed
governance for upstream and downstream issues? What is the traditional knowledge on
keeping peaceful relations over water? Traditional knowledge may provide us with
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practical tools in creating peaceful governance strategies. Moreover, Indigenous wisdom
reminds us of our place in the world. Nlaka’pamux lawyer, Ardith Walkem writes:
Nlaka’pamux law is an exacting law. A law that flows from the fact that we
are owned by the land, by the water, that we owe our existence to the
relationship of our peoples to the territories where our grandmothers, and
their grandmothers before them, came into being. The land and waters have
given our people life, and we are not free to disregard that relationship
because of the assertion of other laws. This law is not diminished by
licenses, certificates of title, or stacks of legal papers that array themselves
in challenge. It is the law of our heart, our memories, a law drawn of the
physical fact that the very components of our bones and marrow are
comprised of the sustenance that we have taken from the land. It is a law
carried forward through stories, nourished and shared through the words we
speak and the actions we take. Indigenous laws are alive and not remnants
from the past, and we have an obligation to follow them, and to reinvigorate
them where they have become weakened.618
While the challenging discourse on the future of sovereignty is likely to continue, the
current global water stress crisis requires us to move beyond sovereignty, at least on a
without prejudice basis, in order to engage in a reconciliation and articulation of the
values that will guide our communities in the governance of shared water.

The comforting message from history
is that our values and paradigms can and do change over time.619
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Figures
Figure 2.1: Map of the Columbia River Basin620

620

Source: Watersheds of the World: North and Central America - Columbia Watershed © 2006 World
Resources Institute <http://earthtrends.wri.org/text/water-resources/map-383.html>. Content licensed under
a Creative Commons License <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/>.
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Figure 2.2: Map of Tsangpo-Brahmaputra Basin621

621

Source: Watersheds of the World: Asia and Oceania - Brahmaputra Watershed. © 2006 World
Resources Institute. Online at: <http://earthtrends.wri.org/text/water-resources/map-347.html>. Content
licensed under a Creative Commons License <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/>.

183

Bibliography

Legislation
Columbia Basin Trust Act, RSBC 1996, cC-53 (Canada).

Jurisprudence: Domestic

Cherokee Nation v Georgia, 30 US 1 (1831) (US).
Chief Mountain v British Columbia (Attorney General) 2011 BCSC 1394 (Canada).
Johnson v M’Intosh, 21 US (8 Wheat) 543 (1823) (US).
Pakootas v Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd, (2006) 452 F 3d 1066 (US).
Worcester v Georgia, 31 US (6 Pet) 515 (1832) (US).

Jurisprudence: International
Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), [1997] ICJ
Judgment of 25 September 1997, International Court of Justice, online: International
Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/92/7375.pdf> [GabčíkovoNagymaros].
Case Relating to the Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the Oder
River (1929), Judgment of 10 September 1929, PCIJ (Series A No 23 -Series C No
17-11), online: International Water Law,
<http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/cases/river-oder.html> [Oder River].
Case of the Saramaka People v Suriname (28 November 2007), IACHR (ser C) No 172
[Saramaka People].
Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group (Canada) (30 October 2009) IACHR, Report No 105/09,
Petition 592-07, Admissibility, online: IACHR
<http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2009eng/Canada592.07eng.htm>.
Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, (16 October 1975) ICJ 12, online: ICJ
<http://www.icjcij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&k=69&case=61&code=sa&p3=4>.

184

International Conventions & Treaties
Convention on Biological Diversity COP – 7, 9-20 February 2004, Decision VII/16,
Annex, Seventh Ordinary Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention
on Biological Diversity, 9 - 20 February 2004 - Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, online:
Convention on Biological Diversity <http://www.cbd.int/decisions/cop/?m=cop-07 >[
Akwé: Kon guidelines].
Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses,
opened for signature 21 May 1997, 36 ILM 700 (1997) (not yet in force) [UN
Watercourse Convention].
Covenant of the League of Nations: Article 23, Creation of Mandates, (28 June 1919)
para b, on-line: African History
<http://africanhistory.about.com/od/eracolonialism/qt/MandateA23.htm>.
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, 19 Dec 1966, 993
UNTS 3 [ICESCR].
International Labour Organisation Convention No 169 Concerning Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, 27 June 1989, 1650 UNTS 383 (entered
into force Sept. 5, 1991) [ILO No 169].
Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de
Janeiro, 3-14 1992) Annex I Rio Declaration of Environment and Development, 3-14
June 1992, GA A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) [Rio Declaration]
Treaty relating to the Boundary Waters and Questions Arising along the Boundary
between the United States and Canada, signed at Washington 11 January 1909,
entered into force 5 May 1910, online: International Joint Commission
<http://www.ijc.org/rel/agree/water.html#text>.
United Nations (UN) Documents and Publications
Agenda 21, Report of the UNCED, I, UN CED, (1992), DocA/CONF. 15126 (Vol. II)
online: United Nations
<http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/agenda21toc.htm>
[Agenda 21].
General Assembly Adopts Convention on Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, GA Res GA/9248, UN GAOR, 21 May 1997, online: The Water Page
<www.thewaterpage.com/UNPressWater.htm>.
General Assembly Adopts Resolution Recognizing Access to Clean Water, Sanitation as
Human Right, by Recorded Vote of 122 in Favour, None against, 41 Abstentions, GA
185

Res GA/10967, UN GAOR, 64th Sess, 108th Mtg (28 July 2010), online:
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/ga10967.doc.htm>.
General Assembly Sixty-sixth Session Summary Report: Law of transboundary aquifers
(Agenda Item 85 re: Res 63/124), UN GAOR (15 January 2009), online: United
Nations <http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/66/TransAquifer.html>.
International Labour Organization, “Convention No C169”, online: ILO
<http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/ratifce.pl?C169>.
---. “Convention No 169”, online: ILO
<http://www.ilo.org/indigenous/Conventions/no169/lang--en/index.htm>.
International Law Commission, Draft articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers,
(2008) UN GAOR Sixty-third Session, Supp No. 10, UN Doc A/63/10, online: UN
<http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/8_5_2008.pdf>
[Law of Transboundary Aquifers].
Permanent Forum Can Play Dynamic Role in Changing Deplorable Situation of
Indigenous People, Secretary-General Says at Opening Session, UN Secretary
General SG/SM/13575, HR/5052 (16 May 2011), online: UN
<www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sgsm13575.doc.htm>.
UN Bibliographic Information System, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, online: UN
<http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?profile=voting&index=.VM&term=ares
61295>.
UN Development Group, Guidelines on Indigenous Peoples’ Issues, (2008) online:
Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/indigenous/docs/guidelines.pdf>.
UN ESCOR, General Comment No. 15: The right to water (arts. 11 and 12 of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), 29th Sess, UN
Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (2002) [General Comment No. 15].
---. Report of the Mekong River Commission, E/ESCAP/63/31, UN ESCOR, 23 March
2007.
---. Res 1589(L), para 7, 50th Sess., Supp No 1, UN Doc E/5044 (21 May 1971)
[Resolution 1589].
UN News Centre, “Ban Ki-moon warns that water shortages are increasingly driving
conflicts” (6 February 2008), online: UN
<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=25527>.

186

---. “Right to water and sanitation is legally binding, affirms key UN body” (1 October
2010), online: United Nations
<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=36308&Cr=water&Cr1=>.
UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR), “UN united to make
the right to water and sanitation legally binding” (1 October 2010), online: OHCHR
<http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10403&L
angID=E>.
---. “Special Rapporteur on the human right to safe drinking water and sanitation”,
online: OHCHR
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/WaterAndSanitation/SRWater/Pages/SRWaterInde
x.aspx>.
UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues [UNPFII], “IASG / Inter-Agency Support
Group on Indigenous Issues”, online: UN
<http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/iasg.html>.
---. “Inter-Agency Support Group”, online: UN
<http://social.un.org/index/IndigenousPeoples/InterAgencySupportGroup.aspx>.
---. Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations,
(consolidated) UN DOC ECN4Sub.219867 and Add1-4 (28 June 1983) (prepared by
José Martínez Cobo), online: United Nations
<http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/spdaip.html> [Martínez Cobo Report].
---. “United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Adopted by the
General Assembly 13 September 2007”, online: United Nations
<http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/declaration.html>.

UN Treaty Collections, “Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses New York, 21 May 1997” (Status as at 2 January 2012),
online: UN Treaty Collections
<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg
_no=XXVII-12&chapter=27&lang=en#Participants>.
UN University, Deep Words, Shallow Words: An Initial Analysis of Water Discourse in
Four Decades of UN Declarations, report from the UNU Institute for Water and
Health, (October 2011), online: United Nations University
<http://www.inweh.unu.edu/River/documents/DeepWords_ShallowWords%20_Mou
nt&Bielak_FINAL_pdf_Oct_26_2011.pdf>.
---. Traditional Knowledge and Water Management, United Nations University, Institute
of Advanced Studies, Traditional Knowledge Initiative, online: UN Traditional
Knowledge Initiative <http://www.unutki.org/default.php?doc_id=14>.
187

UN-Water, Transboundary Waters” UN International Decade of Action, Water for Life
2005-2015, online: UN
<http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/transboundary_waters.shtml>.
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN GAOR
Doc.A/RES/61/295 (13 September 2007) online: UN
<http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/declaration.html> [UNDRIP].
Universal Declaration of Bioethics and Human Rights, adopted at UNESCO's General
Conference, 19 October 2005, online: UNESCO < http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.phpURL_ID=31058&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html> [UDBHR].
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217 (III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess, Supp No
13, UN Doc A/810 (1948) [UDHR].

Secondary Materials
Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, Canada's Statement of Support
on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, online:
Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada < http://www.aadncaandc.gc.ca/eng/1309374239861>.
Adams, Howard. “The Process of Neocolonialism, excerpt from Tortured People: The
Politics of Colonization, Ch. 8 (Theytus Books, 1999) as reprinted in Robert Odawi
Porter, ed Sovereignty, Colonialism and the Indigenous Nations: A Reader (Durham,
North Carolina: California Academic Press, 2005) 497.
Akwesasne Notes. “Indigenous Peoples, Self-Determination and the Unfounded Fear of
Secession” (1995) as reprinted in Robert Odawi Porter, ed, Sovereignty, Colonialism
and the Indigenous Nations: A Reader (Durham, North Carolina: California
Academic Press, 2005) 713.
Alfred, Taiaiake. “Sovereignty” in Joanne Barker, ed, Sovereignty Matters: Locations of
Contestation and Possibility in Indigenous Struggles for Self-Determinism (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 2005) 33.
---. “Sovereignty: An Inappropriate Concept” (1999) excerpt from Peace, Power,
Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto (Oxford: Oxford University Press Canada,
1999) as reprinted in Robert Odawi Porter, ed, Sovereignty, Colonialism and the
Indigenous Nations: A Reader (Durham, North Carolina: California Academic Press,
2005) 67.
---. Wasáse: Indigenous Pathways of Action and Freedom (North York: Broadview Press,
2005).
188

Alfred, Taiaiake & Corntassel, Jeff. “Being Indigenous: Resurgences against
Contemporary Colonialsm” (2005) 40:4 Government and Opposition 597.
Anaya, S. James. Indigenous Peoples in International Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004).
---. “The Capacity of International Law to Advance Ethnic or Nationality Rights Claims”
(1990) 75 Iowa L. Rev. 837 as reprinted in Robert Odawi Porter, ed. Sovereignty,
Colonialism and the Indigenous Nations: A Reader (North Carolina: California
Academic Press, 2005) 681.
---. “Self-determination as a Collective Human Right Under Contemporary International
Law” in Pekka Aiko & Martin Scheinin, eds, Operationalizing the Right of
Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination (Finland: Institute for Human Rights,
2000).
Andrews, Penelope. “Making Room for Critical Race Theory in International Law: Some
Practical Pointers” (2000) 45 Vill L Rev 855.
Anghie, Antony. Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
Aristotle. The Politics, revised ed, trans by TA Sinclair, revised and e-presented by
Trevor J Saunders (London: Penguin Books, 1992).
Armstrong, Patrick. "Conflict Resolution and British Columbia's Great Bear Rainforest:
Lessons Learned 1995-2009" (3 August 2009), online: Coast Forest Conservation
Initiative <http://www.coastforestconservationinitiative.com/pdf7/GBR_PDF.pdf>.
Arpi, Claude. “Dams on the Brahmaputra,” (1 May 2010), online: Claude Arpi Blogspot
<http://claudearpi.blogspot.com/2010/05/dams-on-brahmaputra.html>.
---. “Diverting the Brahmaputra: Declaration of War?” Rediff (23 October 2003), online:
Rediff <www.rediff.com///news/2003/oct/27spec.html>.
---. “Himalayan Rivers: Geopolitics and Strategic Perspectives” Indian Defence Review
(17 February 2011), online: Indian Defence Review
<http://www.indiandefencereview.com/geopolitics/Himalayan-Rivers-Geopoliticsand-Strategic-Perspectives.html>.
Ashley, K et al. “Restoration of kokanee salmon in Kootenay Lake, a large intermontane
lake, by controlled seasonal additions of nutrients” in T Murphy and M Munawar,
eds, Aquatic Restoration in Canada (Leiden, Netherlands: Ecovision World
Monogaph Series, Backhuys Publishers, 1999) 127.

189

Aylward, Carol. Canadian Critical Race Theory (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing 1999).
Bankes, Nigel. “The Columbia Basin and the Columbia River Treaty: Canadian
Perspectives in the 1990s” (Working Paper delivered to Northwest Water Law and
Policy Project PO95-4, Northwestern School of Law of Lewis and Clark College
(1996).
---. “Multiple Actors in Canada-US Relations: Environment: Garrison Dam, Columbia
River, The IJC, NGOs” (2004) 30 Can-US LJ 117.
Barker, Adam. “From Adversaries to Allies: Forging Respectful Alliances between
Indigenous and Settler Peoples” in Lynn Davis, ed, Alliances: Re/Envisioning
Indigenous-Non-Indigenous Relationships (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2010) 316.
Barker, Joanne. “For Whom Sovereignty Matters” in Joanne Barker, ed, Sovereignty
Matters: Locations of Contestation and Possibility in Indigenous Struggles for SelfDeterminism (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005) 1.
Beach, Heather L et al. Transboundary freshwater dispute resolution: Theory, practice
and annotated references (New York: United Nations University Press, 2000).
Bosselmann, Klaus. “Environmental Governance: A New Approach to Territorial
Sovereignty in Robert J Goldstein, ed., Environmental Ethics and Law (Great Britain:
The Cromwell Press, 2004) 293.
Bourquain, Knut. Freshwater Access From a Human Rights Perspective: A Challenge to
International Water and Human Rights Law (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
2008).
Brown, Anna & Odeh, Nancy. "Towards a Global Transboundary Watercourse and
Aquifer Agreement (GTWAA) in William R. Moomaw & Lawrence E. Susskind,
eds, Papers on International Environmental Negotiation, Volume 15 Ensuring a
Sustainable Future (Boston: MIT-Harvard Public Disputes Program, 2006), online:
Program on Negotiation, Harvard Law School
<http://www.pon.harvard.edu/shop/papers-on-international-environmentalnegotiation-series/> 1.
Brown, Peter G & Schmidt, Jeremy J, eds, Water Ethics: Foundational Readings for
Students and Professionals (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2010).
Canadian Columbia River Forum. “Canadian Columbia River Forum Memorandum of
Understanding”, online: Canadian Columbia River Forum,
<http://www.ccrf.ca/assets/docs/pdf/MOU_Eng_17.pdf>.

190

Canadian Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fisheries Commission (CCRIFC). “Letter from
Mr. Fred Fortier, Chairperson of the Canadian Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fisheries
Commission (CCRIFC) with respect to the IJC’s Order of Approval of December 15,
1941, in the matter of the application of the Government of the United States for
approval for the construction and operation of the Grand Coulee dam and reservoir”
(23 April 2003), online: International Joint Commission
<www.ijc.org/rel/boards/ccrifc/request_ccrifc-e.htm>.
Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE). “UN passes Human Right to Water and
Sanitation resolution” CUPE (29 July 2010), online: CUPE <http://cupe.ca/humanrights/un-passes-historic-human-water>.
Center for Columbia River History. ”Columbia River”, online: Center for Columbia
River History [http://www.ccrh.org/river/history.htm#indigenous].
Central Tibetan Administration. Tibet under Communist China: 50 Years (2001), online:
<http://tibet.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/TibetUnderCommunistChine50Years.pdf>.
Cheyfitz, Eric. “What is a Just Society? Native American Philosophies and the Limits of
Capitalism’s Imagination: A Brief Manifesto” in Eric Cheyfitz, N. Bruce Duthu, &
Shari M. Huhndorf, eds (Spring 2011) 110:2 S Atl Quart (Special Issue: Sovereignty,
Indigeneity, and the Law) 291.
Christie, Gordon. “A Colonial Reading of Recent Jurisprudence: Sparrow, Delgamuukw
and Haida Nation” (2005) 23 Windsor YB Access Just 17.
Clark, Regina M. “China’s Unlawful Control Over Tibet: The Tibetan People’s
Entitlement to Self-Determination” in (2001-2002) 12 Ind Int’l & Comp L Rev 293.
Cohen, Alice, Malkinson, Leah & Archer, Jennifer. “The Columbia River Treaty: A
Look at Evolving Rights & Interests in the Negotiation of a Transboundary River
Treaty” (2005) [unpublished paper, UBC Faculty of Law].
Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fisheries Commission. “Columbia River Treaty Tribes”,
online: CRITFC <http://www.critfc.org/text/tribes.html>.
---. “The Importance of Salmon to the Tribes”, online: Columbia River Inter-Tribal
Fisheries Commission <http://www.critfc.org/text/salmcult.html>.
Coordinator of Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon Basin (COICA). “Our
Organization” online: COICA
<http://www.coica.org.ec/ingles/organization/index.html>.

191

Corntassel, Jeff J & Primeau, Tomas Hopkins. “Indigenous ‘Sovereignty’ and
International Law: Revised Strategies for Pursuing Self-Determination” (1995) 17:2
Hum Rts Q as reprinted in (2006) 2 Hawaiian Journal of Law & Politics 53.
Dalai Lama. “Nobel Peace Prize 1989 The 14th Dalai Lama Acceptance Speech” (1989),
online: Nobel Prize, <http://nobelprize.org/peace/laureates/1989/lamaacceptance.html>.
Dasa, Shukavak N. “Non Harming: Ahimsa” A Hindu Primer (2007), online: Sanskrit
Religions Institute
<http://www.sanskrit.org/www/Hindu%20Primer/nonharming_ahimsa.html>.
Davidson, Heather C & Paisley, Richard K. “The Columbia River Basin: Issues &
Driving Forces within the Columbia River Basin with the Potential to Affect Future
Transboundary Water Management” (March 2009), online: Canadian Columbia River
Forum <http://www.ccrf.ca/assets/docs/pdf/issues-driving-forces-ccrf-final-march2009.pdf>.
Davis, Wade. “Dreams From Endangered Cultures” (Lecture presented to TED, February
2003), online: TED
<http://www.ted.com/talks/lang/eng/wade_davis_on_endangered_cultures.html>.
---. “The Wayfinders: Why Ancient Wisdom Matters to the Modern World” (Lecture
presented to Long Now Foundation, January 2010), online: For a TV Conference
Channel
<http://fora.tv/2010/01/13/Wade_Davis_Why_Ancient_Wisdom_Matters_in_the_Mo
dern_World>.
Dellapenna, Joseph W. “The Customary International Law of Transboundary Fresh
Waters” (2001) 1 Int'l J Global Envt'l Issues 264.
Deloria, Jr, Vine. “Self-Determination and the Concept of Sovereignty” in Roxanne
Dunbar Ortiz, ed, Economic Development in American Indian Reservations (New
Mexico: University of New Mexico, 1979) 22, reprinted in Robert Odawi Porter, ed,
Sovereignty, Colonialism and the Indigenous Nations: A Reader (Durham, North
Carolina: California Academic Press, 2005) 52.
Dixon, Rebecca Anne. “Global Water Sensitivity of Transboundary Rivers - Levels &
Leakages: The Nile and the Implications for Global Water” (2010) 6 Human Security,
online: Atlantic International Studies Organization <http://atlismta.org/onlinejournals/human-security/global-water-sensitivity-of-transboundary-rivers/>.
Dunbar Jr, Christopher. “Critical Race Theory and Indigenous Methodologies” in
Norman K. Denzin, Yvonna S Lincoln, & Linda Tuhiwai Smith, eds, Handbook of
Critical and Indigenous Methodologies (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications Ltd,
2008) 85.
192

Dutta, Arup Kumar. The Brahmaputra (India: National Book Trust, 2001).
Economist (The). “Unquenchable Thirst: A growing rivalry between India, Pakistan and
China over the region’s great rivers may be threatening South Asia’s peace” The
Economist (19 November 2011), online: The Economist
<http://www.economist.com/node/21538687>.
Ermine, Willie. “Aboriginal Epistemology” in Marie Ann Battiste & Jean Barman, eds,
First Nations Education in Canada: The Circle Unfolds (Vancouver: UBC Press,
1995) 101.
---. “The Ethical Space of Engagement” in (2007) 6 Indigenous LJ 193.
Fairbanks, Robert A. “Native American Sovereignty and Treaty Rights: Are They
Historical Illusions?” (1996) 20 Amer Ind L Rev 141, reprinted in Robert Odawi
Porter, ed, Sovereignty, Colonialism and the Indigenous Nations: A Reader (Durham,
North Carolina: California Academic Press, 2005) 60.
Flavin, Christopher & Gardner, Gary. “China, India and the New World Order” in The
Worldwatch Institute, ed, State of the World 2006: Special Focus: China & India
(Washington, DC: World Watch Institute, 2006) 3.
Free Tibet. “United Nations Resolutions on Tibet”, online: Free Tibet
<http://www.freetibet.org/about/united-nations-tibet>.
Gabriel, Ellen (Speaker). “Joint Statement of Grand Council of the Crees (Eeyou
Istchee); Inuit Circumpolar Council; Assembly of First Nations: International
Alliance of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of Tropical Forests/Alianza Internacional
de los Pueblos Indígenas y Tribales de los Bosques Tropicales; International Indian
Treaty Council (IITC); Na Koa Ikaika KaLahui Hawaii; First Nations Summit; Union
of British Columbia Indian Chiefs; Network of the Indigenous Peoples-Solomons
(NIPS); Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations; Treaty 4 Chiefs; Innu Council of
Nitassinan; Kus Kura S.C.; Haudenosaunee of Kanehsatà:ke; Kakisiwew Treaty
Council; Ochapowace Cree First Nation; Cowessess Cree First Nation; First Peoples
Human Rights Coalition; Canadian Friends Service Committee (Quakers); Center for
World Indigenous Studies; KAIROS: Canadian Ecumenical Justice Initiatives”
(Statement presented to the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
Fourth session, Geneva 11-15 July 2011) [unpublished], online: Canadian Friends
Service Committee < http://quakerservice.ca/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/ExpertMECHANISM-Study-re-IPs-Rt-to-Participate-ORAL-Statement-GCC-et-al-July-1211.pdf>.
Gage, Andrew with Banks, Nigel. “Submissions by West Coast Environmental Law to
the International Joint Commission: In regard to the application of the Canadian
Columbia Inter-Tribal Fisheries Commission Concerning the Grand Coulee Dam”
193

(Vancouver: West Coast Environmental Law, October 2005), online,
<http://www.wcel.org/resources/publication/submissions-west-coast-environmentallaw-international-joint-commission-regard>.
Gayton, Don. “Ghost River: The Columbia” (2001) 1:2 BC Journal of Ecosystems and
Management 1.
Getches, David H. “Indigenous Peoples’ Rights to Water Under International Norms”
(2005) 16 Colo J Int’l Envtl L & Pol’y 259.
GEF Global Transboundary International Waters Research Initiative, “Good Practices
and Portfolio Learning in GEF Transboundary and Marine Legal and Institutional
Frameworks” online: IW Learn <http://governance-iwlearn.org/¨>.
Gilani, Iftikhar. “China’s move to divert Tibetan rivers upsets India’s plan” The Daily
Times (43 November 2003), online: The Daily Times
<http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_3-11-2003_pg7_11>.
Gleeson-White, Jane. “Extreme weather and Mother Earth: nature gets legal rights in
Bolivia” Overland (17 June 2011), online: Overland
<http://overland.org.au/2011/06/extreme-weather-and-mother-earth-nature-gets-legalrights-in-bolivia/>.
Global Security “Indian-China Border Dispute”, online Global Security
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/india-china_conflicts.htm>.
Global Water Partnership. “What is IWRM?” online: Global Water Partnership
<http://www.gwp.org/en/The-Challenge/What-is-IWRM/>.
---. Strategy 2009-2013 (2009), online: Global Water Partnership
<http://www.gwp.org/Global/About%20GWP/Strategic%20documents/GWP_Strateg
y_2009-2013_final.pdf >
Gourd, Charles A. “Making a Name for Ourselves: The United Nations Draft Statement
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” (1999) 7 Tulsa J of Comp and Int’l L 121,
reprinted in Robert Odawi Porter, ed, Sovereignty, Colonialism and the Indigenous
Nations: A Reader (Durham, North Carolina: California Academic Press, 2005) 705.
Groenfeldt, David. “Water Development and Spiritual Values in Western and Indigenous
Societies” in R Boelens, M Chiba & D Nakashima, eds, Water and Indigenous
Peoples (Paris: UNESCO, 2006) 108, online: UNESCO
<http://portal.unesco.org/science/en/ev.phpURL_ID=4901&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html>.
---. “Viewpoint – The Next Nexus? Environmental Ethics, Water Policies and Climate
Change” in (2010) 3(3) Water Alternatives 575, online: Water Alternatives
194

<http://www.wateralternatives.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=11>.
Green Cross International. National Sovereignty and International Watercourses (The
Hague: Ruckstahl SA, 2000).
Grzybowski, Alex, McCaffrey, Stephen C & Paisley, Richard K. “Beyond International
Water Law: Successfully Negotiating Mutual Gains Agreements for International
Watercourses” (2010) 22 Global Bus & Dev’t LJ 139.
Hammer, Leonard. “Indigenous People as a Catalyst for Applying the Human Right to
Water” (2004) 10 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 131.
Harden, Blaine. A River Lost: The Life and Death of the Columbia (New York: W.W.
Norton & Company, 1996).
Harjo, Suzan Shown. “In Defense of Native Sovereignty; Indian Advocacy in the
American Body Politic” (1998) 15:2 Native Americas reprinted in Robert Odawi
Porter, ed, Sovereignty, Colonialism and the Indigenous Nations: A Reader (Durham,
North Carolina: California Academic Press, 2005) 659.
Harris, Douglas C. Landing Native Fisheries: Indian Reserves Fishing Rights in British
Columbia 1849-1925 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008).
Hearns, Glen. “The Columbia River Treaty: A Synopsis of Structure, Content, and
Operations” (Prepared for the Canadian Columbia River Forum, September 2008),
online: Canadian Columbia River Forum
<http://www.ccrf.ca/assets/docs/pdf/columbia-river-treaty-synopsis-ccrf-final-sept2008.pdf>.
Henderson, James (Sa’ke’j) Youngblood. Indigenous Diplomacy and the Rights of
Peoples: Achieving UN Recognition (Saskatoon, Canada: Purich Publishing Ltd,
2008).
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan (1651), excerpt reprinted in Elizabeth Knowles, ed, The
Oxford Dictionary of Quotations (5th ed) (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1999)
378.
Holslag, Jonathan. “Assessing the Sino-Indian Water Dispute” (2011) 64:2 Journal of
International Affairs 19.
Horse, Billy Evans & Lassiter, Luke E. “A Tribal Chair’s Perspective on Inherent
Sovereignty” (1997) 10 St Thomas L Rev 79, reprinted in Robert Odawi Porter, ed,
Sovereignty, Colonialism and the Indigenous Nations: A Reader (Durham, North
Carolina: California Academic Press, 2005) 30.

195

Hossain, ANH Akhtar. People’s Initiative for Transboundary River Basin Management
(Paper presented to the International Conference on Regional Cooperation on
Transboundary Rivers: Impact of the Indian River linking Project, Dhaka, 2004).
Hume, Mark. “BC Natives Want Salmon Back in Columbia River: Editorial” The Globe
and Mail (2 November 2005).
Hussain, M. “Society in the Brahmaputra Valley” in Vijay P Singh, et al, eds, The
Brahmaputra Basin Water Resources (London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004)
336.
Indraguptha, Gihan. “Water as a Human Right: International Dimension” (2011)
[unpublished, archived at University of British Columbia Lui Institute of Global
Studies].
International Joint Commission. “International Watersheds Initiative: Mandate”, online:
International Joint Commission
<http://www.ijc.org/conseil_board/watershed/en/watershed_mandate_mandat.htm>.
---. International Watersheds Initiatives: Implementing a New Paradigm for
Transboundary Basins - Third Report to Governments on the International
Watersheds Initiative (Canada & United States: International Joint Commission,
2009), online: International Joint Commission
<http://www.ijc.org/php/publications/pdf/ID1627.pdf>.
---. “Response from the IJC to Mr. Fred Fortier on the request from CCRIFC” (31
October 2006), online: International Joint Commission
<http://www.ijc.org/en/activities/main_princ.htm#coulee>.
International Water Law Project. “Status of the Watercourse Convention as of 1 August
2011”, online: International Water Law Project
<http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/intldocs/watercourse_status.html>
.
Jones, Alison with Jenkins, Kuni. “Rethinking Collaboration: Working the IndigeneColonizer Hyphen” in Handbook of Critical and Indigenous Methodologies, Norman
K Denzin, Yvonna S Lincoln and Linda Tuhiwai Smith (eds) (Sage Publications:
London, 2008) 471-486.
Kanping, Hu & Xiaogang, Yu. “Bridge Over Troubled Waters: the Role of the News
Media in Promoting Public Participation in River Basin Management and
Environmental Protection in China” in Jennifer L Turner & Kenji Otsuka, eds,
Promoting Sustainable River Basin Governance: Crafting Japan-US Water
Partnerships in China (Chiba, Japan: Institute of Developing Economics: 2005) 125.

196

Karkkainen, Bradley C. “Transboundary ecosystem governance: Beyond sovereignty?”
in Carl Bruch et al, eds, Public Participation in the Governance of International
Freshwater Resources (New York: United Nations University Press, 2005).
King III, Frank John. “The Myths Surrounding the Term ‘Sovereign’” Indian Country
Today (19 January 2000) A5, reprinted in Robert Odawi Porter, ed, Sovereignty,
Colonialism and the Indigenous Nations: A Reader (Durham, North Carolina:
California Academic Press, 2005) 58-59.
Ktunaxa Nation. “Ktunaxa History Timeline”, online: Ktunaxa
<http://www.ktunaxa.org/who/timeline.html>.
Lesser, Jonathan A. “Resale of the Columbia River Treat Downstream Power Benefits:
One Road From Here to There” (1990) 30 Nat Resources J 610.
Lillooet Tribal Council, ed. “Memorial: To Sir Wilfred Laurier, Premier of the Dominion
of Canada From the Chiefs of the Shuswap, Okanagan and Couteau Tribes of British
Columbia” V: VIII The St’át’imc Runner (T’ak I sts’úqwas’a/August 2010) 19.
---. “Declaration of the Tahtlan Tribe October 18, 1910” V:X The St’át’imc Runner
(Lhwál’tsten/October 2010) 24.
Lil’wat Nation, Mount Currie Band Council. “Introduction and Application for
Membership into the International League of United Nations (Fourth World
Documentation Project, 1997)” in Robert Odawi Porter, ed, Sovereignty, Colonialism
and the Indigenous Nations: A Reader (Durham, North Carolina: California
Academic Press, 2005) 677.
Liu, Jie et al. “Water Ethics and Water Resource Management” an Ethics and Climate
Change in Asia and the Pacific (ECCAP) Project, Working Group 14 Report
(Bangkok: UNESCO, 2011).
Lutz, Ellen. “The Right to Water” in (Sept/Oct 2006) 40:5 Canadian Dimension 43.
Macklem, Patrick. “Indigenous Recognition in International Law: Theoretical
Observations” (2008-2009) 30 Mich J of Int’l L 177.
McCaffrey, Stephen C. “A Human Right to Water: Domestic and International
Implications” (1992) 5 Geo Int’l Env L R 1.
---. “Introduction: Politics and Sovereignty over Transboundary Groundwater” (Paper
presented to Proceedings of the Annual Meeting American Society of International
Law Panel Discussion entitled “If Water Respects No Political Boundaries, Does
Politics Respect Transboundary Waters?” (2008) 102 American Society of Int’l L
Proc. 353, online: JSTOR <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25660314>.

197

---. The Law of International Watercourses, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2007).
McCue, June. “New Modalities of Sovereignty: An Indigenous Perspective” (2007) 2
Intercultural Human Rights L. Rev 19.
McIntyre, Owen. Environmental Protection of International Watercourses under
International Law (Great Britain: MPG Books Ltd, 2007).
Mezey, Naomi. “The Distribution of Wealth, Sovereignty, and Culture through Indian
Gaming” (1996) 48 Stan L Rev 711, reprinted in Robert Odawi Porter, ed,
Sovereignty, Colonialism and the Indigenous Nations: A Reader (Durham, North
Carolina: California Academic Press, 2005) 414.
Mills, Charles W. The Racial Contract, 2nd ed (London: Cornell University Press, 1997).
Mitterand, Danielle. “Tibet Set to Become Next Flashpoint” TibetNet (14 June 2004),
online: Students for a Free Tibet
<www.studentsforafreetibet.org/article.php?id=271>.
Mobile, AD. “Brahmaputra: Issues in Development” ” in Asit K Biswas & Juha I Uitto,
eds, Sustainable development of the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Basins (New
York: United Nations University Press, 2001).
Mock, Gregory. “Transboundary Environmental Governance: The Ebb and Flow of River
Basin Organizations” (2003), online: EarthTrends
<http://earthtrends.wri.org/text/environmental-governance/feature-46.html>.
Mohawk, John. “On Sovereignty” (1995) 1:3/4 Akwesasne Notes, reprinted in Robert
Odawi Porter, ed, Sovereignty, Colonialism and the Indigenous Nations: A Reader
(North Carolina: California Academic Press, 2005) 137.
Mutua, Makau W. “Critical Race Theory and International Law: The View of an InsiderOutsider” (2000) 45 Vill L Rev 841, online: Social Science Research Network
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1525526>.
Nakayama, Mikiyasu. “China as Basin Country of International Rivers” in Jennifer L
Turner & Kenji Otsuka, eds, Promoting Sustainable River Basin Governance:
Crafting Japan-US Water Partnerships in China (Chiba, Japan: Institute of
Developing Economics: 2005) 6, online: Institute of Developing Economics,
<http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Spot/28.html>.
Nelson, Dean. “Dalai Lama attacks China's claim of sovereignty over India's Arunachal
Pradesh” The Telegraph (09 Nov 2009), online: The Telegraph
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/6531093/Dalai-Lamaattacks-Chinas-claim-of-sovereignty-over-Indias-Arunachal-Pradesh.html>.
198

Nuxalk Nation. “Statement before the United Nations Working Group in Indigenous
Populations, July 31, 1984” (Fourth World Documentation Project, 1997), reprinted
in Robert Odawi Porter ed, Sovereignty, Colonialism and the Indigenous Nations: A
Reader (Durham, North Carolina: California Academic Press, 2005) 679.
.
North East Peoples Alliance. “Memorandum to India and China Against Dams on
Yarlung Tsangpo”, 17 September 2010, online: North East Peoples Alliance,
<http://nealliance.net/nepa/memorandum-to-india-and-china-against-dams-onyarlung-tsangpo/>.
Northwest Power Planning and Conservation Council. “Map of the Columbia River
Basin”, online: Northwest Power Planning and Conservation Council
[http://www.nwcouncil.org/library/2004/2004-16/map.htm].
---. The Northwest Power and Conservation Council’s Directory of Columbia River
Basin Tribes (2007-5), online Northwest Power Planning and Conservation Council
at: http://www.nwcouncil.org/library/2007/2007-5.htm> [Directory].
---. “Regional Power System”, online: Northwest Power Planning and Conservation
Council <http://www.nwcouncil.org/library/2004/2004-16/power.htm>.
Ojha, CSP & Singh, VP. “Introduction” in Vijay P Singh, Nayan Sharma & C Shekhar P
Ojha, eds, The Brahmaputra Basin Water Resources (London: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 2004).
Oneida Indian Nation of New York. “Sovereignty Statement”, online: Oneida Indian
Nation <http://oneida-nation.net/sovdoc.html>, reprinted in Robert Odawi Porter ed,
Sovereignty, Colonialism and the Indigenous Nations: A Reader (Durham, North
Carolina: California Academic Press, 2005) 27.
Ortolano, L, Cushing, K & Contributing Authors. Grand Coulee Dam and the Columbia
Basin Project (Case study report prepared as an input to the World Commission on
Dams, Cape Town, 2000), online: International Research Center on Environment and
Development (CIRED), <http://www.centrecired.fr/IMG/pdf/F9_GranCouleeDam.pdf>.
Osborne, Milton. River at Risk: The Mekong and the Water Politics of China and
Southeast Asia (New South Wales: Lowy Institutes for International Policy, 2004).
Paisley, Richard. “Adversaries into Partners: International Water Law and the Equitable
Sharing of Downstream Partners” (2002) 3 Melbourne J of Int’l L 280.
Paisley, R & Hearns, G. “Some Observations from Recent Experiences with the
Governance of International Drainage Basins” in AC Corréa and Gabriel Eckstein,
eds, Precious, Worthless or Immeasurable: the Value and Ethics of Water, (Lubbock,
199

Texas: Texas Tech University, 2006) online: Governance-IWLearn
<http://governance-iwlearn.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Texas-Tech.pdf> 1.
Parlett, Kate. The Individual in the International Legal System: Continuity and Change in
International Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
Parmar, Pooja. Revisiting the Human Right to Water (LLM Thesis: University of British
Columbia, Faculty of Law, 2006) [unpublished].
Pohlner, Huw. “Chinese dam diplomacy: Leadership and geopolitics in continental Asia”
in EastAsia Forum (19 August 2010), online: East Asia Forum <
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/08/19/chinese-dam-diplomacy-leadership-andgeopolitics-in-continental-asia/>.
Porter, Robert B. “A Proposal to the Hanodaganyas to Decolonize Federal Indian Control
Law” (1998) 31 University of Mich J of L Ref 899, reprinted in Robert Odawi Porter
ed, Sovereignty, Colonialism and the Indigenous Nations: A Reader (Durham, North
Carolina: California Academic Press, 2005) 731.
---. “Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through Peacemaking: How the Anglo-American
Legal Tradition Destroys Indigenous Societies” (1997) 28 Colum Hum Rts L Rev
235, reprinted in Robert Odawi Porter, ed, Sovereignty, Colonialism and the
Indigenous Nations: A Reader (Durham, North Carolina: California Academic Press,
2005) 557.
---. “Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty through Government Reform: What Are the
Issues?” (Winter 1997) 7 Kan J L & Pub Pol’y 72, reprinted in Robert Odawi Porter,
ed, Sovereignty, Colonialism and the Indigenous Nations: A Reader (Durham, North
Carolina: California Academic Press, 2005) 55 & 518.
Porter, Robert Odawi. ed, Sovereignty, Colonialism and the Indigenous Nations: A
Reader (Durham, North Carolina: California Academic Press, 2005).
Postel, Sandra. “The Missing Piece: A Water Ethic” in Peter G Brown and Jeremy J
Schmidt, eds, Water Ethics: Foundational Readings for Students and Professionals
(Island Press: Washington, D.C., 2010) 221.
Pradhan, Rajendra, Meinzen-Dick, & Suseela, Ruth. “Which Rights are Right? Water
Rights, Culture, and Underlying Values” in Peter G Brown & Jeremy J Schmidt, eds,
Water Ethics: Foundational Readings for Students and Professionals (Washington,
DC: Island Press, 2010) 39.
Regan, Paulette. Unsettling the Settler Within (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010).
Revenga, Carmen et al. Watersheds of the World: Ecological Value and Vulnerability
(Washington, DC: World Resources Institute & Worldwatch Institute: 1998).
200

Richardson, Benjamin J. “Indigenous Peoples, International Law and Sustainability”
(2001) 10 RECIEL 1.
---. “The Ties that Bind: Indigenous Peoples and Environmental Governance” in
Benjamin J Richardson, Shin Imai & Kent McNeil, eds, Indigenous Peoples and the
Law: Comparative and Critical Perspectives, (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2009) 337.
Richardson, Benjamin J, Imai, Shin & McNeil, Kent. “Indigenous Peoples and the Law –
Historical, Comparative and Contextual Issues” in Indigenous Peoples and the Law:
Comparative and Critical Perspectives, Benjamin J Richardson, Shin Imai and Kent
McNeil, eds (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2009) 3.
Rifkin, Jeremy. The Empathic Civilization: The Race to Global Consciousness in a World
in Crisis (New York: Penguin Group, 2009).
Sarma, JN. “An Overview of the Brahmaputra River System” in Vijay P Singh, Nayan
Sharma & C Shekhar P Ojha, eds, The Brahmaputra Basin Water Resources
(London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004) 72.
Saskatchewan Watershed Authority. “Celebrating and Conserving Water”, online:
Saskatchewan Watershed Authority
<http://www.swa.ca/WaterConservation/default.asp?type=CelebratingWater>
Shelton, Dinah. “Water Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities” (Paper
presented to the University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland Conference "Freshwater
and International Law: the Multiple Challenges" 7-9 July 2011, June 2011)
[unpublished].
Sievers, Eric W. “Transboundary Jurisdiction and Watercourse Law: China, Kazakhstan
and the Irtysh” (2002) 37 Tex Int’l L J 1.
Sinixt Nation “Keeping the Lakes Way”, online: Sinixt Nation
<http://sinixt.kics.bc.ca/history.html>.
Sinvhal Amita & Prakash, Vipul. “Seismo-Tectonics and Earthquake Design Parameters”
in Vijay P Singh, Nayan Sharma & C Shekhar P. Ojha, eds, The Brahmaputra Basin
Water Resources (London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004) 578.
Smith, Linda Tuhiwai. Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples
(New Zealand: University of Otago Press, 2002).
Stoeckel, Katherine Jane. Economics and the Equitable Utilization of Transboundary
Freshwater (LLM Thesis, University of British Columbia, Faculty of Law, 2004,
[unpublished].

201

Swainson, Neil. “The Columbia River Treaty – Where Do We Go From Here” (1986) 26
Nat Resources J 252.
Talukdar, BK. “Ecology” in Vijay P Singh, Nayan Sharma & C Shekhar P Ojha, eds,
The Brahmaputra Basin Water Resources (London: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
2004) 351.
Tarcena, Connie. “Implementing the Declaration: A State Representative Perspective” in
Jackie Hartley, Paul Joffe, and Jennifer Preston, eds, Realizing the UN Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Triumph, Hope, and Action, (Saskatoon: Purich
Publishing Ltd., 2010) 60.
Thorson, Erica J. “Sharing Himalayan Glacial Meltwater: The Role of Territorial
Sovereignty” (2009) 19 Duke J Comp & Int’l L 487, online: Duke University School
of Law
<http://www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl?19+Duke+J.+Comp.+&+Int'l+L.+487+pdf>.
Tsering, Tashi. China’s Water Politics: In Whose Interest?, (MA Thesis in Political
Science, Portland State University, 2005) [unpublished].
---. “Damming Tibet's Yarlung Tsangpo-Brahmaputra and other South Asian rivers”
Tibetan Plateau (24 May 2010), online: Tibetan Plateau Blogspot
<http://tibetanplateau.blogspot.com/2010/05/damming-tibets-yarlung-tsangpo.html>.
Turner, Jennifer L & Zhi, Lü. “Building a Green Civil Society in China” in The
Worldwatch Institute, ed, State of the World 2006: Special Focus: China & India
(Washington, D.C.: Worldwatch Institute, 2006) 3.
Umpleby, Sandra Lynne. Crossing Bridges: The Educational Leadership of First Nations
Women (Phd Thesis, Education, University of Victoria, 2007).
Upreti, BC. Politics of Himalayan River Waters: An Analysis of River Water Issues of
Nepal, India and Bangladesh (New Dehli: Nirala Publications, 1993).
Walkem, Ardith. Bringing Water to the Land, (LLM Thesis: UBC, 2005).
Watts, Jonathan. “Chinese engineers propose world's biggest hydro-electric project in
Tibet” The Guardian (24 May 2010), online: The Guardian
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/may/24/chinese-hydroengineerspropose-tibet-dam>.
Weiji, Zhongguo Shui. China’s Water Crisis trans by Nancy Yang Liu & Lawrence R.
Sullivan (Nowalk: EastBridge, 2004).
Wilson, JW. People in the Way: The Human Aspects of the Columbia River Project
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973).
202

Wolf, Aaron T. “Indigenous approaches to water conflict negotiations and implications
for international waters” (2000) 5 International Negotiation: A Journal of Theory and
Practice 2.
Wouters, Patricia & Tremblay, Hugo. Book Review of Freshwater Access from a
Human Rights Perspective by Knut Bourquain (2009) 10:2 Melbourne J Int’l L 705.
Wouters, Patricia et al. “The New Development of Water Law in China” (2004) 7 Univ
of Denver Water Law Rev 243.
Yahua, Wang. “River Governance Structure in China: A Study of Water Quantity/Quality
Management Regimes” in Jennifer L Turner and Kenji Otsuka (eds) Promoting
Sustainable River Basin Governance: Crafting Japan-US Water Partnerships in
China (Chiba, Japan: Institute of Developing Economics: 2005) 23.
Ying, Rong: “Remembering a War: The 1962 India-China Conflict”, Rediff (December
2002) online: Rediff < http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/dec/20chin.htm>.

203

Appendix
Appendix A: Indigenous Water Declarations & Recommendations
Declaration of the People’s World Water Movement (New Dehli, India, January 2004),
online: Indigenous Environment Network
<http://www.ienearth.org/docs/WaterDeclaration_WorldsWaterMovementNewDelhiI
ndiaJanuary2004IndigenousSection.pdf>
Garma International Indigenous Water Declaration (Australia, 2008) online: UN
University Traditional Knowledge Initiative
<http://www.unutki.org/downloads/File/Water/Garma%20International%20Indigeno
us%20Water%20Declaration_LMMar09.pdf>.
Indigenous Peoples Kyoto Water Declaration (3rd World Water Forum, Kyoto Japan)
2003, online UNESCO
<http://portal.unesco.org/science/en/files/3872/10917799361IP_Water_Declaration_E
nglish.doc/IP%2BWater%2BDeclaration%2BEnglish.doc>.
Protection of Water, Intervention to the Seventh Session of the United Nations
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues 2008 Submitted by the Seventh Generation
Fund for Indian Development Agenda Item 3: Special theme: Climate change, biocultural diversity and livelihoods: the stewardship role of Indigenous peoples and new
challenges, online: Indigenous Environment Network
<http://www.ienearth.org/docs/WaterPFII72008Item3InterventiononProtectionofWat
ersubmittedbySGF.html>.
Report of the Indigenous Peoples’ Presentation on the Topic of: “Spirituality and
Sustainability - Water, the Common Element”, Presented to the Council for a
Parliament of the World's Religions’ 2004 Goldin Institute for International
Partnership and Peace Annual Forum November 6-12, 2004, Taipei, Taiwan, online
at: Indigenous Environmental Network
<http://www.ienearth.org/docs/WaterTaiwanReport.html>.
TLATOKAN ATLAHUAK DECLARATION, Declaration of the Indigenous Peoples
Parallel Forum of the 4th World Water Forum, Mexico City, Mexico, March 17-18,
2006, online: <http://www.treff-raumespaciotime.com/en/articles/TLATOKANATLAHUAKDECLARATION.htm>.
Weledeh Declaration (Tu Cho International Indigenous Water Rights Conference,
Yellowknife) 21-23 June 2006, online: Kairos Canada
<http://www.kairoscanada.org/fileadmin/fe/files/PDF/EcoJustice/Water/Report_Tu_C
ho_water_conference_2007.pdf>.

204

WATER IS LIFE: PROTECT WATER NOW! Indigenous Declaration on Water, July 8th,
2001 Musqueam Territory, British Columbia, Canada, online: Blue Planet Project
<http://blueplanetproject.net/documents/Indigenous_Declaration.pdf>.
WATER IS LIFE: PROTECT WATER NOW! Indigenous Declaration on Water, Endorsed
at the 12th annual Indigenous Environmental Network Protecting Mother Earth
Conference, Penticton Indian Band Okanagan Nation Territories, British Columbia,
Canada, reprinted in “On the endorsement and adoption of the Indigenous
Declaration on Water From the Indigenous Environmental Network’s 12th Annual
Protecting Mother Earth Conference”, (2-5 August 2001), online: Indigenous
Environmental Network <
http://www.ienearth.org/docs/WaterandIndigenousPeoplesIndigenousEnvironmental
NetworkStatementOntheendorsementandadoptionoftheIndigenousDeclarationonWate
r.html>.

205

